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1. Introduction and research approach 
As a student of political science and international development there were common major 
themes and topics that captured my interest throughout the duration of my studies. Of these, the 
search for a postcolonial identity in developing states stood apart from the rest. The case of 
Pakistan, in particular, is of great interest to me. Since its birth in 1947, Pakistan’s search for a 
postcolonial identity has been confronted by numerous challenges such as the radicalization of 
Islam, the instability of domestic politics and the social structure of the nation.  
Working in such a broad thematic field makes it difficult to grasp an authentic and core-touching 
picture on the political situation in Pakistan. This presented me my biggest challenge as I 
endeavoured to find a topic that was innovative and operative in the sense of offering some 
enlightening information that would validate my research. 
Starting from this basis I decided to undertake a survey in Lahore, the capital of Punjab and 
second largest city in Pakistan, which would help me on the authentic and core-touching 
approach of my research. I prepared a questionnaire of twelve pages, outlining questions on 
Pakistani identity and political attitudes of students, as well as a draft of an interview outline that 
I wanted to analyze in view of the recent political events in Pakistan in order to understand their 
political opinion as they are an important part of the Pakistani civil society. 
Students are not only generally a very dynamic audience when it comes to analyzing public 
attitudes, but they have been a key figure throughout the entire revolutionary history of almost 
every postcolonial state as they are being caught in a sensitive field between an education system, 
which horizontally and vertically tears the country apart1, generational conflicts between a youth 
that is at the same time part of secularization and radicalization trends in the country, and their 
families as well as a group which is entangled within individual identity formation processes. 
                                                 
1 Tariq Rahman, the most famous linguist and distinguished professor in Pakistan states that there are two 
levels of inequality, one which works horizontally which favours or discriminates people according to their 
ethnic and linguistic differences, and the second one which works on a vertical basis which creates major 
divergences between students of the three education systems in Pakistan: the Urdu medium, the English 
medium and the madrassah system (“madrassahs” designate schools with a primarily religious syllabus). 
See therefore: Rahman, Tariq: Denizens of an Alien World: “A Study of Education, Inequality and 
Polarization in Pakistan”, Oxford University Press, Karachi: 2004, p. 20. 
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In the recent political events2 in the last couple of months, the rise of this part of an active civil 
society in the fight against authoritative actions of a government or rather a military regime and in 
the establishment of their position in the Pakistani society has certainly given them a new power 
inside the Pakistani society.  
Subsequently, my thesis will focus on the following two-part question: What are the different 
political identities of the Pakistani students in Lahore? And what is their role in and their attitude 
towards the recent political events in Pakistan? 
This is the question I will try to answer in my personal analysis of the political situation of the 
students in Pakistan in the following chapters. However, before doing so it is only appropriate to 
give a short introduction to the methodological approach of my research. 
1.1 Preview of literature and finding hypotheses 
Before being able to start preparing a questionnaire, I began with an intensive survey and analysis 
of literature on Pakistani history. Understanding the creation of the Pakistani state is a necessary 
precursor to understand the recent political situation in Pakistan. History plays an essential role in 
the analysis of any political developments of the country. The importance of history, the creation 
of Pakistan, is a core motif that is deeply connected – directly or indirectly – with the personal 
identity of every Pakistani citizen. It is however difficult to start writing about a national identity 
as the term “national identity” itself is problematic because it understands “nation” as the central 
reference frame and tends to blind out other central – transnational as well as sub national – 
elements in the construction of both communities and subjectivities.3 Therefore the term 
“identity” as used here in my analysis is a term that refers to the common values and attitudes 
that are used as frame for the definition of an identity; “national identity” hence designates those 
values and attitudes that are retraceable in the identity construction of an individual but based on 
national discourses on identity. Pakistan, as a victim of sectarianism and separatist movements, 
nevertheless has common features or traits which are retraceable in the concept of a Pakistani 
citizen. The story of the creation of Pakistan is a story of an ideology that is deeply involved in a 
web of feelings like insecurity in regard of the Hindu-Muslim escalations on the British 
subcontinent, of Muslim pride – a strong Muslim history in Asia throughout the centuries - of 
                                                 
2 The recent political events which will be taken account of in this paper are: the Lal Masjid operation of 
the government against the rise of the Islamists in the country in July 2007, the impeachment of the chief 
justice of the Supreme Court Iftikhar Chaudry in March 2007 by president General Pervez Musharraf and 
the imposition of a state of emergency in Pakistan in November 2007. 
3 Kaelble et al. (Ed.): “Transnationale Öffentlichkeiten und Identitäten im 20. Jahrhundert“, Campus, 
Frankfurt/Main:2002, p.7-33. 
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independence and national autonomy in view of the British colonialism and specifically a strong 
inherent fear of the “other”, particularly being expressed through a great feeling of distrust and 
suspiciousness. These feelings were bunched together in an ideology which would be the basis 
for the creation of Pakistan: the two-nation theory generated by the “Guide”4 of the Pakistani people 
(also known under the Urdu equivalent: Quaid-e-Azam), Muhammad Ali Jinnah. The two-nation 
theory does not only justify the creation of Pakistan, but it has become a leading motif in the 
establishment of a Pakistani nationhood: 
Javid Iqbal, Pakistani scholar and author of the book “Ideology of Pakistan”, confirms that: 
Pakistan claims that it is an ideological State and therefore, it can survive as long 
as its ideological integrity is maintained. The Ideology is based on the two-nation 
theory which raised the edifice of our nationhood. Therefore it is the source and 
expression of our political, economic, cultural and religious and moral values.5 
According to Iqbal, the ideology of a nation “reflects the state of a people’s minds, their 
emotions, hopes, aspirations, ideal or objectives and a subsisting will to realise them”. 6 The 
fusion of political aspirations, with personal feelings, has created a very difficult and sensitive 
field of research. On the one hand it demands a detailed knowledge on the history of Pakistan 
and on the other hand a sensitive approach towards Pakistani culture and Islamic religion. This 
implicated for me especially two main thematic fields: First, a deeper look on the discourse on 
Pakistani history as well as attitudes and identities developed by its citizens, especially among 
students within this process, and second a constellation analysis of the most important political 
actors and elements resulting in a radicalization of Pakistani society along with a militarization of 
Pakistani politics. For the initial stage of my research, I could only rely on literature about 
Pakistan, to derive my initial hypotheses, which would then be the basis for the designing of a 
questionnaire and a draft of an interview outline, to identify in a second step the most important 
units of analysis within my research context. The third major part represents the localization of 
these identities and attitudes found within my field research in order to embed them in a 
framework of the current7 political, social and religious situation in Pakistan. This is followed by a 
deeper analysis of the political situation in Pakistan by picking out one major problem field in 
Pakistan – corruption within the state apparatus and within the army. This problem field needs to 
                                                 
4 The Pakistani people lovingly call him “Quaid-e-azam” which means “The Guide of the Pakistani 
People” in Urdu, official language of Pakistan. 
5 Iqbal, Javed: “Ideology of Pakistan”, Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore: 2005, p. 8. 
6 Ibd., p. 11. 
7 The term “current” refers to the three major events in 2007: the chief justice affair in march 2007, the 
Lal Masjid Operation in July 2007 and the imposition of a state of emergency in November 2007, which 
will all be discussed in chapter four. 
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be taken serious and strategies to cope with the situation are needed in order to achieve 
development in the country. For this reason I have conducted an expert interview with Alexandra 
Souza Martins, expert on crime prevention working for the UNODC (United Nation’s Office on 
Drugs and Crime). The findings of this analysis as well as a detailled analysis of the political 
situation in Pakistan are all included in my fourth chapter.  
I will pursue by giving a short content-oriented introduction to my first step, which is the 
identification of the most important hypotheses within the discourse on Pakistani history. 
1.2 Historical discourse on Pakistan 
As mentioned before it is important to grasp the idea of how Pakistan came into existence to 
further analyze the creation of a so called national identity. Johann Galtung, renowned peace 
researcher once wrote: 
 
History is an inexhaustible reservoir that can be mined for the construction of 
identity, for meaning. (...) The question then becomes: looking backward, mining 
history for nuggets that can serve the purpose of identity construction, on what 
would a people focus on its quest?8. 
 
I have started my quest on Pakistani identity, therefore, by a detailed look at the literature on 
Pakistani history. But this highlights another difficulty, a sensitive approach towards the discourse 
on Pakistani history.  
There are many scholars working on this issue analyzing the history of this country with different 
analytical perspectives: one finds many foreign scholars working on this region, such as Ian 
Talbot, a well known British historian working on the history of India and Pakistan, in addition 
to political scientists such as Christophe Jaffrelot, a French scholar focussing on nationalism in 
India and Pakistan, as well as Stephen P. Cohen, an American political scientist concentrating on 
matters of security in India and Pakistan. But next to a historic-genetic and political-analytical 
approach it is ultimately important to include a psychological account in the research on the 
creation of Pakistan and the historical and political aftermath, which I found well documented in 
the works of Sudhir Kakar, an Indian psychoanalyst, who focuses on the phenomenon of 
communal violence in South Asia, and in the works of Ashis Nandy, a political psychologist 
                                                 
8 Galtung, Johann: “The Construction of National Identities for the Cosmic Drama: Choseness-Myths-
Trauma (CMT) Syndromes and Cultural Pathologies”, in: S.P. Udayakumar (Ed.): “Handcuffed to History: 
Narratives, Pathologies, and Violence in South Asia”, Greenwood Press, Westport/Conn [et.al.]: 2001, pp. 
61-77, here p. 60. 
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working in the field of post-colonial studies and Djallal Heuzé, French sociologist working on 
communal violence in South Asia. 
These were the authors that shaped my theoretical knowledge on Pakistan and at the same time 
offered me the foundations upon which to develop my own hypotheses to continue my research. 
In the following I will present the main hypotheses concerning the political and historical 
dimension and the psychological dimension of the historical discourse on Pakistan. 
1.2.1 The dimension of the politics of history 
Politics is almost always legitimized with historical references, as well as the interpretation of 
history is always politically biased. Based on this general diagnosis, politics of history can be 
defined as “any social agency that is essentially based on historical references and/or tries to 
intervene in the interpretation of history”9. In this regard, it is important to analyze the historical 
developments from a political perspective. 
Pakistan was founded on the 14 August 1947 as a consequence of the end of the British empire 
in South Asia. The creation of Pakistan was a result of intensive Muslim lobbying, demanding a 
nation state for the Muslim population on the Indian subcontinent. The intensive nature of the 
movement for a separate nation state was due to a strong wave of communal violence between 
the Hindu and Muslim communities in India under British colonial rule. The leader of the All 
India Muslim League (AIML), the strongest political organization of the Muslims in India, 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah – founding father of Pakistan – was the most active Muslim politician 
demanding the creation of a Muslim nation state. Jinnah argued, in his two nation theory, that 
coexistence between Muslims and Hindus living in one nation was impossible, as these two 
religious communities are two “distinct social orders”10, two civilizations which thus cannot live 
together as one nation. Based on this ideology, the new Muslim nation state, Pakistan, came into 
existence and fought for its international autonomy and independence, especially concerning its 
new neighbour and enemy state11 India. This demanded a new political, cultural and religious 
orientation of these new Pakistanis, which was strongly based on Islam. As these Muslims were 
coming from all over India with different ethnic, regional and linguistic backgrounds, Islam was 
the only common factor that would create a bond between these new Pakistanis, or as Iqbal 
                                                 
9 Molden, Berthold: “Mnemohegemonics. Geschichtspolitik und Erinnerungskultur im Ringen um 
Hegemonie“, in: Molden, Berthold/Mayer, David (Ed.): “Vielstimmige Vergangenheiten. 
Geschichtspolitik in Lateinamerika”, LIT, Vienna: 2009 , pp. 31-56, here p. 45. 
10 Jinnah quoted in Azam, Ikram: “Pakistan’s Political Culture“, Polymer Publications, Lahore, 1992, p. 16. 
11 India is due to the difficult and even dangerous Indo-Pakistani relations within the past 50 years often 
referred to as an enemy state in the context of Indo-Pakistani political relations.See Jaffrelot, Christophe: 
“Le Pakistan”, Fayard, Paris: 2000, p. 11. 
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emphasizes, a “consciousness among the people of belonging to each other because a large 
majority of them adheres to a common spiritual aspiration, i.e. faith in Islam.”12. 
Thus Muhammad Ali Jinnah proclaimed in one of his public speeches in Dacca on 21 March 
1948: 
Islam has taught us this and, I think, you will agree with me, for whatever else you 
may be and whatever you are, you are a Muslim. You belong to a nation now: You 
have carved out a territory, it is all yours; it does not belong to a Punjabi, or a 
Sindhi, or a Pathan, or a Bengali; it is all yours.13 
 
But as much as the importance of Islam has been stressed in the view of the construction of a 
national identity in Pakistan after 1947, as important was also the fact of building a modern state 
based on Islamic as well as democratic principles. Pakistan can be seen as an ideological state14 
but not as a theocratic state, because “Islam is essentially a polity and aspires to create a civil 
society”15. 
The vision of Pakistan as proclaimed and propagated by its ideological leader, Jinnah, is one that 
envisions Pakistan as a free country, a country which is based on one religion but exerts no 
political pressure on people belonging to other religious communities: 
You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your 
mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may 
belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business 
of the State (...) We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all 
citizens and equal citizens of one State (...) Now, I think we should keep that in 
front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would 
cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious 
sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political 
sense of the State.16 
 
Islam is a major factor for the creation of Pakistan, and it surely is a source of orientation for this 
state, in every sense, in the religious, political and social sense, but when it comes to the political 
structure of the state, Pakistan is based on democratic principles combining Islamic elements of a 
                                                 
12 see Iqbal (2005): 12.  
13 Punjabi, Sindhi, Pathan and Bengalis are/were the different Pakistani ethnic tribes at that time. Apart 
from the Bengalis the rest are still considered as Pakistani ethnic tribes. See Iqbal (2005): 12. 
14 Ibd., p. 11. 
15 Ibd., p. 15. 
16 M.A.Jinnah, presidential address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan at Karachi, 11.August 1947; 
See in: Ziadi, Z. H. (Ed.): “Quaid-I-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Papers. Pakistan at last 26 July – 14 
August 1947”, First Series, Volume IV, Quaid-i-Azam Papers Project, Cabinet Division, Government of 
Pakistan, Islamabad: 1999, p. 537f. 
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state structure. The constitution of the state of Pakistan stresses this dual importance of Islam as 
orientation of social and religious life and also its share in the democratic structure organization 
of the state and its constitution: 
 
Whereas sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Almighty Allah alone, 
and the authority to be exercised by the people of Pakistan within the limits 
prescribed by Him is a sacred trust (…) Wherein the principles of democracy, 
freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam, shall be 
fully observed (…) Wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in 
the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and 
requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah (…) Now, 
therefore, we, the people of Pakistan (...) Do hereby, through our representatives 
in the National Assembly, adopt, enact and give to ourselves, this Constitution.17 
 
Political scientist Ikram Azam, confirms this dual dilemma by stating that it was in the end the 
“democratic ideals and aspirations which have unified the nation’s people and regions and kept it 
integrated and one”18. The importance and role of Islam in the historical nation-building process 
and its continued presence are greatly debated19 in the actual political decision-making process, as 
the British historian, Ian Talbot, highlights: 
 
The freedom struggle had left unresolved the question of whether Pakistan should 
be run on secular or Islamic lines. Indeed, the debate about Islam’s role in 
Pakistan’s public life still rages on over half a century since independence.20 
 
Thus my first derived hypothesis concerns the situation of Islam in Pakistan. On the one hand, it 
is clear that Islam is one major, if not the sole, common ground of these Indian Muslims coming 
to Pakistan or becoming Pakistanis after Partition 1947. Therefore Islam became the only source 
for the construction of a national identity. Hence, my first hypothesis concerns the ideological 
nation- and identity-building process of Pakistan: 
 
1. Pakistani identity is strongly based on Islamic values which becomes the outline of Pakistani lifestyle and 
policy. 
 
Islam was supposed to bunch together these new “Indian Muslim refugees” who were all coming 
to this newly created country Pakistan, with no regard to their ethnic and linguistic background.  
                                                 
17 The constitution of Pakistan:  http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/preamble.html, 
12.07.2008. 
18 Azam (1992): 115. 
19 Pakistan had in the course of its political history various leaders with very different stand on Islam, 
ranging from more liberal and secular leaders to more authoritative and orthodox–conservative leaders. 
20 Talbot, Ian: “Inventing the Nation. India and Pakistan”, Arnold, London: 2000, p.197. 
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Christophe Jaffrelot, a well known French scholar who focuses on the question of nationalism in 
South Asia with particular interest to India and Pakistan, confirms my second hypothesis in the 
regard of the use of Islam in the hands of politicians as a means of national mobilization: 
 
Jinnah and most of his lieutenants aren’t religious but use Islam as a method of 
national mobilization, playing with emotional power to put Muslims in the street 
feel down. (…) Islam, therefore, is becoming a lingua franca, and creating a division 
between the Muslim minorities and the (other) residents of Punjab.21 
 
This brings me towards my second hypothesis which is as follows : 
 
2. Pakistani identity is strongly based on Islam, which becomes the basis for Pakistani nationalism. 
These were my two main hypotheses concerning the political-religious ideological dimension on 
the discourse of the history of Pakistan. The ideological dimension is important to understand, as 
it touches the core of the nation-building process in Pakistan and thus gives the valid approach 
for the analysis on any kind of identity discussion concerning Pakistan. 
But the ideology that stands behind the creation of Pakistan is not the only sole element when it 
comes to understanding the history of the country. It is also important to look at the 
psychological dimension in this process, which helps to explain the emotional commitment and 
compassion that many Pakistanis today feel towards their own identity. 
1.2.2 The psychological dimension  
Several strong feelings underpin the creation of Pakistan. First, a feeling of insecurity due to 
Hindu-Muslim communal violence in India, an inherent fear of the “other” resulting from the 
insecure situation among the communities, leading to a great feeling of mistrust and scepticism 
towards the “other”. Second, a feeling of humiliation and deprivation of freedom and 
independence, resulting from the long British colonial rule. Third, a great feeling of Muslim pride 
– especially considering the long Muslim history on the Indian subcontinent. 
It is extremely difficult to give an analytical account of this emotional situation in the context of 
Partition and the creation of Pakistan and especially of the political and social aftermath of it. 
                                                 
21 Original quotation: “Jinnah et la plupart de ses lieutenants ne sont pas religieux, mais utilisent l’islam à 
des fins de mobilisation nationaliste, jouant de son pouvoir émotionnel pour faire descendre les 
musulmans dans la rue. (...) L’islam devient alors une lingua franca permettant d’établir un front entre les 
musulmans « minoritaires » et ceux du Pendjab ” ; see Jaffrelot (2000): 27. Jaffrelot is referring in his last 
sentence to the ethnic and linguistic power divergences in Pakistani politics, the Punjabis being so far the 
most powerful ethnic and linguistic ethnic tribe in Pakistani politics. 
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This becomes only feasible by choosing one important unit of analysis, which is the Indo-
Pakistani relationship, that I turn to as my main parameter for measuring these emotions in this 
stage of my research. 
Ashis Nandy, Indian psychoanalyst, cites one interesting observation made by an Indian 
diplomat, with which I would like to start the discussion on this topic: 
Before the war the late Sisir Gupta, scholar and hard-eyed Indian diplomat, used 
to claim that the crisis of Pakistan’s identity was mirrored in the inability of 
Pakistani children to even draw the map of their country without drawing India.22 
 
Pakistan’s creation in 1947 involved immediate conflict-oriented implications with India, as many 
questions such as administrative matters of the two new countries, were not resolved under 
British rule. One of the unsettled issues concerned the princely states in India, which under 
British colonial rule had a quasi personal union agreement with the British crown which dealed 
with the distribution of power. The princely states were autonomous in internal affairs as long as 
they offered their loyalty to the British Crown in matters of foreign affairs and defence.23 The 
Independence Act of the British government, guaranteeing independence to India and Pakistan, 
demanded that the princes of each princely state take a decision before 15 August – 
Independence Day of India – which country, India or Pakistan, they would accede to.24 In most 
cases the princely states acceded according to their Hindu or Muslim majority to either Pakistan 
or India. With three princely states this was not the case: The Princes of Hyderabad, Junagahd 
and Kashmir did not decide until the 15 of August 1947. The princely states of Hyderabad and 
Junagahd, were subsequently annexed by India, due to their Hindu majorities, while Kashmir, 
with a Muslim majority eventually became the big issue between India and Pakistan. The Hindu 
Maharaja of Kashmir decided to join India, which led to huge protests among the Muslims in 
Kashmir, leading to the deployment of Pakistani armed forces to support the Kashmiri 
Muslims.25 This sparked the first Indo-Pakistani war that created long lasting negative 
resentments on both sides against the opponent. For the newly established and economically-
                                                 
22 see Nandy, Ashis:“Bonfire of Creeds. The Essential of Ashis Nandy”, Oxford University Press, New 
Delhi: 2004, p. 234. 
23 see Korbel, Josef: “Danger in Kashmir”, Oxford University Press, Karachi: 2005, p. 46. 
24 Ibd., p. 48. 
25 see Lamb, Alastair: “Kashmir. A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990”, Oxford University Press, Karachi: 1992, 
p. 121- 141. 
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weak state of Pakistan, the accession of Kashmir to India was part of an Indian policy “that 
would make sure that Pakistan would not survive at birth”26. 
Pakistan and India have already fought four wars against each other, always putting the whole 
international community in fright, as both of these countries are in possession of atomic 
weapons. These tensions between India and Pakistan, which since the first day of independence 
of these two countries are prominent, continue to shape the domestic and foreign policies of this 
region. This political situation influences the social perception of the people of these two 
countries, which can end up being biased or even worse hostile towards the other country. Many 
scholars such as Jean-Luc Racine, French political scientist, even go further in their analysis on 
the social consequences of the Indo-Pakistani relationship and talk about a so-called “India-
Syndrome” that reaches its peak in Pakistani patriotism, which is defined by a negation of 
everything that is Indian: “In Pakistan <patriotic> is often a synonym for <anti-Indian>”, writes 
Jaffrelot adopting the same logic.27 Jean-Luc Racine, French expert on South Asia, explains that 
the birth of Pakistan created a “culture of mistrust, which sets the tune of the mainstream 
perceptions about India”28. 
Thus my most important hypothesis for the analysis of Pakistani perceptions of the “other”, 
India in particular, is: 
3. Dominant Pakistani self-images are strongly defined by a negation of India. 
 
Ashis Nandy, working in the field of post-colonial studies, especially concerning the region South 
Asia, confirmed this idea by including a new interesting factor of analysis. According to him, the 
image of India that is present in Pakistan is a Pakistani product, independent from the political 
and social reality of India but which has still a considerable influence on the Pakistani psyche: 
 
Pakistan’s India, the image of India Pakistan lives with, is also mostly Pakistan’s 
own. It has almost nothing to do with what India is or might have been. It tells us 
what Pakistan is, feels it should be, or could have been.29 
 
                                                 
26 see Malik, Iftikhar H.: “Islam, Nationalism and the West. Issues of Identity in Pakistan”, St. Anthony’s 
College, Houndmills: 1999, p. 181. 
27 see Jaffrelot (2005): 141. 
28 See Racine, Jean-Luc “Pakistan and the ‘India Syndrome’: Between Kashmir and the Nuclear 
Predicament” in: Jaffrelot, Christophe (Ed.): “Pakistan. Nationalism without a Nation”, Zed Books, 
London: 2002, p. 195-225 p. 196. 
29 see Nandy: (2004): 240. 
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Jaffrelot comes to a similar conclusion by stating that a constant fear of India since Pakistan’s 
birth has been the consequence of creating a strong army in the country.30 
 
Thus my next hypothesis focuses on the consequences of this India-image in Pakistan, which I 
believe to create a feeling of insecurity in the country: 
 
4. The postulated “Indian danger” manifests itself in a general feeling of insecurity in the Pakistani society. 
 
Jaffrelot argues that the construction of the Pakistani state accompanies the development of a 
strong Pakistani army driven by a “security obsession”31 of Pakistan.32 Thus the process of 
constructing a national identity and furthering the process of nationalism is strongly 
interconnected with an inherent fear of India, which leads to my next hypothesis of analysis: 
 
5. The phenomenon of nationalism in Pakistan and the fear of India create a feeling of insecurity, which lead 
to a higher disposition for violence. 
Pakistani politics have tried to capitalize on feelings of insecurity by strengthening the army. This, 
however, has only led to greater political instability, as highlighted by the four military 
dictatorships since Pakistan’s existence. The population has been left to bear the brunt of 
arbitrary politics under Pakistani military leaders. The subsequent political environment has had 
two major effects: the rise of fundamentalism in Pakistan and the rise of the civil society – both 
strategies to cope with an unsatisfied situation within the country. 
Fundamentalist parties, such as the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)33, which today counts among the biggest 
Islamist parties in South Asia34, have gained considerable influence in Pakistan, which is not least 
due to their “campus-policy”35 that politically mobilized a new part of the Pakistani society: the 
students. 
Given the history of the student protests in Pakistan, I have thus derived my final hypothesis, 
which concentrates upon the political potential that lies within students: 
                                                 
30 see Jaffrelot (2000): 122. 
31 Ibd., 167. 
32 Ibd. 
33 The Jaamat-e-Islami is a political party in Pakistan and counts among the most important Islamist 
parties in Pakistan. 
34 see Cohen, Stephen Philip: “The Idea of Pakistan“, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C: 2004, 
p. 165.  
35 see Musa Khan Jalazai: “Sectarianism and politico-religious Terrorism in Pakistan“, Tarteeb Publishers, 
Lahore: 1993, p. 255. 
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6. The student milieu is a fertile ground for retrieving a great political potential that lies within the 
Pakistani society. 
 
These hypotheses form my main hypotheses of analysis when it comes to the psychological 
account of my field of research. In order to understand the scope that is hidden within the 
concept of political identities it is necessary to understand certain elements of identity itself, 
which I have tried to cover in its two most important core elements: the history and development 
of an identity due to certain historical and political factors and the psychological and ideological 
background that has led to certain developments in the creation of an identity. Thus, it was 
important to highlight these two dimensions of analysis, which will be reflected in my study of 
political identities of Pakistani students in Lahore. 
1.3 Conditions of research 
My next step is to discuss the conditions of my research. After having discussed my main 
hypotheses that were shaping my theoretical knowledge on Pakistan, I will now describe four 
main parts of my research: a) my position as a researcher b) my city of research: Lahore, c) my 
audience: students, d) my method: questionnaires, semi-structured interviews and one expert 
interview. 
Each of these four points are necessary to understand the background of my research and 
following also the results I drew from my study. 
1.3.1 My position as a researcher 
I am an Austrian national with a Muslim Pakistani background, born and raised in Austria and 
grew up with the Pakistani value and cultural system. The majority of my extended family still 
lives in Pakistan, the reason for which I regularly travel to my country of origin. I have thus 
grown up with Urdu and Punjabi as my mother tongues. 
These conditions have put me in a sensitive position as a researcher: it has at the same time made 
my job both easier and more difficult. Knowing the local language has been a particularly good 
advantage, as many of my interview partners and those responding to my questionnaires felt 
more at ease when talking to me in Urdu, although many of them used to switch languages 
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between English and Urdu during the interview situation36. Moving back and forth between the 
two languages is due to two reasons: first, it was easier to talk about politics, educational systems, 
and other technical issues in English as it offered most of the technical terms for describing 
situations and conditions referring to these thematic areas. Urdu was often used in conversations, 
when people started telling me about Pakistani culture in general, about their families and about 
religion. Hence, I have made the observation that when it comes to supposedly objective non-
personal issues like the assessment of particular politics I was often being spoken to in English, 
while I was confronted with Urdu when my respondents were sharing their emotions and their 
emotional commitments regarding their family, culture and religion. This linguistic observation 
partly shares my own separation of my two levels of analysis which was the political-ideological 
and the psychological dimension of my research. 
Second, I observed that many of my respondents, knowing that I was born and grown up in a 
non-Pakistani environment, started speaking extensively in English with me – my personal feeling 
here is that some were trying to impress me with their “foreign language”37 skills – although their 
English was too poor to really communicate properly with me in English. In such situations I 
often started to speak in Urdu, in order to indicate to my respondent that we can have this 
interview in Urdu as well, but which was often ignored, as the respondent continued to speak in 
English, which led to weak outcomes in regard of the interview and hence for my research. The 
attitude towards the own language is also an attitude that is shown towards foreigners. Although I 
have noticed a pride especially towards Urdu among my respondents, particularly in regard of its 
high literary culture, English is often perceived as a more important and powerful language, 
which I see as one major reason why I was also often spoken to in English, once my non-
Pakistani background was clear to them. 
Another major issue that became apparent during my research was that people, often knowing 
that I was a “foreign researcher” working on Pakistani identity, had a tendency to gravitate to 
either uncritical praise or harsh condemnation of Pakistan. In the former, I had the impression 
that my respondents wanted to impress me with their country and culture, while the 
correspondents on the latter category, knowing that I am a researcher from an industrialized 
country, may have felt that I would have a negative approach towards the developmental stage of 
                                                 
36 My questionnaire was prepared in English but included some specific Urdu terms. Almost all 
respondents wrote in English, but I have also received some Urdu answers in my open-ended questions. 
As to the interview situation, I started every interview by asking my respondents in Urdu, whether they 
want to speak in Urdu or in English, according to which I adapted myself during the interview situation. 
37 As English is one of the official languages in Pakistan, it would be wrong to refer to English as a 
“foreign language“. I am using this term in this context here, because in these specific situations, English 
was neither their mother tongue nor used entirely in their everyday life. 
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Pakistan and thus wanting to hear negative attitudes towards their country. Aware of this 
paradox, which I put forth as part of my experience as a researcher, I can only stress one more 
time the hypothetical character of this observation. One major issue that is certainly part of the 
outcome of my results in my interviews, is my position as a Muslim women, interacting with 
Muslim males in Pakistan: This was a critical issue as to the scope of the respondents available to 
me. As I was researching in three different universities, with students from different social 
backgrounds, this was especially an issue in two of my target universities: The Punjab University 
of Lahore and the King Edward’s College, Lahore. The Punjab University of Lahore is known to 
be a conservative institution, which can already be noticed by the separation of sexes within the 
institution and on campus, such as separate study rooms for men and women. The King 
Edward’s College in Lahore is one of the oldest higher education medical institutions on the 
Indian subcontinent and has a very mixed background of students, which shows quite 
conservative patterns as to male female interaction as well. These two institutions became a 
challenge for me in regard of meeting males publicly and distributing my questionnaires to male 
students, as well as finding male interview partners. I can only presume that those who were 
ready to talk with me and accepted my questionnaires were open/liberal enough in their attitudes 
towards women to help me with my research. In some cases I had to ask male students, to whom 
I had already build contact, to help me distribute my questionnaires to other male students, as it 
was not perceived well if I interact openly with men. 
These were the most important observations made that have an impact on the outcome of my 
results, due to which it is important to consider the context of this research for further analysis.  
1.3.2 My city of research: Lahore  
Lahore is the cultural capital of Pakistan and the most important city in Punjab. Pakistan is 
divided into four provinces: Punjab, Sindh, North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and 
Baluchistan. 
These provinces have their own provincial capitals with corresponding administrations. The 
province Punjab is the most powerful province, as Punjabis have a high position within Pakistani 
politics and administration. This is a major cause of inner-ethnic conflict within Pakistan, which 
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manifests themselves in language conflicts38 as well as in political conflicts, resulting, in the worst 
case, in radical separational movements.  
Pakistan’s capital, Islamabad, is also located in Punjab and is seen as the diplomatic city of 
Pakistan, hosting all important government offices as well as numerous embassies, whereas 
Lahore as the biggest city within Punjab is seen as the cultural capital and the “heart” of Punjab. 
“Lahore, Lahore hai!” – a famous Pakistani saying which means “Lahore is Lahore!” which 
alludes to its unique status within Pakistan and among Pakistanis who recognize its high cultural 
value. Most of Pakistan’s vibrant culture – its music, literature, cuisine as well as its cultural 
heritage, which goes as far back as Mughal history, finds its navel of inspiration in this city. It is 
thus not only a culturally exciting city but an important strategic city, as it hosts the country’s 
most renowned institutions of higher learning as well as important cultural and social institutions. 
All these factors combined make Lahore to the focal point of Pakistan’s most dominant culture. 
This is why I have chosen Lahore as the city of my research. The city provided me with not only 
the most important research infrastructure, such as an amount of relevant libraries and book 
stores but it has also inspired me with its vibrant culture – mirror of conservative as well as 
modern trends within the city and its culture – which helped me understand the ambivalence and 
diversity within the notion of Pakistani identity as found within my research outcome. Lahore, 
the city that hosts several institutions of higher learning and an array of students from various 
social and cultural backgrounds, has the diversity, paradoxes and ambivalence which underlies the 
concept of Pakistani identity itself. 
1.3.3 My respondents: students 
There are several reasons why I chose students as the target group for my research. The most 
important reason for this was that students can be seen as the future political elite of the country, 
which will shape the country’s future social, political and religious development.  
There is however another important reason for choosing this group. Students are generally a 
relatively young and dynamic group within civil society and are shaped by the political and 
historical education of the country, in addition to the social and religious education of their 
environment. 
                                                 
38
 It is important to note that Pakistan has major language conflicts on a horizontal level between Urdu and 
English – both official languages in Pakistan – and on a vertical level between the various regional and ethnic 
languages, which in every province have a separate conflict situation. As to Punjab, there is a big controversy 
between the use of Urdu and Punjabi whereas the language conflict in Sindh relies on the conflictive situation 
between Urdu and Sindhi. 
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Ruth Wodak, as a renowned Austrian historian and linguist researching among other topics on 
social and historical linguistics, formulated interesting and significant discourse-analytical 
contributions to the broad debates on collective remembrance that have entered human sciences 
since the linguistic turn and post-structuralism.39 Her theory tries to analyze the various power 
and interest constellations within political and historical frames. As an Austrian, she uses one of 
Austria’s most famous export products to conceptionalize her theory: the Mozartkugel.40 The 
Mozartkugel is a famous Austrian chocolate praline, named after Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, 
historical Austrian key figure and musical prodigy child, contributing to Austria’s self-image as 
well as foreign image of Austria as the birth country of many of the most famous classical music 
compositors in the world. The speciality of this chocolate lies in its ingredients and composition: 
It consists of various layers with different substances, which in Wodak’s metaphor stand for a 
sphere of concentric layers that represent the grades of the more or less mediated relation 
between a historical event and its historical traces (sources) on the one hand, and those who later 
construct meaning (history) around these objects. The centre consists of a layer of pistachios 
which is supposed to represent the available historical sources. This layer is followed by a layer of 
marzipan representing the professionals (historians) analyzing the pistachio layer (historical 
sources) and offering diverse discourses and interpretations of history. The marzipan layer is 
covered by nougat creme which represents the non-specialized intelligence which teaches the 
society its history. This non-specialized intelligence is disseminated by teachers, journalists, 
researchers who derive their notion of history from history books that were written by 
professionals in the marzipan layer. This layer of intelligence is equally part of the political culture 
and values being expressed and shared within their own notion of history. The last layer is a 
chocolate layer, which represents the general society, which develops its social and cultural mind 
of history derived from their friends and families as well as from their education, books and 
electronic media.  
The general idea of the Mozartkugel model is to show the importance of the different layers and 
processes within a society in the formation of a historical, and thus present, social and cultural 
mind of its society. Applied to my research, I see students as the nougat layer representing the 
future elite of its country, which draws its significance from deeper intelligence processes (deeper 
layers of the Mozartkugel) on the reproduction and development of historical and social frames. 
At the same time they have a significant role as being an important elite being educated through 
the professionals in the marzipan layer. The students shape the appearance of the society as the 
                                                 
39 Concerning the topic of this paper see Cillia, Rudolf de/Reisigl, Martin/Liebhart, Karin/Wodak, Ruth: 
“The Discursive Construction of National Identity”, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh: 1999. 
40 see Wodak, Ruth: “Die Sprachen der Vergangenheit“, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main: 1994, p. 15f. 
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nougat represents an important significant part for the taste of the Mozartkugel. They are the ones 
who are reproducing historical discourses and forwarding these to the chocolate layer. Only later, 
the other ingredients and hence other constitutional parts for the construction of various power 
and interest constellations can be noticed. 
Gaining a firm understanding of the attitudes of this particular group of society was therefore 
critical to my research. In order to get various types of political attitudes and thus identities 
developed within this group of society, I chose three different universities in Lahore, which are 
attended by students of various social backgrounds. In the following, I shall give a brief 
introduction and personal observance of the three universities visited as part of my research. 
1.3.3.1 The University of Punjab (PU), Lahore41 
The University of Punjab, also often referred to as Punjab University, built in 1882, is the oldest 
and largest university established in Pakistan. It consists of two campusses, the old historical 
campus, Allama Iqbal campus, named after the famous Pakistani poet, and is located in the 
middle of the old historical town in Lahore. Its architecture is the typical British colonial 
architectural style which is often found in Lahore, in the form of the General Post Office, the 
Government College University Lahore, the railway station and many other famous buildings and 
institutions built under British colonial rule. The second campus, Quaid-e-Azam campus, named 
after Mohammed Ali Jinnah, represents the newer part of the university with modern 
architecture, which hosts students in separate male/female student residence buildings. Apart 
from this, the university also constructed two other campusses located in Lahore, the campus of 
Gurjanwala and a summer campus at Khanaspur. The university compromises 13 faculties, 9 
constituent colleges, 64 departments/centres/institutes and 434 affiliated colleges.42 
The Punjab University has relatively low tuition fees43, which promotes the possibility for 
education for a large public and at the same time offers a huge variety on study programmes.  
It is probably due to this large scope of students being offered a study place at this university, 
that popular Islamist parties, such as the Jaamat-e-Islami (JI), known for their famous “campus 
policy”44, could establish a certain power within this university. Stephen P. Cohen describes the 
                                                 
41 For information on the University of Punjab see its homepage: http://www.pu.edu.pk/, 05.12.2008. 
42 see for a more detailed description of the history of the university: http://www.pu.edu.pk/about/, 
05.12.2008. 
43 see the tuition fees according to different study programmes: 
http://www.pu.edu.pk/fees/default.asp?feeid=1, 04.02.2009. 
44 see Jalazai, (1993): 255.  
Chapter I Introduction and research approach 
 
 18 
Punjab University campusses as being under the influence of the widespread JI student wings45, 
which have a certain “social control”46 on the students in terms of conduct. 
My personal observation of the Punjab University, particularly of the Quaid-e-Azam campus, 
affirms this above mentioned conservative atmosphere. Many of the female students are either 
totally covered in a burqa47, or wear the traditional Pakistani dress, shalwaar kameez, with a dupatta 
– a long scarf used to cover the body – which was in this university also often used by female 
students to cover their heads. In many of the informal conversations I had with various girls 
studying at the university, I was told that wearing the dupatta on their head or being covered by a 
burqa, was an additional protection to avoid social harassment from male students or more 
specifically to acquire a certain respect and seriousness among other students and teachers. I was 
also told that in family gatherings or even when being out with friends, they would often 
disregard such conservative clothing rules, and even wear jeans or sleeveless clothes, if permitted 
by their families.  
The conservative conduct observed at the university is reinforced through the division of gender 
between particular university buildings. The main library of the Punjab University offers, for 
example, separate study rooms for males and females, and also one big common room, which is 
rarely used by female students.48 Moreover, there are separate cafeterias for male and female 
students. Interaction between male and female students is nevertheless not impossible, but is 
often strongly being surveyed by the surrounding staff or other students. It is equally important 
to note that not only students are covered in burqa but also some of the teaching staff.49  
For the purpose of this research, the interaction with male students represented a difficult task 
for me sometimes, for which I had to rely on female acquaintances asking their male class fellows 
to fill out my questionnaires and being ready for an interview situation. 
                                                 
45 see Cohen (2004): 178. 
46 see Jalazai (1993): 266. 
47“Burqa” is the Arabic term used to signify the long (often) black robe worn by women to cover their 
whole body.  
48 In my first day at the library of the Punjab University, I was being shown the library by a male librarian, 
who – most probobly due to the strong separation of sexes – did not show me the female study rooms, 
due to which I started using the big common room as study area, where I was the only or one of the few 
girls studying there. It was only later by the acquaintance of some female students that I learned that there 
were separate female study rooms, where most of the female students used to spend their time. 
49 I even met female teachers who were entirely covered in burqa, only displaying their eyes and even 
covering their hands with gloves. 
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1.3.3.2 King Edwards College (KEC), Lahore50 
King Edward’s College (KEC) in Lahore was established in 1860 and is the second oldest 
medical college on the Indian subcontinent. KEC is located in the old city centre of Lahore and 
as one of the oldest buildings in Lahore still exhibits much of its original colonial architecture. It 
is next to other universities located in the old city centre such as the Allama Iqbal campus of the 
Punjab University and the Government College University Lahore. 
KEC consists of 46 departments, 8 institutions/schools/centres and of three attached hospitals51. 
Tuition at King Edward’s College is slightly higher than at Punjab University, with a 12.000 
rupees maximum52 according to the year in which the student is studying. 
My personal observation of KEC has shown me also a relatively conservative atmosphere but 
not comparable with that of the Punjab University. The library and canteens offer separate 
sections for male and female students but do have a common room for both sexes as well. 
The dress code is also reflective of the wide ranging socio-economic backgrounds of the 
students. However, I noticed that most of the female students wear the traditional Pakistani 
shalwaar kameeze. There are even many girls who resign to covering their head with scarfs and 
dupattas. However, it is also possible to see some girls wearing western clothes such as jeans and 
long shirts. Due to their study field, most of the students have to wear long white lab coats which 
cover most parts of their body anyway. 
In regard to male female interaction between students, it is difficult in the first two years of study. 
In the first two study years students are being taught in separate groups of male and female 
students, which changes from the third year on when the groups are mixed. 
The university also offers two student residence houses which are separated according to gender. 
1.3.3.3 Lahore University of Management and Science (LUMS), Lahore53 
The Lahore University of Management and Science is one of the most renowned universities in 
the entire country educating, the future political and administrative cadre in Pakistan. It is in 
comparison to the Punjab University and the King Edward’s College a private university. It was 
                                                 
50 see the homepage of KEC online: http://kemu.edu.pk/, 06.12.2008. 
51 see online a list of all departments, institutions and hospitals: http://kemu.edu.pk/faculty.html, 
06.12.2008. 
52 see annual fees according to each year online: http://kemu.edu.pk/Prospectus-2007-08.pdf, 06.12.2008, 
pp.32-34. 
53 see the LUMS homepage: http://www.lums.edu.pk/financial_assistance/overview.php, 06.12.2008. 
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established in 1985 and is located in an elite area of the city (Defense). It consists of three 
schools: the Suleman Dawood School, School of Humanities, Social Sciences and Law and the 
School of Science and Engineering and five departments in the area of computer science, 
mathematics, law and policy, economics and social sciences. 
Admission in LUMS is very competitive, and only the best students are admitted. This goes along 
with a very high annual fee varying in the different study programmes54, which in many cases only 
allows rich families to send their children to this university. The university does however offer 
various student loans and scholarships to give less wealthy students the possibility to study in this 
institution55. 
LUMS students have a very mixed profile, as it also has many non-Pakistani students, or 
Pakistani students brought up abroad or those who have a foreign family background among its 
students. The atmosphere in LUMS appears in comparison to PU and KEC as very open and 
liberal. This is already recognizeable by the students’ dressing. The clothing of the students varies 
from Western clothes such as jeans and T-shirts, to sleeveless shalwar kameezes, as well as 
traditional shalwar kameezes which cover most part of your body. Girls wearing burqa or a head 
scarf are seen far less on the campus than at the other two universities described earlier. There 
are no separate study rooms for males and females in the libraries and there is one common 
cafeteria and common room for everybody. Interaction between male and female students is not 
a problem and is part of everyday student life. The only separation between sexes is found in 
separate residence houses for male and female students. 
The atmosphere of LUMS is also open insofar as many cultural activities are organized, such as 
concerts on campus, or other similar events. 
The more liberal international orientation seen in the students can also be witnessed in the 
institution’s professional staff. Many of the teachers have a foreign background or are of 
Pakistani origin but educated abroad. This goes along with the language skills of the students who 
almost entirely speak in English among each other, often even without accent, giving me the 
impression as if they were educated and brought up abroad or in an entirely English-speaking 
environment. 
                                                 
54 Admission fees of graduate and phd programmes are accessible through this link:  
http://www.lums.edu.pk/graduate_programmes/programmes.php, 06.12.2008.  
admission fees of undergraduate programs are accessible through this link:  
http://www.lums.edu.pk/undergraduate_programmes/programmes.php, 06.12.2008. 
55 The LUMS homepage states that a minimum of 40% of students are in some form receiving financial 
aid; see online: http://www.lums.edu.pk/financial_assistance/overview.php, 06.12.2008. 
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My personal observance of LUMS stood in complete opposition to what I had experienced in the 
two other institutions, as LUMS seemed to me to be the most “Western” institution and 
environment I had seen in Lahore. For my research, this meant that the distribution of 
questionnaires and the finding of appropriate interview partners was not perceived as 
problematic in this institution. 
1.4 Methodology 
This part of the chapter focuses entirely on the applied methodology used for my survey. I was 
basically using two different methods and three different methodological approaches: 1) a 
questionnaire 2) a semi-structured interview outline and 3) an explorative expert interview. 
In the following, I will discuss both methods: 
1.4.1 Questionnaire56 
My questionnaire was prepared according to the hypotheses I drew during the intensive phase of 
discourse analysis on works dealing with Pakistani history and society. My questionnaire was 
distributed to the students of the different universities in the months of August and September 
2007. 
Therefore, my main aim was to retrace the most important dominant Pakistani self-images and 
attitudes existing among Pakistani students concerning their national identity and their country. I 
have hence structured my questionnaire along various themes, which are the following: 
I. Personal information 
II. General information 
III. Attitudes towards the nation 
IV. History 
V. Kashmir 
VI. Pakistani self-images 
VII. Muslim identity 
VIII. Perception of the “other”: a) Pakistan and India b) Pakistan and the United States 
IX. Emotional commitment 
X. Culture 
XI. Society 
 
                                                 
56 A copy of my questionnaire can be found in the attachment. 
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Inspiration for the design of this questionnaire was drawn from an American questionnaire on 
national identity57, which consists of 11 pages including 24 questions, though is not divided along 
different themes. 
My questionnaire consists of 12 pages with 11 thematic sections. It includes questions with 
different levelled responding scales, depending on the question. Next to these questions I have 
also included several open-ended questions, allowing the student to lead me towards his or her 
personal impression or idea of the given problem/question. 
The questionnaire was distributed in the three above mentioned universities. I have received 34 
questionnaires from students at the Punjab University, 20 from students of the King Edwards 
College, and 23 from students of the Lahore University of Management and Science. In each case 
more questionnaires were distributed as actually returned to me in the end, which explains the 
different number of questionnaires received from each university. At the Punjab University I 
chose myself to distribute more questionnaires as it was the university with the most students. 
In every case, the amount of questionnaires was distributed along a 50:50 division of male and 
female respondents. I have a total of 77 questionnaires, which will be analyzed in terms of two 
main core questions, which I want to answer in my succeeding chapters, namely: 1) How do 
Pakistanis view/understand their nation? 2) What are specific threats perceived by them? 
1.4.1.1 Sampling methodology 
The questionnaires were distributed randomly to students at the three different universities. In 
each case this meant that I distributed with the help of one student studying at the particular 
university the questionnaires to random people I met on the campusses. The questionnaires were 
either returned to me directly or to my contact person in the specific university. I tried to have a 
50:50 sample of male and female respondents, which I achieved to have at PU (17:17) and KEC 
(10:10), but in LUMS I have 10 male and 13 female respondents. 
1.4.2 Semi-structured interviews 
My interviews were conducted after the distribution of all questionnaires. It was inspired by 
answers I derived from my questionnaires in a first initial step. The main questions asked of my 
interview were the following: 
 
                                                 
57 see the USA ISSP 2003 – National Identity II, Questionnaire online:   
http://www.za.uni-koeln.de/data/en/issp/questionnaires/q2003/US2003.pdf, 06.12.2008. 
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1) When you think of Pakistan what are your first thoughts? How do you view your 
country? 
2) According to you, what are the most important features/elements that make you a 
Pakistani? 
3) Do you personally feel that there is any other country or nation that stands in opposition 
to Pakistan? 
4) What are your thoughts concerning India? 
5) According to you, do you think the horrible incidents of Partition 1947 still have an 
impact on the Pakistani people, culture and society? 
6) What are the biggest problems encountered in Pakistan in your opinion? 
7) Do you think that Pakistan has a problem with religious fundamentalism? 
8) According to you, does the rise of fundamentalism have any impact on Indo-Pakistani 
relations? 
9) What is your opinion on the recent Lal Masjid happening? What is your opinion on Jamia 
Hafsa and other similar groups and the Pakistani government? 
10) When you think of the Kashmir conflict, what is your personal opinion on this conflict? 
 
In each of the three institutions I randomly chose one male and one female interview partner. 
The interview lengths ranges from thirty minutes minimum to more than one hour. The 
interviews were conducted between August and September 2007 in the different universities with 
only one person at a time. In one interview situation at the Punjab University, I could not avoid 
the interference of one other female student so that the interview turned to a “group” interview 
presenting answers from two students. 
Although the interview outline was designed by 10 core questions, every interview had its own 
individual turnout as every student has his or her individual perception on their identity and of 
the political, social and religious situation in Pakistan. It is thus very difficult to compare these 
interviews, due to which I have decided to filter specific units of analysis out of my interviews, 
which are in accordance with the themes asked in my questionnaires and will be presented as 
joint result of my study. 
1.4.2.1 Sampling methodology 
The interview partners at the different universities were chosen randomly. In every case I 
approached the person with my contact person on the campusses of the different universities and 
asked whether the person was willing for an interview or not. All interviews were conducted on 
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campus. In total eight interviews were conducted, two from each university, choosing every time 
one male and one female student from the specific university. 
1.4.3 Expert interview with UNODC expert on crime prevention  
The expert interview was an another important step in my methodological approach. The expert 
interview was conducted with Alexandra Souza Martins, expert on crime prevention, working in 
the “Justice and Integrity Unit” of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 
The interview was conducted on the 18th January 2009, in the UN Headquarters in Vienna. 
The main aim was to find out more about the UNODC’s work on corruption, as Pakistan’s 
major political problems that are analyzed in my part on the analysis of the political landscape in 
Pakistan can be related to the field of corruption. Therefore, I conducted an explorative interview 
with Mrs. Souza Martins, learning not only about the UNODC’s work in this regard, but also 
about the different aspects important in order to combat corruption on a national scale. 
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2. Pakistan’s political culture – a historical, political, 
psychological and social genesis 
 
Strategic and operational level 
This chapter will analyze the most important outcomes in terms of a Pakistani identity through 
an analysis of the historical, political, religious and social perception in the discourse on the 
creation of the Pakistani state. An extensive hermeneutical interpretative analysis of relevant 
literature will therefore be presented. This initial part is also intended to give the adequate 
normative and ontological framework to the reader as a source of orientation towards the topic. 
2.1 The birth of Pakistan – The ideology of Pakistan 
The creation of Pakistan is a product of the historical independence of the Indian subcontinent 
from the British colonial rule. The presence of the British in India started extensively through the 
creation of the East India company in 1757 whose main aim was to establish an economic link 
between the British Empire and the Indian subcontinent. Subsequently, the influence of the East 
Indian company grew immensively, which gradually led to the establishment of the British crown 
in India in 1858 and the colonization of the Indian subcontinent. It would break the framework 
of this paper to go into detail of the history of the British colonialism due to which, the most 
important elements for the creation of Pakistan will be the main references for this chapter. 
The creation of Pakistan is a complex process, which has had influence on various factors of the 
historical, political, religious and social constitution of the present situation in South Asia and 
Pakistan in particular. Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the founding father of Pakistan, envisaged the 
creation of one country which would be based on the principle of one nation, one culture and 
one language.58 On this basis, the independence of the Indian subcontinent which was shadowed 
with intensive blood-shed riots between Hindus and Muslims, which made the country 
impossible to rule for the British, the newly established state Pakistan was supposed to create a 
home for millions of Muslim “refugees”59 on the Indian subcontinent. This new home Pakistan – 
                                                 
58 see Jaffrelot (2000): 19. 
59 It is critical to use the word “refugee“ in this context due to two reasons: First of all, the definition of a 
“refugee“ was only established one year after Partition 1947, namely in 1951 by the Genève Refugee 
Declaration, and secondly because as the creation of Pakistan resulted from one territory ruled by the 
British crown it can be argued that these Muslims fleeing to Pakistan were not refugees but in fact 
internally displaced persons. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to use the vernacular term for these 
people, which is “mohajir”, meaning migrant, and carrying a specific notion of distinct social and ethnic 
characteristics. 
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an artificial state construction60 – was the object of widespread scepticism from the international 
community, not at least due to the construction of the state in West Pakistan (representing 
today’s Pakistan) and East Pakistan (representing today’s Bangladesh), which was divided through 
its enemy state, India.61 
The high level of scepticism was followed by the difficulty of defining Pakistan’s history and 
consequently its identity throughout time. The problem starts with divided opinions of today’s 
historians as to when Pakistan’s history actually begins. Some historians start from the early Indus 
civilizations whereas others start from the first Islamic movements present on the Indian 
subcontinent.62 
Still others believe it is due to this complex character of this process that my analysis regarding 
the creation of Pakistan will be divided along the following factors: a) the historical factor, giving 
a short account on the historical events within this process; b) a political factor, giving an account 
on the political developments within this process; and c) a psychological factor, giving an account 
on the psychological components inherent in this process. 
2.1.1 The historical factor 
The partition of India in 1947 into a Hindu-majority country, India, and a Muslim-majority 
country, Pakistan, is part of an intensive historical debate as to what can be seen as the main 
reason for Partition. Whereas the official historiography of Pakistan suggests that the two-nation-
theory of Muhammed Ali Jinnah, according to which Hindus and Muslim are two separate 
communities and thus cannot live together under one centrally administered country, was the 
main cause for the creation of Pakistan, official Indian historical resources blame the drawing of 
ostensible religious lines63 and the “divide and rule”64-policy of the British for Partition.65 Both 
approaches are viable explanations for the creation of Pakistan. However, it is important to stress 
the strong Muslim lobbying that was part in this process to proclaim a separate Muslim nation 
state. This strong lobbying efforts resulted from the big potential that has been located within 
                                                 
60 see Jaffrelot (2000): 9. 
61 Ibd., p. 11. 
62 Ibd., p. 12. 
63 It were the British who for the means of ruling the country set up different categories of the religious 
communities in India – not only inventing the term “Hindu” – but also generally categorizing Indians. See 
Aziz, K. K.: “The making of Pakistan. A study in nationalism”, third edition, Sang-e-Meel Publications, 
Lahore: 2005, p. 93. 
64 The “divide and rule“-policy is a policy used by British colonialists, which divided the religious 
communities, Hindus and Muslims, socially, religiously and geographically in order to rule easier over the 
different communities on the Indian subcontinent.  
65 see Bosa, Sugata/Jalal, Ayesha: “Modern South Asia. History, Culture, Political Economy”, second 
edition, Oxford University Press, New Delhi: 2004, p. 135. 
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Muslim revolts, which were one of the first separationist tendencies66 on the Indian subcontinent. 
This Muslim revolts have several major reasons: First, the end of the Mughal empire had 
economically weakened the Muslims as well as placed Hindus in more favourable positions for 
the British colonialists.67 Second, the democratisation process in the Indian subcontinent allowed 
Indians to vote for their municipal leaders, which put the Muslim minority – representing one 
fifth of the British raj – under fear of being reduced to “the status of a perpetual minority in any 
constitutional arrangement”68. It is this weak political situation of the Muslims that resulted in 
early revolutionary movements among Indian Muslims, especially given the fact that the Indian 
National Congress (INC) – Indian’s key figure and main actor within the independence 
movement that was mainly dominated by Indian Hindus – developed not only more radical 
tendencies and ideologies under the influence of its Hindu leaders, but also marginalized more 
and more Muslims within the congress.69 
Consequently, the Muslims founded – after being promoted by the Viceroy Lord Minto, who 
demanded the creation of separate electorates for Muslims – their own party. This party, the All 
India Muslim League (AIML) was founded in Dacca in 1906 in an effort to secure Muslim 
electorates in legislative elections.70 The political developments after the first World War, which 
among others consequences led to the elimination of the Ottoman caliphate, created a strong 
emotional shock for the Muslims on the Indian subcontinent, who formed a movement in 
Aligarh to defend the caliphate.71 This movement was strongly supported by Mohandas Gandhi, 
and at the same time evoked strong criticism and hostility from leaders of the Indian National 
Congress, who eventually formed their own movement with nationalist Hindustic ideologies, 
called the Hindu Mahsaba.72 This led to stronger communal violence among the two religious 
communities in various areas in India. The communal violence was one of the central factors 
prompting Jinnah to use the All Indian Muslim League as a vehicle for a Muslim-based nation 
state. The story of the creation of Pakistan is strongly interlinked with Jinnah, whose personality 
                                                 
66 see Jaffrelot (2000): 20. 
67 Among others Hindus were the first to have been in a majority-lead of the most important havens such 
as Bombay and Madras and have thus started to interact earlier with the British. See Türkkaya, Ataöv: 
“Kashmir and Neighbours. Tale, Terror, Truce”, Ashgate, Burlington: 2001, p. 39; Jaffrelot also points out 
that the participation of the Muslims during the Sepoy-revolt in 1858, which represents the first major 
independence revolt against the British on the Indian subcontinent, in which Indian Muslims had an 
important strategic point (as the revolt was for example endorsed by the last Mughal emperor Bahadur 
Zafar Shah), led to great suspicions from the British side towards the Muslims; see Jaffrelot (2000): 20. 
68 see Bose/Jalal (2004):139; see also: see Jaffrelot (2000): 21. 
69 see Gaier, Malte: “Religiöser Fundamentalismus im Prozess der Staatswerdung Pakistans”, master thesis, 
University of Vienna: 2008, pp. 37-39. 
70 see Jaffrelot (2000): 23. 
71 Ibd. 
72 Ibd. 
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strongly influenced the outcome of this historical process and who still shapes the images and 
perceptions of many Pakistanis to whom he has become a legend. Jinnah was the most important 
key figure in the All India Muslim League. He is originally from a predominantly Hindu 
populated area (near Bombay) and belonged to the liberal intelligentsia on the Indian 
subcontinent. Like many of those adhering to the intellectual Indian elite at that time, he had 
studied law in England and worked as a lawyer in India.73 He was a member of the Indian 
National Congress and joined the AIML in 1913. In 1930, the British government ordered the 
Simon Commission to study the new constitutional reforms in India, which created strong 
mistrust among the Indians, who under the Nehru report74, demanded the principle of separate 
electorates. This demand was rejected by the British under the argument that it would tear the 
nation apart.75 The All India Muslim League strongly endorsed this suggestion by not only 
demanding separate electorates, but also demanding one third of seats within the national 
assembly, which would help ensure the political significance of Muslims on the Indian 
subcontinent within the National Assembly.76 It was, however, only in 1935 through the 
Government of India Act, that Jinnah and his Muslim followers found some kind of satisfaction, 
as this act envisaged a federal system, which theoretically created the infrastructural settings on a 
provincial level to bind together most of the predominantly Muslim provinces such as the north 
and north-west India as Muslim dominated areas.77 Jinnah’s argument for the creation of separate 
Muslim states was postulated by his own theory: the two-nation theory. This theory had at its 
core the inherent argument of the communal character within Islam and the Muslim ummah (= 
Muslim community) which cannot be achieved through the co-existence with an entirely different 
religious and social system such as Hinduism: 
 Islam and Hinduism – they are not religions in the strict sense of the word but 
are, in fact, different and distinct social orders. (...) Indeed they belong to two 
different civilizations, which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and 
conceptions. Mussalmans [the Urdu term for “Moslem”, S.S.] are not a minority 
according to any definition of a nation, and they must have their homeland, their 
territory and their state.78 
 
                                                 
73 Ibd., p. 24. 
74 Jawahrlal Nehru is one of the most important key figures of the Indian National Congress. He can be 
seen as Jinnah’s opponent in the process of partition, where he was defending Hindu Interests, whereas 
Jinnah was representing Muslim interests. 
75 Jaffrelot (2000): 24. 
76 Ibd, p. 25.  
77 Ibd. 
78 see Azam (1992): 16. 
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The idea of a separate Muslim state was however one that Jinnah had elaborated from the ideas 
of Mohammed Iqbal79 – Pakistan’s most famous national poet. Mohammed Iqbal is often seen as 
the creator of the idea of a separate Pakistan, which represents one of the most popular Pakistani 
myths, which in fact is not entirely true. Iqbal only stressed the importance for the creation of a 
separate “Muslim bloc” within India. K. K. Aziz, one of Pakistan’s most famous historians with a 
critical stance on Pakistan’s history as taught within schools in Pakistan, states:  
 
It is grossly misleading to call him the originator of the idea of Pakistan or the 
poet who dreamed of partition. He never talked of partition and his ideal was that 
of a getting together of the Muslim provinces in the north west so as to bargain 
more advantageously with the projected Hindu centres. It is one of the myths of 
Pakistani nationalism to saddle Iqbal with the parentage of Pakistan.80 
 
 Iqbal’s speech in Allahabad in 1920, later became known as the “Pakistan speech” because it 
brought-up for the first time the separate structures of Islam and Hinduism.81 In 1930 he 
consequently asked the AIML council to endorse the idea of a Muslim state82 compromising the 
regions Punjab, Sind, NWFP and Baluchistan. Three years later, a Cambridge student (Chaudry 
Rehmat Ali), inspired by Iqbal’s vision created the name “Pakistan” alluding to two puns: The 
first one is to signify “pak-stan”, which means “the land of the pure” and the second one the 
alliteration of letters of the Muslim dominated provinces in the north west which would 
eventually create the name “PAKISTAN”: P for Punjab, A for Afghan (NWFP), K for Kashmir, 
S for Sind, and “tan” for Baluchistan.83 
This demand of separate Muslim administration only found its valid representation in the Lahore 
Resolution 1940, drafted by the AIML. The Lahore Resolution demanded “that all future 
constitutional arrangements be ‘reconsidered de novo’ since Indian Muslims were a ‘nation’ and 
not a minority”84. It suggested rather the promotion of independent Muslim states as constituents 
                                                 
79 Mohammad Iqbal plays an important role for the comprehension of the process for the creation of a 
Pakistani identity. At this point it is nevertheless important to point out the ambivalence that lies within 
the perception of Iqbal as the generator of the idea of Pakistan and of the perception of Iqbal as the 
postulator of separate Muslim federations, which if differently interpreted as it was by Jinnah, could also 
only suggest an autonomous Muslim administration of Muslim provinces within one big Indian federal 
union. 
80 see Aziz (2005): 54. 
81 see Schimmel, Annemarie: “Muhammad Iqbal. Prophetischer Poet und Philosoph”, Diederichs, 
Munich: 1989, p. 88f. 
82 Aware of the paradox that lies within the comprehension of Muhammad Iqbal’s vision, different 
analytical sources speak of a “Muslim state” that was propagated by Iqbal in 1930; see for example 
Jaffrelot (2000): 26 and Bose/Jalal (2004): 143.  
83 see Bose/Jalal (2004): 143. 
84 Ibd., p. 144. 
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of a federal unit.85 The consequence of this resolution was that the All India Muslim League, with 
its presumption to speak for all Indian Muslims, sought federal solutions for the creation of a 
“constitutional arrangement in which Muslims would have an equitable share of power at a 
centre reconstituted on the basis of a partnership between two essentially sovereign states, 
Pakistan (representing the Muslim-majority provinces) and Hindustan (representing the Hindu-
majority provinces)”86. Through the adoption of this Pakistan-idea, the birth for Muslim 
nationalism was finally given. K. K. Aziz writes on this long historical process of Muslim 
emancipation on the Indian subcontinent: 
It had taken the Muslims three-quarters of a century finally to decide what they 
wanted. They had tried everything: a revolt in 1857 [the Sepoy revolt; S.S.], 
friendship with Britain, opposition to Congress, extremist agitation, co-operation 
with the Congress, belligerent neutrality, negotiations, appeals and threats. (...) 
The march of history had made a nation of a community.87  
The first victory88 of Muslim nationalism came in 1942 when the British War Cabinet accepted 
the idea of Pakistan, which was declared by Sir Stafford Cripps in a Draft Declaration in March 
1943 which stated that “any province could stay out of the proposed Indian Union with the right 
of forming its own independent government”89 – the so called “non-accession clause”90. 
Eventually Jinnah expanded his power through the improvement of the Muslim League’s 
organizational structure and the expansion of its publicity:91 “Jinnah was no longer a Muslim 
leader. He was now the leader, symbol of Muslim nationalism.”92 
Jinnah gathered more and more strategic importance and power as one of the most important 
political actors in India. He was increasingly included in political consultations among the British 
Viceroy, Gandhi and many others.93 At the same time, the Congress as being opponent to the 
                                                 
85 Ibd. 
86 Ibd., p. 146. 
87 see Aziz (2005): 60. 
88 There are several theories as to why the British government accepted the proposal of a separate Muslim 
state: First of all, it is argued that the British were to scared of alienating the Muslims as they represented 
“the flower of the Indian Army”. Second, it is being argued that its non-accession clause was not meant 
seriously and only seen as a means to force Hindus into a compromise with Muslims. Third, it is argued 
that the decision of the British War Cabinet was indeed a genuine decision and promoted by politicians 
who were in favour of autonomous Muslim demands. For this explanatory theories see Aziz (2005): 62. 
89 Ibd., p. 61. 
90 Ibd. 
91 Ibd., p.63. 
92 Ibd. 
93 Ibd. 
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Cripp’s Declaration, was politically weakened, which was enforced through the arrest of its 
Hindu leaders by the British government during the “Quit India”94-movement.95 
The arrest of the Hindu leaders gave Jinnah greater room in which to manoeuvre. In time, he was 
able to the AIML to a powerful political party. Gandhi and other Hindu leaders from the 
Congress saw themselves forced to negotiate with Jinnah on the future of the Indian 
subcontinent.96 The Jinnah-Ghandi talks in 1944 failed, however, as Jinnah was not ready to trust 
Hindu leaders and Gandhi to actually implement Partition once the British had departed. On the 
contrary, Jinnah demanded that Partition ought to be implemented before independence was 
given to India by the British. Gandhi who finally recognized this decision helped turn Jinnah’s 
demand of a separate nation state into a personal victory for Jinnah97: 
Jinnah had won a clear victory by getting Gandhi to recognize Pakistan. This also 
gave wide publicity to his two-nation theory.98 
Consequently, the British Viceroy, Lord Wavell, organized the Simla conference to form an 
Executive Council and to discuss the balanced representation of Hindus and Muslims within the 
partition process. This conference turned into a failure as the British accepted neither Jinnah’s 
idea of parity between Hindus and Moslems, nor his idea on the nomination of Muslim 
councillors by the AIML.99 The political quarrel between the AIML and the INC was not 
resolved, as the INC demanded independence of India without partition, whereas the AIML 
demanded independence of India with partition. The solution of India’s future was to be decided 
according to the legislative elections in 1945, in which both parties had a strong support – AIML 
winning every Muslim seat in the central legislature and the INC winning all the “general (non-
Muslim) constituencies”100 in India.101 Due to this irreconcilable political developments, the 
British Government created a Cabinet Mission, led by the Secretary of State to resolve the matter. 
The Cabinet promoted the idea of an “Indian Union arranged in three tiers – provinces, sections 
and the federal centre”102 and rejecting the idea of an autonomous Pakistan.103 Jinnah refused to 
accept this decision. Within one year, 1946-1947, several plans were drafted for the independence 
                                                 
94 The “Quit India“-movement was a movement inspired by Gandhi against the British rule in India, 
which by Jinnah was interpreted as being not only anti-British but also anti-Muslim. See Aziz (2005): 64. 
95 Ibd. 
96 Ibd., p. 64. 
97 Ibd., p. 64f. 
98 Ibd. 
99 Ibd. 
100 Ibd., p. 67. 
101 Ibd. 
102 Ibd., p. 68. 
103 Ibd. 
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of India, which were accepted or rejected by different parties, often underrating Muslim 
nationalism on the subcontinent.104 It was largely due to Jinnah’s obsession with the Pakistan 
idea105 that in 1947 Lord Mountbatton, British Viceroy of that time, decided to opt for 
independence with Partition. The eruption of great violence between Hindus and Muslims and 
the political rift between INC and AIML made Partition inevitable. The Partition plan was 
drafted on 3 June 1947 and was finally accepted by all parties.106 It was decided that the biggest 
Muslim-populated areas in the north and northwest were bunched together in an East Pakistan 
(today’s Bangladesh) and West Pakistan (today’s Pakistan), which got its independence on 14 of 
August 1947107. Since the princely states had a semi-autonomous status within the British 
administration, they were allowed to choose whether they wanted to accede to India or 
Pakistan.108 This created a new conflict on the subcontinent as the fate of Kashmir – a Muslim 
majority region with a Hindu Maharaja (= princely ruler) bordering both India and Pakistan109  - 
was not resolved until the eve of independence which eventually led to several future Indo-
Pakistani wars. It would break the framework of this paper to discuss all the events that have 
happened after Partition. This is why only the most important elements for the comprehension 
of the future outcome of the Pakistani history are presented here. After the first Indo-Pakistani 
war on Kashmir in October 1947, an independent United Nations Committee for India and 
Pakistan (UNCIP) was created, suggesting a plebiscite in Kashmir to decide on the future of the 
region, which was never carried out.110 After several years of conflict in this region and between 
both countries, the Simla Agreement in 1971 offered an operational solution to the problem: The 
Line of Control. It was decided that Kashmir was divided in Azad Kashmir, adhering to Pakistan, 
and the rest of Kashmir, accessing to India. These two regions were divided by the Line of 
Control (LOC). 111 1971 was equally the year when East Pakistan separated with the help of India 
from Pakistan and become an autonomous state, Bangladesh. 
                                                 
104 Ibd. 
105 see Lamb, Alastair: “Birth of a Tragedy. Kashmir 1947”, Roxford Books, Karachi: 1994, p. 13. 
106 see Aziz (2005): 69. 
107 India got its independence one day after that on 15 August 1947. 
108 see Lamb (1994): 4f. 
109 During Partition the various districts of India were supposed to be allocated by the British 
Government according to their Muslim/Hindu-majority either to Pakistan or to India. The Gurdaspur 
district, was a Muslim-majority district in the northwest of India. This district was – unlike the logic of 
allocation of districts – allocated to India by the British, through which the Indians eventually had access 
to the Kashmir region. See for a more detailed analysis on this: Lamb, Alastair: “Kashmir. A Disputed 
Legacy 1846- 1990”, Oxford University Press, Karachi : 1992, p. 104. 
110 Hönig, Patrick : “Der Kashmirkonflikt und das Recht der Völker auf Selbstbestimmung“, Dunker und 
Humblot, Berlin: 2000, p. 51. 
111 see Ataöv (2001): 68. 
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The various violent events between India and Pakistan, beginning with a wave of violence during 
Partition that has created a huge wave of mohajirs emigrating to Pakistan under the most difficult 
conditions and evoking a holocaust-like situation between the two communities, Hindus and 
Muslims, have marked Indo-Pakistani relations. The four wars112 fought between these two 
countries since then, have always aggravated a new violent dimension in Indo-Pakistani relations, 
which resulted in the formation of India and Pakistan turning towards nuclear weapons – 
destabilizing the entire region through its political conflicts. 
2.1.2 The political factor 
The political factor is going to analyze the creation of the Pakistani state from a political 
perspective starting off with the beginning of a Muslim self-perception on the Indian 
subcontinent to the establishment of a Pakistani nation state and the ideology which was given to 
this state. Additionally, this chapter is also going to analyze the history of political developments 
in Pakistan, as well as Pakistan’s political system. It will also look upon Pakistan’s realpolitik in 
regard to the Kashmir conflict. 
2.1.2.1 Muslim self-perception in the pre-Partition phase and during Partition 
This chapter will present the most important political factors leading to the result of 
independence in India and its Partition in 1947. The various political developments are based on 
a lot of psychological factors inherent to the political self-perception and demand of the various 
communities involved in this phase. These initial political attitudes, declarations and 
developments are necessary to understand the creation of the Pakistani nation and the ideology 
on which it is based. 
For this, it is utterly important to grasp the political concept of Muslim nationalism and how it 
came into existence. Muslim nationalism on the Indian subcontinent found its start with 
Mohammed Ali Jinnah. Communal Muslim sentiments were, however, already present on the 
Indian subcontinent long before. K. K. Aziz, Pakistani historian, argues that Muslims on the 
Indian subcontinent have established a certain “imperial pride”113 throughout their history on 
account of the Mughal empire:  
                                                 
112 The four wars took place in: The first Kashmir war in 1947, the second Kashmir war in 1965, the war 
on East-Pakistan in 1971, and the Kargil War in 1999. 
113 see Aziz (2005): 75. 
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The Muslims had come to India as conquerors and had established an empire 
which lasted for hundreds of years. This factor moulded their outlook in many 
ways.114  
Aziz goes so far as to speak of Muslim imperialism, which not only has become part of India’s 
reality in the past but also forced the Hindus to accept Muslim rule on the subcontinent.115 The 
fact that Muslim rule was put to an end through British colonialism put Muslims in a “bitter and 
truculent” state116. During the following political events such as the Sepoy-revolt in 1858 against 
the British, which can be seen as first revolutionary element in the fight against British rule and at 
the same time the attempt to reconquer a “glorious past”117 of the Muslims on the subcontinent,  
a huge anti-British and thus anti-Western sentiment was developed. 118This bitterness of Muslim 
failure was enforced through the fear of Hindu majority and “Hindu polity”119, who throughout 
history have been the “subject race”120, whereas Muslims were the “ruling race”121 on the Indian 
subcontinent, and could under no circumstances accept the fact of being ruled or governed by 
these “ci-devant slaves”122. According to Aziz, such attitudes prevented the syncretistic mixture of 
Islam and Hinduism on a broad scale in India and secured the orthodoxy of both religions.123  
The Hindu-Muslim rift can be defined as a religio-political problem that found its great eruption 
during the British rule. It is often argued that before British rule Hindus and Muslims were living 
together on the Indian subcontinent peacefully, but this is only partly true. As the Muslims 
arrived in India as conquerors, their Hindu subjects dared not show open enmity towards 
them.124 It was through the British rule and particularly through the “prospects of self-
government” that this rivalry found its peak.125 The conflict between Hindus and Muslims also 
found its way into the question of representation within Indian politics during British 
colonialism. The All India Muslim League proclaimed to represent all Muslim Indians on the 
subcontinent. This argument was often contested through the Congress who denied this 
approach of representation of the Muslim League and reproached it to be conservative old 
Muslim imperialists.126 The AIML in its political history had a long struggle as to win not only the 
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Muslim votes but also the support for its ideology such as the two-nation theory. The party had 
to form several alliances with other (Muslim) communities in different parts of India to spread its 
popularity and justify its ideology. This was feasible through the pro-Khilafat movement127 which 
allied the Muslims together in an unprecedented emotional attachment to a Muslim cause as well 
as helping to building the future cooperation of Muslim solidarity on the Indian subcontinent. At 
the same time, it contested the ideology of the AIML as Gandhi, promoting Indian independence 
and Hindu-Muslim unity, joined this cause with his mobilization of masses and thus contradicted 
the idea of the neglection of Muslim politics in the pre-Partition phase.128  
As to the question of representation, the Indian National Congress with its Hindu majority on 
the other side could not democratically represent all Indians.129 This helps explain the outcome of 
the 1937 legislative elections in which neither the AIML nor the INC won the expected results, 
but in which the INC nevertheless had a leading position and continued to insist to represent all 
Indians.130 Through this persistence of the Congress statement that it represented alone all 
Indians and that the AIML was not even representing all Indian Muslims it forced the Muslim 
elite into the re-thinking of their self-perception and in designing the idea of a separate nation: 
By declaring repeatedly that there was only one brand of nationalism in India, the 
Congress brand, it forced the Muslims to proclaim themselves as a separate 
nation. Such claims created fear and hatred in the Muslim mind. And hate and 
fear are potent ingredients for militant nationalism.131 
 
This was the beginning of Muslim nationalism and the Pakistan Movement, led by Mohammed 
Ali Jinnah. In the following section I will analyze the question on which basis the Pakistani nation 
state under Jinnah was built. 
2.1.2.2 Jinnah and the Pakistani nation state 
The concept of the Pakistani nation state and its birth is incomprehensible without a closer look 
on Pakistan’s founding father itself. Jinnah was throughout the historical debate torn between 
secularist and fundamentalist mainstream groups, both of whom lay claim to providing the 
ideological framework of Jinnah’s beliefs.  In short, I will try to give the most important analysis 
of his persona and reflect this debate on the present analysis of Pakistan’s identity. 
                                                 
127 The Khilafat movement is the vernacular Urdu/English term to speak of the movement for the rescue 
of the Ottoman califat. 
128 see Bose/Jalal (2005): 139. 
129 see Aziz (2005): 89. 
130 Ibd., p. 91. 
131 Ibd., p. 92. 
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The year 1947 and especially the years before stand in a very bloody light: This constitutional 
phase of Pakistan is often shadowed by the “communal holocaust”132 between Hindus and 
Muslims and the great refugee wave leaving millions of Indians without home:  
When India was partitioned there were nearly a hundred million Muslims in the 
subcontinent, or more than one person in five. Of these about sixty million were 
to live in Pakistan, both east and west, making it the largest Muslim state.133 
Although the Indian Muslims had one common ground, which is their religious background, 
hardly any other facts, such as their ethnic or linguistic identity were taken into account when 
Jinnah mobilized the Muslims all over the Indian subcontinent. This is one of the reasons why he 
has often been “accused and denounced in unison for tearing apart the historic unity of the 
Indian subcontinent”134.  
Historians often argue that Jinnah during his demand for Pakistan never clearly stated the 
grounds of his demand: 
While the leaders remained tight-lipped about what Pakistan actually entailed, the 
followers were allowed to make of it what they wished. Naturally, a host of 
conflicting shapes and forms, most of them vague, some utopian, others simply 
fatuous, were given to what was little more than an undefined slogan.135 
 
It is suggested that this move of Jinnah was done deliberately so as to hide that “Jinnah’s appeal 
to religion was not characteristic of his earlier politics136, nor indeed of his personal 
convictions”137. 
Historians and political analysts are certain that the use of Islam as a means of national 
mobilization was only a tactical step, used as a “lingua franca”138 by Jinnah. 
Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, historians from India and Pakistan, argue that religion as common 
cultural ground has always played an important role for Muslims, but in the context of the 
                                                 
132 see Bose/Jalal (2005): 162. 
133 Ibd., p. 158. 
134 Ibd. 
135 Ibd., p. 158f.  
136 Jinnah was between 1913 to 1937 for a combined Congress-League political programme and also 
demanded Hindu-Muslim unity. See Bose/Jalal (2005): 158. 
137 Ibd., p. 159. 
138 see Jaffrelot (2000): 27. 
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Pakistan Movement there has been no agreement whatsoever on the use of religion as a political 
ideology.139 
Jinnah’s strategy thus only achieved to mobilize the Muslim provincial bosses and thus seemed to 
have mobilized the Muslim masses. But in fact, most Muslims, whose local and cultural 
background did not find any representation within the AIML ideology did not feel represented by 
Jinnah and his party. Jinnah’s main aim was to give political power to the Muslims on the Indian 
subcontinent and thus to “win an equitable share of power for Muslims at the all-India centre”140. 
Jinnah’s political strategies can therefore be seen as being purely political and secularist and not 
religious. His famous speech held on 11 August 1947 proves this secularist tendency of Jinnah: 
You are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any 
other places of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion 
or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the State. (...) We 
are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal 
citizens of one State. (...) Now I think, we should keep that in front of us as our 
ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus will cease to be Hindus and 
Muslims will cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the 
personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens if the State.141 
This speech, which was given three days before the inauguration of the Pakistani state, is 
probably the most viable proof that Jinnah in his political understanding did not compass entirely 
Islamic principles of an Islamic state and of an Islamic society, and that he is in fact tolerating the 
mixed religious composition of the Pakistani society.  
Contested in his political personality, he is also often put in separate ideological frameworks. 
Among historians there is a heated debate going on, whether Jinnah can be seen as secularist or 
fundamentalist. Fact is that he constantly used religious references and arguments142 which makes 
Jinnah a hero for religious-fundamentalist Pakistani political parties such as the Jaamat-e-Islami.  
At the same time, fundamentalists feel uneasy with Jinnah’s religious tolerance and attitudes close 
to Western liberalism, which explains why Jinnah himself married a Parsee143 or why he allowed 
                                                 
139 see Bose/Jalal (2005): 159. 
140 Ibd., p. 160.  
141 see Zaidi (1999): 537f. 
142 see Ahmed, S. Akbar: “Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity. The search for Saladin.”, Oxford 
University Press, Karachi: 1997, p. 194. 
143 A Parsee is a member of the Zoroastrian community in India. 
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his only child to marry a non-Muslim144. These tendencies make Jinnah turn to a hero for secular-
democratic parties in Pakistan such as the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). 
Apart from this discourse on Jinnah’s personality, Jinnah nevertheless remains the political and 
historical figure – “the man born once in a million”145 – who shaped and formed this country 
Pakistan in its ideological background and who died at the peak of his greatest triumph in 1948, 
leaving a country behind that is until today struggling with its identity. 
2.1.3 The psychological factor  
Pakistan is caught in a cycle of violence from which it has not found any exit yet: It has not only 
led four wars against India since its creation, but is also in perpetual conflict situation with India 
due to the unresolved Kashmir conflict. Additionally, Pakistan has become a country of high geo-
strategical significance due to its nuclear armed power and the constant political instability within 
the country, often in terms of rising religious fundamentalism. 
The roots of all these problems are hard to make out, but as a fact Partition 1947 and the political 
and social aftermath have left a great psychological trauma within its citizens that is still 
governing the minds of its people and the country’s history since its creation. Pakistan’s foreign 
relations with India since 1947 can be seen as a pure failure that has only led to more violence 
than amical approach towards each other. Jaffrelot argues that Pakistan was born out of a feeling 
of insecurity and the strong belief in a fundamental difference between Hindus and Muslims. 
This has had the consequence that Pakistan has since its inception regarded India as its “enemy” 
and has thus demonised his big Indian neighbour.146 The Kashmir conflict is thus per se not only 
a geo-political conflict, it is also an ideological conflict between two countries which stand in 
ideological opposition towards each other. Pakistan is still struggling with the question of how to 
treat India. Jaffrelot concludes Pakistan’s dilemma towards India in following questions: 
Does it have to construct a future in a position of opposition towards India ? Is it 
better to turn its back to it, for priviligiziing the relations with its “brothers” – 
countries with Islamic faith? Or does the logic of its geographical situation order it 
to revise its politics and prepare a better future based on a dialogue and 
cooperation? In other words, does Pakistan face India ?147  
                                                 
144 see Akbar (1997): 199. 
145 Ibd., p. 187. 
146 see Jaffrelot (2000): 199.  
147 See original quotation : « Doit-il construire son avenir dans une posture d’opposition à l’Inde ? 
Vaudrait-il mieux lui tourner le dos, pour privilégier les relations avec les « pays frères » en Islam ? Ou la 
logique géographique lui commande-t-elle, au prix d’une difficile révision de sa politique, de préparer un 
meilleur avenir fondé sur le dialogue et la coopération ? En d’autres mots, le Pakistan doit-il se penser face 
à l’Inde en dehors d’elle, ou avec elle ? »Ibd. 
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In the following, I will try to portray the events that have led to this dilemma within Pakistan’s 
self-perception and politics. 
2.1.3.1 Partition 1947 – Memories of violence 
In order to grasp the whole picture on the psychological aftermath of Partition, it is extremely 
important to understand the view of the opposite side, which in our case is India and especially 
the “Hindu perception” of the situation. Therefore, I will in the following conclude the results of 
Djallal Heuzé, French anthropologist, researching among others on violence on the Indian 
subcontinent. 
In his article “La violence indienne aux prises avec l’imaginaire” he analyzes the ideological basis 
that is hidden behind the communal violence in India. Although the situation in India between 
Hindus and Muslims is more different than the overall situation between the two predominantly 
Hindu and Muslim states, India and Pakistan, his conclusions touch the fundamental basis of the 
Hindu and Muslim belief as to which I can use his conclusions as well as a mirror to understand 
the relationship between India and Pakistan on a religious and psychological basis.  
Heuzé understands violence as a force that derives from different conceptions of the “humane” 
and of its limits. It is equally a force that can erupt when it is impossible to speak.148 Furthermore, 
Heuzé sees violence as a “historical creation and a matrix of history and its apprehension”149. 
The violent events he analyzes is the Ayodhya conflict where for years Hindu’s and Muslims are 
not only struggling for their right to construct a Hindu temple by distroying  the historical Babri 
mosque but which has already led to bloody fights between both communities. In his 
understanding of violence, Heuzé argues that the violence which is expressed in this conflict 
derives from a historical reference, which has structured the myths, symbols, imaginations, 
scientific arguments, traditions and identity elements of the people.150 This violence is thus, so the 
author’s conclusion, a “cultural matrix”151. In his analysis on communal violence, one of the most 
used violent forms of crime on the Indian subcontinent is that of rape. But the fear of rape is not 
only a fear of a physical or psychological harm but it has even a bigger harm on a social level, 
where rape is seen as loss of honour. 
                                                 
148 see Heuzé, Djallal: “La violence indienne aux prises avec l’imaginaire“, in: Revue Tiers Monde 
“Entendre les violences – II ”, (2003) 176, t. XLIV, revue trimestrielle, pp. 771-802, here p. 772 
149 Ibd. 
150 Ibd., p. 773. 
151 Ibd., p. 774. 
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In a severely masculine dominant universe, for Hindus and Muslims, where a 
communal family (an endogamy model for the Muslims, and one of exogamy for 
the Hindus) is an ideal that’s rarely realized, and more and more abused, violence 
against women’s reproductive organs robs them of their reproductive identity. 
From the perception of many perpetrators, women’s breasts are also are a source 
of power, which are seen as the equivalent of the male penis. In this way, women 
are reconstructed as sex objects, and in suffering, destroyed as human beings.152 
 
Rape is not only against one person, one woman, but it touches the whole community, as the 
sense of community and family is very strong on the Indian subcontinent. It thus holds a 
“collective power” that lies within one violent act.153 
Rape is therefore not only a powerful violent strategy against another community, it is also 
“justifiable” through the perception on the history of the Indian subcontinent. In the Hindu 
perception, where India as the fertile ground, also often referred to as “bharat-mata” (= Mother 
India), represents something sacred and untouchable, Partition 1947 has been perceived by 
orthodox Hindus as a rape of their motherland India.154 
Rape has hence already been performed at the day of Partition 1947 and then carried on as 
“ethnic rape” in form of a sexual intimidation. 155 It has also been the result of a wish to 
externalize violence in the longest possible way, which would destroy izzat (=honour) of a family: 
The woman is made to suffer twice: first from the brutality of the rape itself and 
then from the horror of her family. It is a double burden. It violates the woman 
and it also alienates her from her own society as she is considered ‘impure’. 
Honour modesty and motherhood are all deemed to have been violated. (...) Rape 
is thus deliberately employed by ethnic neighbours who are fully aware of its 
expression as political power and cultural assertion to humiliate the internal 
other.156 
 
This violence also separates both communities as the violence performed creates the utmost 
hatred for the “other” and starts a spiral of violence between both communities. This has created 
a new problem of warfare and of soldiering in conflict situations: 
                                                 
152 Original quotation: “Dans un univers prédominance masculine sévère, chez les hindous et les 
musulmans, où la famille communautaire (de modèle endogame chez les musulmans, exogame chez les 
hindous) est un idéal rarement réalisé et de plus en plus malmené, la violence contre le ventre des femmes 
ramène ces dernières à une identité procréatrices. La poitrine est aussi, dans les perceptions de nombreaux 
participants, une source de la puissance, l’équivalent du pénis masculin. Les femmes sont recinstruites en 
tant que terreau fertile et souffrant, en même temps que détruites en tant qu’êtres humains”; see Heuzé 
(2003): 779. 
153 Ibd., p. 781. 
154 Ibd. 
155 see Ahmed (1997): 160. 
156 Ibd., p. 161. 
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Rape today is a modern instrument of war. In areas such as Bosnia and Kashmir, 
the modern soldier, it appears, marches with gun in one hand and penis in the 
other. His victories and main activities are not in the battlefield.157 
 
This extreme violence is still in the minds of millions of Indians and Pakistanis who have lived 
the horrors of Partition 1947 and which have shaped their image of the “other”. In the following 
I will analyze more concretely the image of India in Pakistan. 
2.1.3.2 The “India-syndrome”  
Jean-Luc Racine, French political scientist, has introduced this term “India-syndrome” which he 
uses to describe Pakistan’s “obsessive” behaviour towards India: 
 
Born of Partition, Pakistan has been self-defined at its birth as a Promised Land 
for the Muslims willing to escape from what the Muslim League defined as the 
‘Hindu rule’ in India. However, its successive leaders have not been able to free 
the national mind from its Indian obsession – rather they used it deliberately for 
their own purposes. A feeling of insecurity has been nurtured constantly since 
1947, partly by India’s realpolitik, but perhaps mostly by Pakistan’s eagerness to 
take to task a much larger neighbour.158 
 
Pakistan’s “obsession” with India is especially analyzed in the works of Ashis Nandy, working in 
the field of political psychology and looking at post-colonial states such as India and Pakistan. 
Ashis Nandy explains that Pakistan carries an “unofficial India”159 within its citizen’s minds, 
which unconsciously influences Pakistan’s self-image and “defines Pakistan’s boundaries and 
origins, loves and hates, past and future, its very core”.160 Nandy goes even further by saying that 
this unofficial India would in fact constitute Pakistan’s unofficial culture.161 Due to Pakistan’s 
ideology which constitutes Pakistan as a predominantly Muslim country that feared that India 
would not be a pluralistic multi-ethnic society due to its Hindu majority, it has turned anti-Hindu 
sentiments as a part of its ideology.162 Furthermore, he concludes that the Muslims in Pakistan do 
have in fact among others two inherent fears, which justify the fear “that Hinduism was not 
something outside, but a vector within”163. 
                                                 
157 Ibd. 
158 see Racine (2002): 198. 
159 see Nandy (2004): 240. 
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These two reasons, are first of all the recognition, that Hinduism on the Indian subcontinent is 
older than Islam, which means that every Indian’s forefathers have converted from Hinduism or 
Buddhism to Islam and thus creates a feeling of hatred within the “self”: 
The Muslim hatred of Hindus is actually the hatred of what they have rejected in 
their genealogical history. The Hindu hatred of Muslims is a direct result of this 
betrayal – a betrayal reinforced by the partition of India and creation of 
Pakistan.164  
 
Another reason is that Pakistan as a Muslim state cannot claim the authenticity of Islam on the 
South Asian continent, because of the fact that South Asian Islam is too influenced by Hinduism 
and Buddhism and other South Asian faiths.165 
 
Apart from this Nandy concludes that Pakistan does in fact need India as its enemy state, as the 
country that contests its ideology and its existence because without this contestation the existence 
of Pakistan would not be justified: 
 
India, to qualify as India for Pakistanis, must interfere in and try to subvert the 
Pakistani state. For Pakistan needs India to be its hostile but prized audience 
which, after trying out all its dirty tricks, will have to admit someday that Pakistan 
has made it, that Pakistan is not the failure that the Pakistanis themselves secretly 
suspect it to be. That acceptance by India and, by implification, the Hindus is 
even more important for the ideologues of Pakistan than what the common run 
of Pakistani citizens think of Pakistan. For, everything said, India is the exiled self 
of Pakistan, by exteriorising and territorializing which Pakistan has built its 
identity and it remains fifty years after its creation, the final measure of the worth 
of Pakistan.166 
 
Jaffrelot has a similar finding of his analysis on Indo-Pakistani relationships and suggests that this 
“difference” that was promoted between India and Pakistan since their independence has in fact 
defined both identities and constructed them politically.167  
In the following, I want to discuss the result of this Indo-Pakistani ideological battle on a political 
level, looking at Pakistan’s realpolitik in two major fields: the Kashmir conflict and Pakistan’s 
nuclear power politics. 
                                                 
164 See Ziauddin Sardar quoted in: Nandy (2004): 243. 
165 Ibd., p. 244. 
166 Ibd., p. 245. 
167 Ibd., p. 201. 
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2.1.3.3 Pakistan’s realpolitik  
If we look at Pakistan’s realpolitik after 1947, we see that there are several major political 
events168 which are entirely defined by Pakistan’s relationship to India. One of these events is the 
Kashmir conflict. It would break the framework of this paper to analyze all the political events 
involved in this conflict. This is why I am only going to portray the psychological components of 
the political developments inherent in this event. 
2.1.3.3.1 The Kashmir conflict 
As already discussed Pakistan is strongly marked by a perception of Muslim-Hindu difference, 
which contributes to a reductionist social policy that often defines India as the Hindu country, 
ignoring India’s religious and ethnic pluralism. According to Jaffrelot, Pakistan needs this 
reductionist simplification of India so as to legitimize itself as a Muslim country.169 This politics 
of difference resulted into the demonization of India, and Pakistan’s existence in the light of a 
strongly perceived feeling of insecurity, has led to the establishment of a strong army in 
Pakistan.170 Focal point of these fears is the Kashmir conflict, which per se becomes a present 
quasi-battle of the historical Muslims struggle for power, independence and security on the 
Indian subcontinent under British rule. The fact that Kashmiri Muslims are forced to live and 
suffer171 under the controlled Indian territory, confirmed many Pakistanis that a “co-habitation” 
between Hindus and Muslims, especially under Hindu dominance, would not have been 
possible.172 This has strongly activated the spirit of defence173 among Pakistani policy-makers and 
justified Pakistan’s wars on Kashmir with India. Next to this religious component of this 
historical conflict on Kashmir, Kashmir is also in itself a topos174 for wealth, beauty and 
particularly a metaphor used for paradise. Jannat, the Urdu term for signifying Garden Eden, 
paradise, has often been compared with the valley of Kashmir, due to its immense beauty and 
popularity on the Indian subcontinent throughout time.  
The loss of a region which bears such a tremendous significance on a political, religious and 
psychological level has charged the Kashmir conflict with an ideological burden which both 
                                                 
168 To grasp the whole picture on Indo-Pakistani relations it would be necessary to at least look at the 
different wars between India and Pakistan, the secession of Bangladesh in 1971, and Pakistan’s armament 
as a nuclear power, on a historical basis.  
169 Jaffrelot (2000): 202. 
170 Ibd. 
171 The Kashmir conflict is especially shadowed by strong human rights violation in the region.  
172 see Jaffrelot (2000): 202. 
173 Ibd. 
174 The term “topos” is used here in a simplistic linguistic understanding of this term, which understands 
“topos” as a stereotyped idea. See Bergez, Daniel/Géraud, Violaine/Robrieux, Jean-Jacques: “Vocabulaire 
de l’analyse littératiare“, Armand Colin, Paris : 1994, p. 129. 
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countries cannot give up. For India, the region Kashmir is ultimately important, so as to portray 
themselves as a secular pluralistic country that is capable of dealing with religious minorities: 
A number of writers have linked India’s unyielding stance on the Kashmir dispute 
to the fear not only of Balcanisation if the region became independent or went to 
Pakistan, but to the importance for India’s secular self-image of having this sole 
Muslim majority state safely within the Union. It could be argued, however, that 
the Kashmir issue has been far more important to Pakistani than Indian 
nationalism, because it has provided a rallying point in an otherwise fractious 
political environment.175 
 
On the other hand, the Kashmir conflict for Pakistan is also often seen as a question of honour 
and a question of Pakistan’s acceptance as a Muslim country and of the recognition of injustice 
lived by India.176 
2.2 Pakistan – a nation in the quest of its identity 
Pakistan has long been on the quest of its identity as this was never really defined. Pakistan – “the 
state of refugees”177 – provided a home for millions of Indian Muslims throughout the Indian 
subcontinent. Today, Pakistan is often being referred to as a “country without a nation”178.  
To quote one famous Pakistani artist on Pakistan’s quest for its identity:179. 
 
Ik mulk ki talaash us waqt thee qaum ko 
Ab mulk dhoonta hai meri qaum hai kahaan 
 
‘At that time, the nation was searching for a state,  
Now the state searches for its nation.’ 
 
Before I start the analysis on Pakistan’s identity problem, I want to give some theoretical input as 
to what are the most important and contested elements that create a so-called, “nation” and 
“collective identities”. 
The concept of a “nation” is per se a very contested one. Ernest Gellner argues that nations are 
not “an inherent attribute of humanity”180, moreover both the “nation” and the “state” have to 
                                                 
175 Ian Talbot: “India & Pakistan“, Arnold, London: 2000, p. 168. 
176 see Lamb, Alastair: “Incomplete Partition. The Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute 1947- 1948”, Oxford 
University Press, Karachi: 2003, p. 345. 
177 Jaffrelot (2000): 33. 
178 see the book of Jaffrelot, Christophe: “Pakistan, Nationalism without a Nation”, Zed Books Ltd., 
London: 2002. 
179 see Jaun Aelia in Abbas, S.M. Ali: “Pakistan: The state searching for its nation” in: The Ravi, Centanary 
Issue 2006, GCU Lahore, pp. 45-48, here p. 45 
180 see Gellner, Ernest: “Nations and Nationalism“, Basil Blackwell Publisher Limited, Oxford: 1983, p. 6 
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emerge independently so as to consolidate nationalism.181 He further argues that the state often 
develops itself before the nation in an independent and contingent way, however it is also 
possible to find states “that have certainly emerged without the blessing of the nations”182. To 
conclude, he answers the question on the state of the nation by giving two viable possibilities on 
how to define a nation: Either two man who share the same culture183 can call themselves as 
citizens of the same nation, or if two men “recognize each other as belonging to the same 
nation”184. 
Whereas Gellner lets this question unanswered, Benedict Anderson in his theoretical work 
“imagined communities” presents a clear understanding of a nation. Anderson strongly focuses 
on the semantical concept of nationhood that is according to him strongly defined by the print 
media, which again is the result of a long capitalist process. Anderson locates the selection of one 
privileged language as the access to the ontological truth185 as a prerequisite condition to establish 
a print-media which eventually contributes to the profound faith in a new autonomous imagined 
community, a nation.186 
Basis of every nation is a “collective memory” – a concept defined by the French philosopher 
Maurice Halbwachs. This concept ascertains that each individual in every society becomes part of 
a socialization process in which he acquires the memory of its society, which becomes his own 
national reference.187 Jan Assman pursues the theoretical understanding of Halbwachs and creates 
the concept of a “collective identity”. This concept consists of three major references, which are 
a) a time/space reference which embeds memories in a concrete geographical space and locates it 
on a historical timeline, which then provide vectors of identity and build a “home”188, b) a group-
reference that defines the “self” and the “other”189 and last c) a reference to the reconstructivity 
of history as it also structures the past and the present.190 
                                                 
181 Ibd. 
182 Ibd. 
183 “Culture“ is defined by Gellner by “a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving 
and communicating”. See Gellner (1983): 7. 
184 Ibd. 
185 see Anderson, Benedikt: “Die Erfindung der Nation. Zur Karriere eines folgenreichen Konzeptes.“, 
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In the case of Pakistan all these concepts should be kept in mind as they will be discussed later 
according to the hermeneutical and empirical output. We can however already argue that 
Pakistan, as a state constructed on an ideological basis, will find most probably its theoretical 
background in theories of Ernest Gellner, although they their application on Pakistan still 
remains ambivalent. As Gellner argues in one of his definitions a nation is only then a nation if 
two men share the same culture. This would steal the ideological justification for the existence of 
the state Pakistan, as the Indian subcontinent is a pluralistic society sharing different cultures in 
one territorial space. It is therefore not applicable for Pakistan if we look at Pakistan’s different 
ethnic cultures. It might be applicable if we change culture by religion and accept religion as “a 
system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating”191 as 
Gellner defines “culture”. But, if we consider on the other hand, that India has more Muslims 
than Pakistan does, the ideological justification for Pakistan is still missing. Pakistan’s major claim 
as being an ideological state, based on Islam, would equally not allow Gellners first definition of a 
nation, as more than half of the Indian Muslims still live in India at the time of Partition, which 
would mean that these Indian Muslims would probably share the same culture as Pakistani 
Muslims but do not belong to the same nation.  
As to Anderson’s understanding of an imagined community, his argument on the selection of 
one privileged language as the access to one ontological truth can also be heatly debated. First of 
all, this presumes that most of the countries follow a literary tradition, which in regard of 
Pakistan is only partly true. Pakistan has always had a strong oral tradition, where many 
languages, such as Punjabi, the biggest ethnic and linguistic group in Pakistan, is not commonly 
used to converse in a written way. On the other hand, it can be argued that Pakistan, did however 
select Urdu as its national language, which has always been regarded as the language of the 
Muslims, and thus does have the power to bind a nation together on grounds of this language. 
The only problem here lies within the fact that Urdu itself is a contested element of a language 
and ethnicity problem in Pakistan and does not have the necessary potential to bind these 
Pakistanis together on grounds of one privileged national language.  
As to Jan Assman’s ideas on a collective identity it certainly finds its fertile ground in Pakistan, 
where the education system tries to define the time/space-reference along with a group-
reference, which also shape the perception of Pakistan’s citizens and thus does have a 
reconstructivity effect on the present and the future. His theories on a collective mind are thus 
applicable and operational conceptions for the analysis of a Pakistani nation. 
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In the following, I will present Pakistan’s most contested aspects included in the theoretical 
findings of a nation and an identity, along two major levels: Pakistan’s contested ideology behind 
an Islamic identity versus a historical, traditional and cultural pride of the own ethnic identity. 
2.2.1 Islamic identity 
This chapter is going to discuss the notion of Islamic identity in Pakistan. This analysis will be 
divided along two lines, which will look at the different implementation of Islam on a) a political 
level in regard of the nation state and its constitution and b) on a social level in regard of basically 
two outputs of culture: language and education. 
2.2.1.1 Political implementation of Islam 
In this part, I will primarily focus on the works of Javid Iqbal, who pursues a critical stance 
towards the ideology of Pakistan and Pakistan’s contested identity. 
Due to the historical background of the creation of the state of Pakistan, and Jinnah’s constant 
demand for a Muslim state on the Indian subcontinent, Pakistan is often seen as an ideological 
state, which derives its significance and identity from the two-nation theory it is based on. After 
the death of Jinnah, hardly any “service was rendered to the Ideology”192, as no one really 
implemented the two-nation theory in the different domains such as politics, education or 
economy. According to Iqbal this was one of the major reasons why the “anti-ideological 
forces”193, such as Muslim extremists, regional groups or sectarian movements threatened a 
disintegration of Pakistan. The different regional, cultural and linguistic traits of the Indian 
Muslims were not taken into account, when the state Pakistan was founded. Therefore, the only 
viable ideology that could be given to this newly created state, was that of Islam. But does this 
turn Pakistan into an Islamic state?  
Islam has thus become the one and only “nation-building force”194 for the establishment of 
Pakistan. Contrary to nations that give birth to states, in Pakistan it is the state that gives birth to 
a nation: 
Pakistan by herself did not give birth to any nation; on the contrary, the Muslim 
nation struggled for and brought Pakistan into being. Therefore, Pakistan is not 
technically the cause of any kind of nationhood. It is only an effect, a result or a 
fruit of the struggle of the Muslim nation for territorial specification.195 
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The Islamic principle on which Pakistan is based is the overall sovereignty of God and the 
concept that the “authority delegated to the State is a sacred trust”196, which has to envisage the 
democratic recognition of its citizens and guarantee the most fundamental rights of every citizen: 
 
(...) equality of status and of equality before law, freedom of thought, expression, 
belief, faith, worship, association, assembly, movement, trade, business or 
profession, and the right to hold and dispose of property, subject to law and 
public morality; it must secure the complete independence of the judiciary and 
uphold the supremacy of rule of law.197 
These are the most important fundamental rights based on the Qur’an and Sunnah198, which are 
grounded in Pakistan’s Islamic self-perception of the state and which were also promoted by 
Jinnah.199 Nevertheless, the question of the relationship between the state and religion in Pakistan 
was not solved, which presented major challenges in the constitution-making years between 
1947-1956. The first Constituent Assembly in Pakistan drafted in 1949 an Objective Resolution, 
where democratic principles such as freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice should be 
followed according to Islamic principles. For the constitution of such a document, the different 
power/elite groups, such as politicians, religious scholars and intellectuals  in the Pakistani state 
had to answer the question on how the concept of an Islamic state looks like. The ulema200 
envisaged an Islamic state such as the early caliphate and demanded it to be the basis for the 
Islamic constitution in Pakistan.201 The views of the ulema, seen as the traditionalists in this 
debate, were not accepted by the Government of Pakistan, as their vision on an Islamic state 
seemed “dead, unprogressive and a state collection of injunctions and prohibitions”202. This 
group also integrates the religious groups such as the Jaamat-e-Islami, who under his founder and 
leader Maulana Maududi, demanded equally medieval Islamic concepts according to the Islamic 
caliphate in the past and the introduction of the Sharia in Pakistan. 
The modernists, who were recruited from the members of the AIML, preferred the Arab model, 
the concept of “ijma” – a consensus of elected Moslems on a state level who try to bridge the gap 
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between old Islamic political concepts and institutions and the modern world.203 The Pakistani 
intelligentsia as third important group in this debate, seen as the secular elite on the other side 
tried to elaborate a modern concept of an Islamic state. According to the Pakistani intellectuals, 
the Qur’an and Sunnah provided no real concept of an Islamic state. On the other hand, the 
Sharia allows a “great latitude in governmental method and administration”204 due to which it 
would be more necessary to “define the principles which should actuate an Islamic polity”205. 
The Objective Resolution presented in 1949 can be seen as a resolution drafted very openly as 
“both traditionalists and the modernists could read in it the embodiment of their version of 
Islamic state”206 and which presented the draft of a future constitution with an Islamic 
character.207 Another major reason for this is that neither traditionalists nor modernists had really 
clearly pointed out their views on an Islamic state, because of which their contradictory 
discourses could not be clearly made out.208 
The process of establishing a constitution in Pakistan took eight years, from 1947 to 1956. Both 
traditionalists along with religious groups and leaders such as Maulana Maududi – leader and 
founder of the Islamist party Jaamat-e-Islami – and modernists presented various different 
aspects for the formation of a Pakistani constitution. In 1956, Pakistan was finally declared as an 
“Islamic Republic” with its constitution which was seen as a compromise for both modernists 
and traditionalists. The constitution of 1956209 had the Objective Resolution as its preamble, 
which affirmed the sovereignty of Allah and guaranteed its citizens to have the possibility to live 
according to the Islamic law. Other important aspects of the constitution 1956 are the Principles of 
Policy which seek to develop cooperation with other Muslim countries, the promotion of Islamic 
education and institutions within Pakistan as well as the promotion of Islamic morals within the 
Pakistani society. As to the president of Pakistan, he is supposed to create infrastructural settings 
for the establishment of an Islamic society. Next to this, the formation of a consultative 
commission whose members are elected by the Pakistani government, was decided, which similar 
to a check and balance-system checks whether the laws voted by the parliamentarians are 
according to the Qur’an and the Sunnah. This commission only had a consultative role, the 
legislative power still lied within the Pakistani government. In 1958, general Ayub Kahn took 
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over the government and established the first martial rule in Pakistan. Ayub Kahn tailored his 
own new constitution in 1962. 210 This constitution strengthened the role of the president, to 
which he accorded the power of leading a presidential regime. At the same time he modified the 
voting system to a pyramidal voting system and tried to de-politicize the society. He additionally 
deleted the word “Islamic” from Pakistan’s title as an “Islamic Republic of Pakistan” and 
changed it to the “Republic of Pakistan”. Because of the protests coming from the religious 
parties, he had to change it back to its previous title. He was not able to secularize the country, 
but he still managed to lead a relative modern course by establishing the Muslim Family Law 
Ordinance, which restrained polygamy and strengthened the rights of women. 
In 1971, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, head of the PPP came into power in Pakistan and amended the 
constitution in 1973. 211 He left the Islamic clauses of the constitution such as the role of the 
consultative commission untouched and did only one major change: He changed the political 
system by introducing a parliamentary regime, replacing thus the presidential regime introduced 
by Ayub Khan. 
This is still the very same constitution which is applied in Pakistan today. However, this 
constitution has been amended through Pakistan’s various leaders through different decrees and 
amendments. Although Bhutto changed the political situation, the perpetual political crises in 
Pakistan always invited military rulers to overthrow the government and establish a martial rule. 
2.2.1.2 Social implementation of Islam 
The social implementation of Islam will be analyzed along two important criteria: the use of Urdu 
as official Muslim language in Pakistan and the education system in Pakistan which has a strong 
focus on Islamic teaching. 
2.2.1.2.1 Urdu as Muslim language 
The social implementation of Islam becomes visible in the promotion of several Muslim outputs, 
that after Partition 1947 have been added by a national attribute “Pakistani” after the conflict. As 
Urdu is known to be the language that was developed and derived within Moslem rule in India 
and used during British rule by the religious scholars and Islamic clerks to propagate the message 
of Islam,212 Pakistan officially implemented Urdu as its national language.213 Nevertheless, Urdu 
cannot be seen as an entirely Muslim product, as it was in fact a language that was influenced by 
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various languages such as Arabic, Persian, Turkish and English and basically compromises 
vocabulary from the “Sanskrit” group, such as Hindi. Urdu can be seen as a “product of Hindu 
Muslim amity and also the confluence of their cultures”214. Nevertheless, both languages, Urdu 
and Hindi, became part of an avid conflict during Partition 1947 and especially in the policy-
formation processes afterwards. Jaffrelot argues that both languages have become cultural 
symbols, which have been turned to national languages of India (Hindi) and Pakistan (Urdu).215 
This, he concludes, is the reason why those languages became identity markers, and thus the 
vectors of identity for either country: 
 
The manipulation of cultural symbols focused not only on Islam, but also on 
Urdu. The command of this language by the Muslims would have helped them to 
preserve their privileged positions, had not Hindi become an official language too. 
While it was almost indistinguishable from Hindi as a spoken language – both 
were the two faces of the same coin, Hindustani – and while it was used by many 
literate Hindus, the ideologues of Aligarh and the Muslim League, like the zealots 
of Hindi at the same time, tried hard to present it as the language of the Muslims. 
This is one more indication that Muslim nationalism did not derive from 
‘primordial’ identity makers, but was an ideological construction.216 
 
Jaffrelot follows Benedict Anderson’ s theory – the most important author in the analysis of 
nationalism – that one of the most important elements of creating a nation is to “elect” one 
privileged language that becomes part of the formation of a national identity.217 Official language 
in Pakistan however is English, whereas national language of Pakistan is Urdu. The paradox that 
lies within this is that Pakistan as a multi-linguistic country only holds 6% of Urdu mother 
tongue-speakers. But it is still used on various levels: in schools, in the media, in the military, in 
various institutions, as well as a means of communication between the different provinces.218  
2.2.1.2.2 Religious instruction in schools 
Education is another important parameter to look at in terms of social implementation of Islam 
in Pakistan. Pakistan has a highly diverse education system, which will be analysed in detail in the 
following chapter. It is important to note that Pakistan has a three-dimensional education system: 
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1) The English vernacular school system 2) The Urdu vernacular school system and 3) The 
madrassah system. 
The English vernacular system is relatively expensive which is why most of upper and middle 
class families send their children to these schools.219 Those in lower classes send their children to 
low-cost English vernacular schools or to Urdu medium schools.220 Poor families send their 
children to madrassahs, where education is free for boys.221 
Religious education in Pakistan is seen as extremely important for the education of its citizens. 
The Commission on National Education 1958 in Pakistan states that: 
As education aims at the integrated and balanced development of the whole man, 
body and spirit – it must create an appreciation of the fundamental moral and 
spiritual values that constitute the foundations of civilization, towards which all 
human endeavour should be directed. In performing this task a system of 
education must benefit from the humanizing influence of religion, which 
broadens sympathies, inculcates tolerance, self-sacrifice, and social service, and 
removes artificial distinctions between man and woman. Reverence for God and 
the prophets has an annobling effect on the soul and opens the mind to an 
appreciation of the unity of mankind.222 
 
The question of the ideological basis of education has long been a contested issue in Pakistan. Its 
most important aim was to “contain, oppose, and eliminate ethnic threat”.223 Following the logic 
of Pakistan’s ideological basis, it was thus decided to include “Islamic studies” in the Pakistani 
syllabus and make the rest of the syllabus also confirm with Islam, as well as make Urdu 
compulsory for everybody along with English as compulsory language in schools.224 The 
madrassahs, which filled an “educational and social vacuum” in terms of inaccessible national 
school systems, especially in the northern parts in Pakistan and in terms of social rise through 
education, indoctrinated the children according to the ideology of religious political parties, to 
which these schools were allied.225 Due to this educational problem through the madrassahs, 
politicians tried to counteract by suggesting that the syllabus of madrassah schools should be 
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structured according to the general education in Pakistan, which still has not been achieved, since 
madrassahs are funded by charity and endowments and not through the government.226  
Religious education in Pakistan especially thrived under General Zia-ul-Haq’s martial rule. His 
educational policy contained among others “to foster in the hearts and minds of the people in 
Pakistan and the students in particular a deep and abiding loyalty to Islam and Pakistan” as well 
as “to create awareness in every student that he, as a member of the Pakistani nation, is also part 
of the universal Muslim Ummah and that it is expected of him to make a contribution towards 
the welfare of fellow Muslims inhabiting the globe on the one hand and to help spread the 
message of Islam throughout the world on the other”.227 Thus textbooks and other materials 
were all “islamized” under the regime of Zia-ul-Haq and served as a propaganda-means for his 
regime: 
Moreover, Islam was used to support the state’s own militaristic policies in such a 
way that it appeared to the readers of these textbooks that Pakistan, the Pakistan 
movement, Pakistan’s wars with India, the Kashmir issue were all connected not 
only with Pakistani nationalism but with Islam itself.228  
 
The civilian governments which followed the regime of Zia-ul-Haq basically took over the 
educational policies:  
 
The trend towards privatization, started by Ziaul Haq and promoted by all 
subsequent governments, was to be encouraged even further.229 
 
Tariq Rahman states that the education system was basically the “vehicle for creating 
nationalism”230 and in guaranteeing “a unified Pakistani nation”231. 
2.2.2 Ethnic identity 
 
In Pakistan, the state is controlled by the military232, traditional legalislatic Islam 
has reasserted itself, and the largest ethnic community prevails over all the others. 
It is not apparent that this system is unusually exploitative or that any other 
feasible arrangement could be more effective. Nevertheless, Pakistan is not a 
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democratic state; Islam is not, in Pakistan, a driving moral force; and neither 
political nor religious institutions have succeeded in diminishing interethnic 
conflict.233 
 
This statement by Leonard Binder, author of the article “Islam, Ethnicity, and the State in 
Pakistan” gives a good overview over the ethnic situation in Pakistan. In the Indian subcontinent 
the ethnic identity, has been the first and foremost identity marker, followed by religion, and only 
then, according to the historical process, the state. In Pakistan, were Indian Muslims all over the 
Indian subcontinent were bunched together under an artificial state constellation with an 
ideological basis, the problem of ethnicity soon posed a problem to national politics and society. 
This is especially due to the fact that the Pakistani state has always used religion – the common 
major trait - to suppress any ethnic movement in order to maintain the national solidarity. 
 
The government of Pakistan has consistently denied the legitimacy of politicised 
ethnicity, and it has attempted to use the twin instruments of Islam and the state 
to overcome this subversive force.234 
 
As this ethnic problem was therefore never resolved throughout history, Pakistan is still and 
often been described as a country that is in quest of its identity. To analyze this problem, this 
issue has to be viewed according to two different parameters which are: the provinces and 
ethnicities and languages. 
2.2.2.1 Provinces 
Pakistan consists of four provinces which are: Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan and the North West 
Frontier Province (NWFP), along with two regions who have an autonomous status which are 
the Northern Areas and Azad Jammu and Kashmir. These last two regions are still in 
contestation between India and Pakistan and still pose a problem to the foreign policies of both 
countries. The Northern Areas are still administered by the Central Government of Pakistan, 
whereas the Azad Jammu and Kashmir have its own parliament and its own government and 
thus can act autonomously except for economical and foreign policy-matters as well as matters 
concerning the Pakistani currency.235 
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Similar political status is accorded to the Tribal Areas bordering Afghanistan, which are being 
governed by “political agents” of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.236 These areas are 
often described as a no-rule area because the common law of Pakistan is not being applied 
here.237 That is why these regions are controlled by so called “jirgas” – which define tribal 
councils – who make the most important judicial, political and social rules in the various regions, 
which cover very traditional, often not even Islamic, attitudes. 
The most important province in Pakistan is Punjab. This province not only holds Islamabad as its 
capital but also contains the biggest cities in Pakistan such as Lahore and Faisalabad. Often it is 
being spoken of the “Punjabi hegemony” because Punjabis are the most powerful ethnic groups 
as they control the state through their widespread representation within Pakistani politics, the 
army and several other strategic important institutions. The Punjab is not only politically a very 
important province but also economically as it is the most fruitful region, which contains five 
rivers and has two of the most important industry businesses in Pakistan: textile and rice. 
 
Sindh is next to Punjab the second most important region in Pakistan, as it has as its capital 
Karachi, which is the largest city in Pakistan and which can be seen as an industrial haven with 
many business domains. Most of Pakistan’s economic policy is being defined by Karachi. 
 
Baluchistan’s capital is Quetta. The province is widely unpopulated due to its desert-like 
topographical situation, which on the other hand makes it rich for ressources such as gas, choil, 
and copper.  
 
The NWFP has its capital in Peshawar, which borders Afghanistan and often becomes a focal 
point of the political tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The province is a region which 
mainly lives from agriculture and livestock farming. 
 
Main problem of all provinces are the finances: Most of the finances flow into Punjab and Sindh, 
as it contains the most important cities, due to which the other provinces hardly get any financial 
share. 238 
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2.2.2.2 Ethnicity and language 
In these four provinces and the three allied regions with quasi-autonomous political status many 
different ethnic groups are found, which speak more than 20 languages.239 As political units of 
identity, Pakistan is structured from “family to neighbourhood to clan and tribe and then to 
larger entities defined by cultural or lingual unity”.240 
Haq Nawaz Akther, who analyses the history of military rule in Pakistan, sees the first military 
coup in 1958 as responsible action for the non-creation of national solidarity in Pakistan as it 
hindered the development of sovereignty of the people in Pakistan: 
 
Alas, the army coup 1958 by Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan arrested the political 
development. Military organization is based on centrality of a command 
organization. The person of the commander is the centre of loyalty and blind 
obedience ‘Theirs not to reason why. Theirs but to do and die’. This philosophy 
serves ill the cause of populism and democracy. So a system of selection replaced 
elections. By depriving people of the exercise of sovereignty, the nation had to be 
managed through hand-picked feudals;241 
This is why under Ayub Khan the movement of the Bengalis (East Pakistan) gradually gained 
more importance. This conflict was also strongly caused by a linguistic issue, as Urdu was 
declared national language in 1951 and the Bengalis, proud of their language and especially their 
literary culture, refused to replace Bangla (language of Bengalis) with Urdu, which resulted in a 
big protest movement in 1952.242 Together with an economic and social neglect of the province 
East Pakistan, eventually strong separationist movements could be established which led to the 
India-supported secession of Bangladesh, and to the second Indo-Pakistani war. 
The Punjabis have always been a very powerful ethnic group since the inception of the state 
Pakistan. Jaffrelot argues that the reason why Punjabis are so powerful within Pakistani state 
politics is that the Punjabi Muslims have throughout the Pakistan Movement been the most 
receptive group as to the idea of Pakistan and were seeking to maintain and expand their power 
over the whole country.243 Punjabis do not only control the state apparatus but also the army. 244 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who became president of Pakistan in 1971, was himself a Sindhi and 
changed the constitution in favour of a federal system to strengthen the parity within the 
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different groups, promoting especially Sindhi Punjabi accord. 245 Nevertheless Sindhi nationalism 
awakened due to their weak political situation demanding a provincial autonomy along with more 
supply of water, which turned into a big political issue. Until today the Sindhi conflict marks the 
local scenario in terms of ethnic conflicts with other ethnic groups in urban Sindh. 
The Baluch and Pashtun issue also goes back to the beginning of the consolidation of the state 
Pakistan. Already in 1948 Baluchi leaders tried to claim their right for sovereignty for the entire 
region in the Baluch army struggle.246 Baluch nationalism kept on surfacing, with a new peak in 
1973 under Bhuttos regime, but their aim of Baluch sovereignty was never achieved. Until today, 
Baluchis are demanding their own homeland. 
 
The Pashtun issue is similar to the Baluchi issue. From the very beginning, the Pashtuns were 
against an integration of their region into the state Pakistan. Furthermore, they even demanded a 
separate autonomous provincial state “Pakhtoonistan”. It was only under the regime of Zia-ul 
Haq that the Pashtuns found some satisfaction, because he provided a certain quota of Pashtuns 
access to the state and the army, in return for their help against the Sovjets in Afghanistan.247 
Today, the Pashtun nationalism often stands in the light of Islamic militarization as the 
“talibanization of Aghanistan” is often combined with the “pashtun tribalism”.248 
  
One major separatist tendency that still needs to be discussed here is that of mohajirs. Mohajir is 
the Urdu term for migrant and defines those Indian Muslims coming from different provinces of 
the Indian subcontinent who settled down in the state of Pakistan. Although they have no 
particular common ethnic ground, they all have an Urdu-speaking background which made them 
build up their own community and eventually form their own political party, Mohajir Qaumi 
Movement. This party tried to balance out the ethnic inequality between the different ethnicities 
in Pakistan and even became a radical agent in this demand.249 Until today the MQM is still one 
of the major important political parties in Pakistan.  
2.3 Pakistan’s political culture 
Pakistan’s political culture is difficult to describe and can be analyzed according to various 
different parameters. One of the most striking re-occurrences of the history of Pakistani politics 
is its almost periodical fall into a military rule and the follow-up of undemocratic principles. A 
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closer and more narrow analysis of the political situation in Pakistan in the given time framework, 
will be analyzed later in chapter four in “The political situation in Pakistan – a country in 
perpetual crisis”, where I will give an analytical approach towards the political situation in 
Pakistan. For now, I will present the two most important factors inherent in the development of 
the political culture in Pakistan, in order to understand in a second step the findings of my 
questionnaire and interviews results, to which this part shall only became a referential framework 
for the reader. 
2.3.1 History of political developments in Pakistan 
Since Pakistan’s existence in 1947, Pakistan has had three different constitutions and four military 
rulers. In total, military regimes have in Pakistan survived longer than civilian regimes. 
Democracy seems still to be an unachieved goal of this young country, which is prone to military 
rulers. 
In the following, I will give a very brief history on the political developments by highlighting the 
different eras of Pakistani politics, by characterizing the politics of the Pakistani leaders and the 
most important political parties and its opponents in the different eras.  
After the creation of Pakistan, Jinnah became the first Pakistani political leader by designating 
himself the title of the governor general in Pakistan. Jinnah was especially in favour of a 
centralization of politics along with a strong personalization of power in the form of the 
governor general.250 He justified the strong power accorded within the position of the governor 
general by the argument, that it would be important to first construct the state and to deal with 
other problems later on.251 By saying so, he also dismissed the governors of NWFP and Sindh, 
who were opposing to Jinnah’s politics. After Jinnah’s death, Liaquat Ali Khan became the new 
prime minister. Under Liaquat Ali Khan’s political era, the first separational movements and 
parties started to get more politically involved on the political landscape. As Liaquat Ali Khan 
himself, was the leader of the All India Muslim League, which according to him had the sole 
legitimacy to speak for the Pakistani people, he was strictly against all other political formations, 
such as the Jaamat-e-Islami, whose leader, Maulana Maududi, was being arrested by him. His 
policies led to a rising number of enemies, which eventually led to his assassination in Rawalpindi 
in 1951. Khawaja Nazimuddin became then the new governor general of Pakistan. His policy 
especially concerning West Pakistan, created a big political crisis with countrywide protests. 
Combined with economical problems in forms of a food crisis under his regime, the political 
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crisis in Pakistan became gradually bigger, which led to big riots within the country. Eventually, 
his cabinet got dismissed by the prime minister of Pakistan. Mohammed Ali Bogra became the 
new Prime Minister of Pakistan and set up the “One Unit Scheme”, integrating all the different 
regions into West Pakistan and established a political and cultural balance in East and West 
Pakistan. The political era under his regime was also marked by strong political dissent which 
among others led to the establishment of a state of emergency in Pakistan. 1956, the first 
constitution of Pakistan was being adopted under Iskander Mirza, the new General Governor, 
who later became the president of Pakistan. 
In 1958, General Ayub Khan established for the first time military rule in Pakistan and later 
became the next elected president of Pakistan. Ayub's politics were marked by a strong de-
politization of society and of “political tutelage through indirect elections and official nomination 
of representatives”252. His two orders, the Public Offices Order and the Elective Bodies Order, 
allowed to withdraw politicians who had misconducted. Further Ordinances such as the Public 
Safety Ordinance and the Press and Publications Ordinance allowed to suppress and control the 
media and to use it for his own political propaganda. But among other things, his political era was 
also known to have modernized the country as his social reform, the Family Laws Ordinance 
1961, strengthened women’s rights particularly in regards of divorces. He equally engaged himself 
in the economic development of the country through land reforms and actually pushed the 
Pakistani economy during his military rule. Nevertheless, his military rule raised more and more 
social and regional tensions especially concerning the imbalances between East and West 
Pakistan. Due to this mounting opposition, his successor, Zulflikar Ali Bhutto, established the 
new government of Pakistan with his political party, the Pakistan’s People’s Party (PPP). The 
party was ideologically following “Islamic socialism” and understands itself as a secular-
democratic party. His party became relatively popular in East Pakistan, but could not build 
alliance with the Awami League, the most popular party in West Pakistan, which eventually led to 
the secession of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. Bhutto’s domestic policy 
focused especially on land and labour reforms. The political changes he made were particularly 
the strengthening of the parliamentary regime in Pakistan in the new constitution of Pakistan in 
1973. Bhutto’s politics of populism which was only half-heartedly following Islamic socialism, 
and his authoritarian character eventually led to the next military coup by Zia-ul-Haq in 1977. 
Zia-ul-Haq had Bhutto executed and swamped the country through his Islamization policy. 
Under his regime the position of the president was strengthened again, arguing that this would be 
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the closest to Islamic dogma. In the same logic political parties were considered as un-Islamic,253 
as this would challenge the Muslim unity and solidarity. In fact, the sectarian movements grew 
stronger under Zia’s regime culminating in sectarian violence between different groups. Zia’s 
Islamization policies also raised the violence between Sunni and Shia Muslims, as his policies 
favoured in the first line Sunni Muslims. Zia’s zakat (Muslim alms) Ordinance created a big 
conflict as Shias had objections against making the zakat compulsory and feared that the money 
would all go to Sunni charity activities.254 Zia’s policies thus created country-wide protests and 
objects raised by sectarian, regional movements as well as the civil society in Pakistan, such as 
human rights organizations and the media. Minorities and women were suffering under his severe 
policies and political decisions against these groups through the Blasphemy Ordinance, which 
made minorities vulnerable towards political charges and the Law of Evidence that stated that the 
evidence of one man was equal to the evidence of two women. This became especially critical in 
rape cases, which were punished according to the Hudood Ordinances which laid down the 
Islamic punishment of such crimes. Zia’s era was thus a legacy of sectarian violence, ethnization 
of politics (through the Punjabization of Pakistani politics, as Zia was particularly favouring 
Punjabis), and the emancipation of secular elites in Pakistan.255 Zia died in 1988 in a plain crash 
that until today is still a mystery to many Pakistanis as it is unsure as this was a planned murder or 
an accident. Following his death, Benazir Bhutto, daughter of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, became prime 
minister of Pakistan (1988-1990) and at the same time the first female leader in the history of a 
Muslim state. Benazir Bhutto’s government tried to present Pakistan as a “moderate Islamic 
democracy which was open for business and willing to assist the West in the struggle against 
drugs and terrorism”256. Sectarian violence and Pakistani militancy still rose under Bhutto’s 
government. In 1990, Nawaz Sharif came into power (1990-1993) and continued some of the 
Islamization policies of Zia-ul-Haq. His political era was marked by the attempt to liberalize the 
economy. His policies were similar to that of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s populism politics and also 
showed the same degree of authoritarianism. He pursued nepotism and encouraged corruption 
through these political decisions and at the same time charged Benazir Bhutto on grounds of 
corruption. 
Nawaz Sharif was toppled by a military coup of General Pervez Musharraf in 1999. Musharraf 
suspended the constitution and the government and sent Nawaz Sharif into arrests and Benazir 
Bhutto into exile. He justified his military coup by the corruption charges he pursued against 
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Nawaz Sharif and by the pronounced necessity to create order in the country. Although 
Musharraf let a certain liberty to the press, the Supreme Court became his political target. A 
certain number of judges refused to legitimize Musharraf’s military coup due to which Musharraf 
re-organized the composition of the Supreme Court by positioning judges favourable to him. 
With this “judicial support”, Musharraf eventually became the new president of Pakistan in 2001. 
Whereas the economy thrived under Musharraf’s regime, Islamic militancy grew perpetually 
stronger, especially after Musharraf’s pro-U.S. policies after September 11th. In the course of 
several inner political events such as the Red Mosque affair, in which Musharraf showed severe 
action against an Islamist grouping in Islamabad, criticism against Musharraf grew stronger. His 
actions were interpreted as purely strategical in order to guarantee his re-election as president in 
the coming presidential elections. His strategy, however, backfired and raised more criticism 
against him. Prior to the Red Mosque affair, Musharraf weakened one more time the judiciary by 
suspending the chief justice Iftikhar Chaudry, as he was objecting to legitimize his re-election. In 
the consequence of all these events, Musharraf was forced to give up his position as general of 
the Pakistani army. In the following, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif’s 
return to Pakistan both in 2007/2008 destabilized the country one more time and challenged the 
political landscape of the country. 
2.3.2 Pakistan’s political system 
Pakistan is an Islamic Republic and consists of a two-chamber parliamentarian system, the Senate 
and the National Assembly. The National Assembly elects the Prime Minister who heads the 
cabinet. The president chairs the National Security Council which consists of cabinet ministers 
and of military chiefs. The president has the right to dissolve the government and the two houses 
of parliament in case of a state of emergency. 
Senators represent their provincial region and are elected for a six year term. Provinces usually 
have their own chief minister and a governor elected by the government, who has the power to 
dissolve the provincial government. Provinces are equally represented in the National Assembly 
according to proportion of the populations in the various regions. Members of the National 
Assembly are elected in a five-year term on basis of a majority voting system. Next to this, 
Pakistan also has its own provincial parliament located in the capital of the various provinces. 
The judiciary of Pakistan is per se independent, but is restricted in its autonomous independence 
as the judiciary gets elected by the president.  
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This shows that the political system in Pakistan has a strong executive power in which the 
president can easily misuse the power and establish an authoritarian regime. This is the structural 
prerequisite why Pakistan has such a circular history in terms of military rules and unachieved 
democratic goals. 
2.4 Pakistani education system – spaces of interaction between 
different identities 
This chapter is going to portray the different education systems in Pakistan, which have an 
influence on the identity formation of Pakistani students. In this part, I will primarily focus on 
the work of Tariq Rahman, distinguished national professor teaching at the Quaid-e-Azam 
University in Islamabad. Tariq Rahman is known to be the most famous linguist in Pakistan who 
has written several books on the education system in Pakistan. In his latest book “Denizens of 
alien worlds. A Study of Education, Inequality and Polarization in Pakistan” he not only 
historically analyzes the development of the different educational systems but also presents the 
results of his survey, where he analyzed the political attitudes, attitudes on self-perception of 
students studying in different education systems. 
I will in the following present very shortly the three different education systems: the English 
vernacular, the Urdu vernacular257 and the madrassah system. Consequently, I will present the 
most important outcomes of this survey in these different education sectors and continue with 
this survey on secondary and tertiary education level, as to college and university systems in 
Pakistan. At this point, I will present my own survey. 
2.4.1 The Urdu vernacular system 
The Urdu medium schools are the most frequented schools in Pakistan, as they are affordable by 
the low and middle class in Pakistan. According to the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey, the 
number of enrolled students in the Urdu medium schools for the school year 2001-2002 were 
42%.258 Tariq Rahman argues that the Pakistani education system is per se a very polarized system 
that disfavours poor students in terms of education. Only 27% of the poorest people manage to 
send their children to public schools, whereas 56% of the richest class send their children to 
school.  
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The Urdu medium schools are basically meant for working class children and also the lower 
middle class. The same logic applies also to teachers who come from these classes. The language 
of instruction in these schools is Urdu, although English is obligatory. Fact is, however, that 
hardly any student can really converse fluently in English. The schooling in Urdu medium school 
takes 10 years, which ends the secondary education. The exams are held in Urdu. 
The social problem that comes with these schools is that they are often far away from their 
homes, so that students have to travel a long way to reach school, which affects their time 
schedule, personal energy and money. The conditions in school and of the education in these 
schools are additionally very low: 
Schools are generally dull, stringent places, often painted a dirty yellow with blue 
doors and windows with broken glass panes. They are highly regimented with 
semi-educated teachers forcing their pupils to memorize passages out of poorly 
written, poorly printed and extremely dull books. Classrooms are overcrowded 
with forty-one girls and thirty-eight boys per teacher (...)259 
 
Furthermore, the conditions in summer are extremely hard as there is no air-condition. In rural 
areas classes are often held in the open field as there is too little space in the classrooms. Another 
major issue of these schools is that corporal punishment is often part of the pedagogical use of 
teachers, which becomes a major reason to why students drop out of school.260 Often the drop-
out rate, which is the highest among the poorest students, is often made out as a lack of 
motivation of teachers. 
Urdu-medium schools are generally funded by the state and teachers get usually a very low salary, 
which only attracts “those who fail to get other jobs”261. 
The textbooks used in Urdu medium schools were analyzed in T. Rahman’ survey on the 
different education system. He analyzed the policy guidelines to which the textbooks were 
written and which educational values were presented in these books. According to Rahman, the 
general values presented in these books belong to an “in-group” which define the nation and 
national identity. At the same time, an “out-group” is being defined which stands in opposition 
to the in-group. The “other” in those textbooks is therefore always either romanticized or 
demonized.262  
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Rahman further argues that ethnicity is widely ignored in order to create one Pakistani identity: 
 
Ethnicity is ignored to create a Pakistani identity, although these centrist policies 
have been resented by ethnic communities (...) There is also much glorification of 
war and the military and many anti-Hindu and anti-India remarks and religious 
bias interspersed throughout the books.263 
 
According to Rahman, these textbooks influence the students’ world view. The objectives for the 
teaching curriculum are defined by the Pakistani government. These objectives often mark Islam 
“as a marker of identity and define the boundaries of the self”264. At the same time, the “other” is 
defined as non-Muslim. Rahman argues that this is one reason why students exposed to these 
textbooks “tend to be intolerant of Hindus, Christians and non-Muslim minorities”.265 Another 
factor that can be made out to understand the view of Urdu-medium students which stands apart 
from the influence of the textbooks used in schools, is their socio-economic background. As 
already described, the student of Urdu-medium schools often come from upper working class 
and lower middle class families and are thus often “less exposed to Western discourses available 
on cable television, English books and conversations of peer group members, family and friends 
who have been abroad”266. Their families can be described as conservative and religious, who 
often read Urdu newspapers and watch Urdu programmes at television.267 
Rahman explains that in these social classes students are often found to be relatively emotional as 
to religious issues, which even favours the Islamization of the state although they do not want to 
be ruled by religious clergy:268 
A corollary of this Islamic outlook is emotionality about religious issues and 
hence, intolerance for the religious ‘other’, i.e. the Hindu, the Ahmedi and, to a 
lesser degree, the Christian. Part of this emotion has also been transferred to 
Pakistani nationalism.269 
 
These are generally the observations made and attitudes found within Urdu-medium school 
students, which appear to be quite conservative, very patriotic and bear a potential of religious 
intolerance. 
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2.4.2 The English vernacular system 
English medium schools are quite popular and advertisement for these schools can be found 
everywhere on the streets.270 These schools can be divided into state-influenced elitist public 
schools, private elitist schools and non-elitist schools. English is often seen as the provider for a 
brighter future for students. The state-influenced English schools belong to the best schools and 
colleges in the country. Enrolment fees are much higher than those of Urdu medium schools and 
depend on the professional background of the parents:271 
 
This means that English medium schooling can be bought either by the elite of 
wealth or that of power. And this has not happened through market forces but 
has been brought about by the functionaries or institutions of the state itself. 
Indeed, the state has invested heavily in creating a parallel system of education for 
the elite, especially the elite that would presumably run elitist state institutions in 
future. This leads to the conclusion that the state does not trust its own system of 
education and spends public funds to create and maintain the parallel, elitist 
system of schooling.272 
The medium of instruction in these schools is both Urdu and English, depending on the teacher.  
Elitist English medium schools can be public schools run by the state as well as private 
institutions with very high fees. The teachers come generally from the middle classes. The 
conditions of the English-medium schools are defined as “more humane, modern, innovative 
and interesting than in the Urdu-medium schools and the madrassas”273. 
 
The textbooks are mostly imported from other countries and the syllabus contains the classics of 
the English language. Although Pakistan studies, Islamic studies and Urdu are compulsory, the 
focus lies on world history.274 
Rahman argues that students from these schools have broader access to Western discourses 
through literature, TV and relatives abroad and thus tend to be more tolerant towards an “other”: 
 
They are tolerant of people from different religions (such as Hinduism) and of 
different countries (such as India). These children are much less supportive of 
militant policies in Kashmir than their counterparts in other schools. 275 
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The private non-elitist English medium schools. The medium of instruction is predominantly 
English and the English taught in these schools are from a higher level than that in Urdu-
medium schools. Students attending these schools are often from “modest backgrounds”276, due 
to which the language of instruction and communication is also often Urdu. Additionally these 
schools are also part of the chain of “Islamic schools” as the Siqara system, where books are 
checked for their anti-Islamic content and female teachers and students are forced to wear a 
headscarf:277 
 
It seems that the Islamic revitalist thinkers have realized how empowering English 
is and want to attract lower income groups through it. (...) While the percentage 
may be contested, there is no doubt that Islamists, especially those who are 
politically oriented, teach English because it enables students to enter the 
mainstream for positions of power in the salariat. This policy has also been 
endorsed by the Jamaat-i-Islami which, while being against English-medium elitist 
schools, does not deny either secular education or English to the students who 
study in its institutions.278  
 
Thus the students from English medium schools are according to the schools they attended, 
elitist or non-elitist, more or less westernized. Rahman argues that the negative consequence of 
those who are more westernized is, that they get “alienated from Pakistan, especially from its 
indigenous languages and cultures”.279 This can turn to “arrogant” attitudes towards the own 
country, but at the same time makes them often open towards “liberal-humanist” and 
“democratic” values.280 They are equally more tolerant towards other countries, especially India, 
and often do not glorify the past of Pakistan as students from other countries do. The other 
group of students from non-elitist schools, however, can turn out to be equally arrogant or 
ignorant towards the own indigenous culture, but, are more nationalistic and militaristic and thus 
often pursue an anti-India attitude and are in favour of the military.281 
What is common in both groups, is their understanding of themselves, of belonging to the elite-
group in Pakistan – “not of money and power, which they are, but of talent and knowledge”282. 
I would like to conclude with Rahman’s description of these students of being “foreigners” in 
their own country. 
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What is worse is that it is not only certain values and or customs, which these 
“foreigners” living in Pakistan dismiss derisively; they hold all Pakistanis, except 
Westernized ones, in contempt. They are what people call ‘brown Englishman’ 
(...) This kind of dismissal of everything ‘native’ is one of the worst legacies of 
colonial, Western rule.283 
2.4.3 The madrassah system 
The madrassah system has especially become an issue on international and also again on national 
level after 9/11 where these schools were alleged to educate children towards the Islamic 
fundamental ideology. Since then, many analyses and reports have been brought forward. It is 
nevertheless still difficult to acquire useful data on the madrassah system as the data are often not 
registered. However, it is registered, when these madrassahs are allied to the Central Boards of 
Madrassas in Pakistan, which are under the control of following political parties or sub-sects: 
Deobandi, Barelvi, Shia, Jaamat-i-Islami or the Ahl-i-Hadith.284  
The number of madrassahs has increased especially under Zia-ul-Haq’s military regime (1977-
1988). The United States as supportive to the Talibans in Afghanistan, sent money, arms and 
ammunition to Pakistan, which was equally used to finance the madrassahs in Pakistan.285 
Madrassahs are always funded by charity or other donors, money also often comes from rich 
businessmen settled in the west.286 
Admission fee of madrassahs is extremely low, students come from the poorest class and 
sometimes even receive a sustenance from the schools. Reasons for sending their children are 
often on a financial basis, as parents often cannot afford “to feed them and educate them in 
government schools”.287 Madrassahs provide children with food, education and often also a place 
to sleep due to which these schools become relatively popular among poor families.288 Another 
reason why parents send their children to these schools is that they try to “keep them protected 
from gangs, drugs and the violence of everyday life”.289Most of the madrassahs are single-sex 
institutions only educating male students, although there also few madrassahs who educate 
female students. 
The curriculum is entirely according to Islamic dogmatic ideology and is taught in Arabic: 
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Their curriculum is broadly similar throughout South Asia. Twenty subjects are 
covered using about eighty standard textbooks. Twenty books might be used in 
any given madrasa. Textbooks are written in Arabic and subjects include Logic, 
Mathematics and Astrology, Philosophy, Theology, Jurisprudence, Quranic 
exegesis, Rhetoric, and Grammar.290 
 
One important characteristics is the teaching method that is designed to have students recite 
mindlessly the Quran: 
 
Recitation and memorization is a common pedagogical device. Indeed, to aid in 
their memorization, many standard madrasa textbooks are written in rhymed 
couples. However, the Quran is not typically the principal text and madrasas rely 
heavily on books of fiqh [Islamic jurisprudence].291 
 
In a study on madrassahs by Candice Lys, the author points out that children take harm on an 
educational level, being exposed to low quality education that hinders the development of 
students, on a physical level, often being the victims of physical harm or even sexual abuse, and 
on a psychological level, as suffering from humiliation, terrorizing and other emotional neglecting 
behaviour.292 The author concludes that the result of these harms along these three levels can lead 
to an overall violent behaviour: 
 
Possible results of exposure to violence include psychological problems such as 
increased aggression, anti-social behaviour, defensive and offensive fighting, 
deficient emotional regulation and difficulty expressing feelings, negative self 
images, alcohol and drug use, as well as depression and anxiety. Through military 
training and the promotion of violence against the “other”, children exposed to 
“prolonged desensation and lack of empathy for others may have adverse and 
long term social and emotional consequences” (Buka, et al., 2001:303) that 
negatively affect their growth into healthy adults.293 
 
Tariq Rahman comes to a similar conclusion, where he points out that madrassah students are 
the “most intolerant of all other students groups in Pakistan”.294 Additionally, they strongly 
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approve of aggressive, offensive foreign policy in terms of Jihad, in regard of the Kashmir 
conflict for example.295 
Former president Musharraf declared in 2005 to combat extremism by controlling the funding 
and curriculum of madrassahs and providing more scrutiny in this regard.296 The madrassah 
system and the consequences of religious extremism in Pakistan have since Musharraf’s last 
statement not been resolved yet and perpetually posed a problem to Pakistan on a national and 
international level, always leading to major political crises within the country. 
2.4.4 Higher education in Pakistan 
This chapter looks at the education system in Pakistan in regard of higher education, which will 
not only focus on university level, but also on college level. Higher education in Pakistan includes 
secondary higher education in colleges and tertiary higher education at universities. Students 
attending higher education in Pakistan come from Urdu-medium or English medium schools. 
Colleges can be seen as an “extension of the schools, but the two-years a student stays here are 
the years of transition from the Urdu-medium to the partly English medium type of study”297. It 
is only after this transition of two years298 that the student either chooses professional colleges, 
such as engineering and medical studies, or goes to degree colleges, where he does his master. 
Real intensive study starts with the level of Masters in Pakistan, which is usually taught in 
universities, although more and more colleges also offer MA courses. 
Rahman argues that Pakistan’s universities lack in academic standards. They are often of “low 
quality of academics and lack of good laboratories, libraries and other facilities of research”299. 
This often leads to several social problems, such as student frustration which is expressed in 
(violent) student protests. These protests are a result of a stereotyped system of evaluation that is 
prone to corrupted decision-making processes.300 Due to this crisis which was mainly located in 
public universities, the first private university, the Aga Khan University in 1983, followed by the 
establishment of LUMS in 1985, were established. Today the “mushrooming of private 
universities”301 continues, as the problem of public universities has still not been solved yet.302 
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Here too one can differentiate between public and private institutions. The Lahore University of 
Management and Science is the second largest private higher institution in Pakistan. Along with 
this privatization came also the liberty “to deviate from the curriculum of state-run school 
systems”303. Rahman speaks of an “educational apartheid”304 that segregates the students from 
these different education systems. Along with this comes the lack of funding from the state 
which results in universities “charging exorbitant tuition fees from students”305. 
Rahman locates the crisis of Pakistan’s education system also in the demotivation of students to 
seek academic excellency in universities, due to these countless problems in the university system 
in Pakistan.306 This is the reason why private universities, which are often donor or institution 
driven, such as universities administered and funded by the Pakistani army, create parallel 
educational hubs in the country, which offer high academic standard comparable to higher 
institutions worldwide: 
 
Because of the lack of high-quality in the public universities as well as the 
population pressure, private entrepreneurs as well as the armed forces have 
established their own universities. (...) However, since they cater to the affluent 
classes they are attractive for young people who are educated in English medium 
schools. Thus, the educational apartheid established in schools, (...), now 
continues throughout the student’s career. This development ghettoizes the public 
university, alienating the affluent classes from the less affluent classes more 
markedly than before.307 
 
This leads to the conclusion that the state willingly spends more money in the elite classes than in 
the masses, as state institutions often are the sole or most prominent donors for the education 
system. If this is not the case, schools, colleges and universities are little sponsored by the state, 
which leads to greater social problems and the educational segregation and thus the future social 
and economical separation of the different classes. The Pakistani education system is strongly 
structured along social-economical classes. Madrassahs, which are not stately funded at all, but 
educate the largest number of students in Pakistan, thus fall in the hands of generous Islamist 
parties and/or sects who take over the religious education of the student and thus de-stabilize the 
country by promoting the violent and aggressive potential found within attitudes of the 
madrassah system, as presented in the study. It is due to all these facts that the title of Rahman’s 
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book gives the most adequate designation of the societal consequences of such an education 
system,  that creates “Denizens of alien worlds”. 
Chapter III Political identities of Pakistani students in Lahore 
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3. Political identities of  Pakistani students in Lahore 
Strategic and operational level 
This chapter is going to analyze the results of my questionnaires and my interviews in view of 
political identities of Pakistan. I will discuss mainly three important questions. The first question 
will try grasp the scope of how Pakistani students understand their own identity and how they 
view the identity of their country. The second question is going to depict their attitudes towards 
the Pakistani state and government. Finally, I will answer the third question on what the 
perceived threats, fears and dangers are from the Pakistani student’s view.  
For every question, I will first put forth the results of my questionnaire and then interpret them 
using the results of my interviews for comparison and supporting evidence. 
These results will be interpreted according to three major content-oriented items: 1) identity 2) 
attitudes towards the Pakistani state and government and 3) threats. In the end I will give an 
analysis on how the political attitudes and thus identities of the different student bodies can best 
be described in the three universities in Lahore: Punjab University, King Edwards College and 
Lahore University of Management and Sciences. 
3.1 On Identity 
This chapter is going to be structured according to two major steps of my empirical work. In a 
first step I will present the results of my interviews concerning different elements of Pakistani 
identity. For this I have chosen two variables of my questionnaire. 
These variables are: 
 
a. Importance of your religion  
b. Importance of being a Muslim in order to define yourself as Paki 
 
In a second step, I will analyze and interpret these results according to similar items present in my 
interviews and try to draw a picture on their attitudes of their identity from the students of the 
different universities. 
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3.1.1 Importance of your religion308 
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Figure 1: Importance of your religion 
 
31 out of 34 Punjab University students have given an answer to this question. 30 students out of 
34 PU respondents answered this question with “Very Important” and only one student with 
“Fairly Important”. 98.6% of Punjab University students thus esteem religion very important for 
themselves and 3.2% fairly important.  
 
King Edwards students have answered on a broader scale. All King Edwards students have given 
an answer to this question. 16 out of 20 students answered this question with “Very Important”, 
2 with “Fairly Important”, 1 with “Not Very Important” and 1 with “Not Important at All”. 80% 
of K.E. students thus consider their religion as very important and 10% as fairly important; 10% 
of K.E students did not express so much importance towards religion and have thus voted for 
“Not Very Important” or “Not Important at All”. 
 
In LUMS, 23 out of 23 students have answered this question. 15 have answered this question 
with “Very Important” and 5 with “Fairly important”. 3 students have chosen the option “Not 
                                                 
308 Participants: PU 31 out of 34, KE 20 out of 20, LUMS 23 out of 23. 
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Very Important”. On the whole, 65.2% of LUMS students esteem religion as very important for 
them and 21.7% as fairly important and only 5% attribute it unimportant status. 
 
3.1.2 Importance of being a Muslim in order to define yourself as Pakistani309 
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Figure 2: Importance of being a Muslim in order to define yourself as Pakistani 
 
33 out of 34 Punjab University students responded to this question. 93.9% of the students 
answered with “Very Important”, 3% with “Fairly Important” and 3% with “Not Very 
Important”. In total, 96.9% of P.U. students think it is important to be a Muslim in order to 
define themselves as Pakistanis. 
 
At the King Edward's College 19 out of 20 students answered this question. Again the answers at 
King Edward’s are on a broader scale. 68.4% responded with “Very Important”, 21.1% with 
“Fairly Important”, and 10.5% with “Not Very Important”. Thus, 89.5% of K.E. students think 
it is very important to be a Muslim in order to define oneself as Pakistani. 
 
The answers of the LUMS students vary a lot. All LUMS students have responded to this 
question. Only 39.1% answered with “Very Important”, 26% with “Fairly Important”, 26.1% 
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with “Not Important” and 8.7% with “Not Important at all”. In total, only 65.2% of LUMS 
students thus think it is important to be a Muslim in order to define themselves as Pakistani. 
3.1.2 Analysis and interpretation 
This part will not only discuss the results of my questionnaires but also include the statements of 
the interviews with the students from the three different universities to help me analyze and 
understand the results of my questionnaires.  
As religion has played an extremely important role in the state formation of Pakistan and policy-
makers later on attempted several times to use it in the formation of the identity of the Pakistani 
people, the significance of religion as judged by the students of the different universities has been 
a very important parameter for analyzing and measuring their identity. My first question was 
generally asking about the importance they give to religion, whereas my second question more 
importantly focused on the question whether being a Muslim is important to them in order to 
define themselves as Pakistanis. The results are striking, as the questionnaires from the three 
universities have different outcomes. In the following, I will discuss in short the results by using 
the interviews I have conducted. 
The Punjab University holds the highest percentage of students (96.8%) allocating a great 
importance to their religion. As I have discussed in the chapter on my conditions of research310 
the Punjab University has, according to my own observations, a very conservative student 
atmosphere. The openness or conservativeness of students is measureable through the dress code 
and the male female student interaction at the university. As female students of the Punjab 
University predominantly cover up their hair through a dupatta, scarf or covering their whole 
body by burqa, their dress code already suggests that religious dressing is important to them. The 
same observation can be made through the male female interaction, which is institutionally 
separated through reading rooms for male and female students only and separate cafeterias for 
male and female students, and which is also socially rather separate depending on the individual 
attitude of each student. This would also explain why, for an almost equally high percentage of 
students (93.9%), it is important to be a Muslim to define themselves as Pakistani. This 
observation is also supported by my interviews. Both PU students I conducted an interview with 
emphasized the importance of Islam in their identity. My male PU respondent, student of space 
sciences, gave me this answer in regard to his identity:  
                                                 
310 See chapter 1.3.3. “My respondents: The students” 
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There is only one important thing for us: We are Moslems. And we are supposed 
to live according to that. That’s our religion. 
 
The female PU student, a student of library sciences, also stressed the importance of culture and 
religion and defined them as the most important parameters for understanding life in Pakistan: 
 
My first association of Pakistan are my family, my relatives and my culture, my 
religion. These are the things that help you understand what it means to live in 
Pakistan. 
 
The importance of religion is stressed further by the same student as she even regrets the fact 
that Pakistan has not become a real Islamic Republic yet, because of various social, economic and 
political problems in Pakistan:  
 
When I think of the country I think that we are not achieving what we were 
supposed to achieve. Our destination was to become an Islamic Republic, what 
we haven’t become yet. (...) That’s because of the social and economic problems 
in Pakistan, nepotism, bribery, injustice...the main problem is injustice. There’s no 
justice in Pakistan! 
 
Their attitudes towards religion are very positive and appointed. Deep down there is a strong 
belief in religion as being an important guiding element for the personal identity and that of the 
Pakistani state. 
 
At the King Edward’s College, 80% of the students stressed the personal importance of religion, 
which is also a high percentage of students. Combined with those who answered with “Fairly 
Important” that shows that in general 90% of students esteem religion as very important or fairly 
important. The percentage of students thinking that it is important to be a Muslim in order to 
define themselves as Pakistanis is smaller (68.4%) but is still the majority of the K.E. students. 
Thus, we can say that also here the importance of religion and its role in identity formation can 
be very important to this student body. My personal observation of the dress code and the male 
female interaction also showed me a relatively conservative atmosphere, but not comparable to 
that of the Punjab University. Shalwaar Kameeze and dupatta and/or scarf are still very common 
but interaction between male and female students does not seem so hard. I would therefore 
suggest that the King Edward's College has a moderate conservative atmosphere allowing both 
trends to be expressed. My interviews have shown me similar oscillating results. My male K.E. 
interview partner, a student of medical studies, with big musical interests in the form of classical 
dance, allocated a very minor and almost unimportant role to religion: 
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I am not religious at all. I don’t look so much at the religious perspective. I love 
music – my aesthetic sense gets satisfied through that and I like that. I am not 
religious because I don’t pray, nor anything else. I don’t know so much about 
religion or Islam and don’t have so much information on it. If I am forced to 
pray, then I pray, but then I don’t understand why I am praying. I don’t have any 
logic of this. 
 
Although he personally cannot relate very much to religion, his statement does however show 
how present Islam seems to be in his environment and to what degree he is confronted with it. 
He continues by saying that because of his strong interest in music and dance he is often insulted, 
as socially and religiously the use of music and dance for artistic purposes is not very well seen in 
all circles in Pakistan: 
 
I often feel alienated in Pakistan, because all my interests like music are not 
accepted in Pakistan. 
  
This strong religious pressure did however leave its imprints on him, causing him to say that 
Islam did in fact have an important role in the formation of his identity: 
 
Islam is a big part of my identity, because my ideas and values are influenced by 
this. I have this basic concept of that there is one God and to be righteous and 
that I have to account for my actions. I believe in punishment if I do bad things. 
These are the basic things that were imposed on me since my childhood. That 
does naturally influence me. 
My second K.E. interview partner, a student of pharmacy, had a very similar position towards the 
role of Islam in her life and for the future of the country:  
I think that Pakistan is a country where everybody, as a Muslim, can live freely. 
And Pakistan is very protective in regard of its citizens. 
The main point of her statement, Muslims can live in freedom in Pakistan, suggests that 
somewhere else this is not the case, although this has not been specified in her statement. In 
every regard this statement shows pride towards the own country and the potential that lies in 
Pakistan for the future and safety of Muslims on the Indian subcontinent.  
Generally, I would say that the students of King Edwards do stress the importance of religion 
and especially of Islam in their life throughout my results. I find both very assertive attitudes 
towards Islam in their life as well as almost indifferent attitudes towards Islam for their personal 
identity, although the first presumption prevails, especially as demonstrated by the results of my 
questionnaires. 
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When it comes to LUMS students, the results are strikingly different from both previously 
discussed institutions. Although 65.2% of LUMS students esteem religion as very important and 
21.7% as fairly important, which is quite a high percentage if put together, only 39.1% of students 
think that it is important to be a Muslim in order to define themselves as Pakistani. We can 
therefore presume that religion is personally important to them out of different reasons, which 
were not analyzed in the questionnaire, but it is not necessarily important to define themselves as 
Muslims. This shows sort of a kind of respect towards religion, but not necessarily an importance 
when it comes to the personal identity formation. My personal observation of the dress code and 
male female interaction at LUMS has shown me a very open atmosphere. It is not only very 
common to dress in a Western manner, but also to interact with males openly, as there are no 
separate institutional settings for male and female students, except for the students hostels of 
course. Next to this, LUMS has the most diverse student body in the sense of international 
students or Pakistani students who have partly lived abroad or even grew up abroad, or just have 
an intensive contact with the foreign world through relatives and the media they use. My 
interview partners both have shown quite open attitudes in regard to the definition of their 
personal identity. My male LUMS interview partner, a student of social sciences, answered my 
question of how he would define his identity: 
 
I define identity by relating to people. And what gives me a sense of Pakistani 
identity is the common values I share with most of the people. I know it doesn’t 
fit into the definition very well, but I have developed this, because I tried to find 
some sort of identity, reconcile things and I found yes, that I do share a Pakistani 
identity. I do have a Pakistani identity in terms of likes and dislikes, values, 
religious values, a lot of other things, yes, values in general; they are what make 
me Pakistani from the core. 
 
Although this is a very open definition to their personal identity it does however stress the culture 
aspect of identity and different values that lie underneath and do not explicitly focus on religion. 
He does however later also stress the importance of Islam as a source for his identity formation: 
 
I try to take guidance from religion. There’s a lot of flexibility, yes, but it’s from 
there. It allows for each aspect of behaviour, not just, you can start with how you 
greet each other, etc. etc. (...) there are a lot of things! Everything has a lot of 
answers to it. You can’t have one answer to everything! 
 
But it is definitely not the sole source of “inspiration” for his identity, as he also mentions 
“Western influence” as an important parameter for his personal identity: 
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Part of my identity is also inspired, also comes from the West, yes, but people 
who entirely forget their identity don’t share the common values. For people who 
have grown up and lived abroad for them it’s a different thing. I say this as 
reference to people who live here. They don’t represent Pakistan, not even the 
values, yes, not even the upper-middle class values! 
 
As discussed, LUMS students are widely more exposed to “Western influence” as PU and K.E. 
students. Therefore the conflict which is hidden between such an intensive exposure to the 
Western world also comes out in the same interview:  
 
I haven’t been torn apart, yes, but I have tried to sort of balance these things. And 
that is also because of the fact that my circle or my society that I DIRECTLY 
associate with has a degree of respect attached to Western identity.  
 
My second interview partner, a female law student, has shown an equally open attitude towards 
religion and her own identity: 
 
We do have this overarching Muslim identity, supposedly symbolic. In the 
Pakistani identity we’re supposed to be united by Islam. I don’t think it literally 
happens that way, but in the symbolic it exists in that way, so then what happens 
is that people who ascribe to this, expect other people to do the same. (...) So you 
have this sort of a conflict, that is there. 
 
Although she recognizes the structural significance of Islam in the Pakistani identity, she 
personally does not believe in the effect it has on the formation of the people. What is important 
for her to really create a “Pakistani identity” is the common idea of “Pakistan” as a nation state: 
 
Frankly speaking, I don’t think that there is something that holds us together. I 
know that a lot of people will disagree with me, because, yeah, actually the only 
thing that does bring us together is maybe when you grow up with the idea of 
Pakistan and not everybody does! For those people who are, yes we are connected 
through this, but for those people who are not, they’re not. 
 
She sees the problem of the formation of one common Pakistani identity in the deep differences 
between the Pakistani people, which are rooted ethnically and linguistically within the people. She 
admits herself that, when she was younger she did not realize the big differences between the 
people. That is something she only realized when coming to university and being confronted with 
students from all over Pakistan. She blames Pakistan’s “closed ideological existence” for this, 
which is being promoted through propaganda and manipulation through the media. These 
differences could only be bridged through religion, which she sees as a mere strategic and 
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operational element for the construction of an identity in Pakistan, but not as a sustainable, 
inspirational source of identity. 
 
Now we can’t relate to each other and this alienation, this deep chasm, I would 
say, was created, not exactly created, but encouraged through the government. It 
was in their benefit so that people can’t interact, so that the people don’t rise 
again and in order to make them not rise again, all those spaces where people 
could interact in this way needed to be crushed! That’s the reason why people get 
so emotional about religion, because that’s the only space they have for 
expression! Political space we’ve never had, it’s been created now after the chief 
justice issue, sort of a little bit and even then the government tries so hard to 
control it, but couldn’t! 
Furthermore she suggests that this actually creates further social problems such as a diverging 
Pakistani society, falling apart, alienating, in regard to different lifestyles, attitudes and 
incomprehension of the “other”.  
In short, we can therefore say that the openness, the Western lifestyle pursued by some of the 
LUMS students or just the simple exposure to Western lifestyle did in one way or another have 
an effect on the openness towards their own identity and towards the attitudes they bear in 
regard to their own country, and their own identity. 
3.2 Attitudes towards the Pakistani citizenship, government and the 
army 
This chapter is going to portray the results of my questionnaires and my interviews concerning 
the Pakistani citizenship, government and the army. In a first step, I will present the results of my 
questionnaire by depicting the results of following variables: 
 
a. Importance of voting at Pakistani elections 
b. Proudness towards the Pakistani government 
c. Proudness towards the Pakistani army 
 
In a second step, I will then put these results together with the statements that were presented to 
me in my interviews regarding the same topic.  
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3.2.1 Importance of voting in Pakistani elections311 
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Figure 3: Importance of voting in Pakistani elections in order to define yourself as Pakistani 
 
All Punjab University respondents have answered this question. 44,1% of PU students esteem 
voting in Pakistani elections as “Very Important”, 26.5% as “Fairly Important” and 14,7% 
esteem both times voting in Pakistani elections as “Not Very Important” or “Not Important at 
All”. In total we can say that the importance of voting in Pakistani elections in order to define 
themselves as Pakistanis lies with 70.6% of PU students. 
 
In King Edward’s, 19 out of 20 students have responded to this question. 26.3% of the students 
have answered with “Very Important” and 15.8% with “Fairly Important”. The most chosen 
answer among K.E. students was however “Not Very Important” which represents 47.7% of the 
K.E. students. 10.2% have answered with “Not Important at All”. In total, only 42.1% think it is 
important to vote in Pakistani elections in order to define themselves as Pakistanis. We can 
therefore say that the majority of K.E. students does however think that it is not important to 
vote in Pakistani elections in order to define themselves as Pakistanis. 
 
                                                 
311 Participants: PU 34 out of 34, KE 19 out of 20, LUMS 23 out of 23. 
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In LUMS every student has answered this question. 17.4% have answered with “Very Important” 
and 47.8% have answered with “Fairly Important”. 13.0% have answered with “Not Important” 
and 21.7% with “Not Important at All”. We can thus say that in total 65.2% think it is important 
to vote in Pakistani elections in order to define themselves as Pakistanis. 
3.2.2 Proudness towards the Pakistani government312 
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Figure 4: Proudness towards the Pakistani government 
 
At the Punjab University, 31 out of 34 students have answered the question how proud they are 
of the current Pakistani government. Only 3.2% have answered this question with “Very Proud”, 
6.5% with “Somewhat Proud”; 45.2% have answered with “Not Very Proud” and 35.5% with 
“Not Proud at All”. 9.7% of the students were uncertain and responded with “Can’t choose”. In 
total, only 9.7% of the students were proud of the Pakistani government and a big percentage of 
students, namely 80.7% are not proud of the current Pakistani government. 
 
In King Edwards all students have responded to this question. Nobody answered with “Very 
Proud”, 10% however with “Somewhat proud”. 25.0% answered with “Not Very Proud” and 
65.0% with “Not Proud at All”. The majority of K.E. students, namely 80% of K.E. students, are 
thus not proud of the Pakistani government. 
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In LUMS, 22 out of 23 students responded to this question. Nobody answered with “Very 
Proud”, although 31.8% answered with “Somewhat Proud”. The majority, 45.5%, answered with 
“Not Very Proud” and 18.2% answered with “Not Proud at All”. 4.5% of LUMS students 
answered with “Can’t choose”. There’s a relative balance between those who are somewhat 
proud and those are not very proud of the Pakistani government. 
3.2.3 Proudness towards the Pakistani army313 
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Figure 5: Proudness towards the Pakistani army 
 
31 out of 34 PU students responded to this question. Among them, 48.4% are very proud of the 
Pakistani army, 25.8% “Somewhat Proud”, 16.1% are “Not Very Proud” and 6.5% “Not Proud 
at All”. 1 Student, 3.2%, was uncertain and chose to respond with “Can’t Choose”. 
 
From the K.E. respondents, all students answered this question. 25% answered with “Very 
Proud”, 65% with “Somewhat Proud” and each time 5% with “Not Very Proud” and “Not 
Proud at All”. We could therefore presume that the majority of K.E. is relatively proud of the 
Pakistani army. 
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In LUMS, 22 out of 23 students responded to this question. 27.3% are very proud, and 31.8% are 
“Somewhat Proud”. 22.7% are “Not Very Proud” and 18.2% are “Not Proud at All”. Here again, 
there is a relative balance between those who are proud and those who are not, although the 
majority, 59.1% are proud of the Pakistani army. 
3.2.4 Analysis and interpretation 
Attitudes towards the state and the government where analyzed through three questions. The 
first question was to measure the importance they put into elections to measure their own 
political responsibility in regard to their Pakistani citizenship by asking them whether it is 
important for them to vote in Pakistani elections in order to define themselves as Pakistanis. The 
second and third question both refer to the government and the state by asking them how proud 
they are of the current Pakistani government314 and the Pakistani army – as one of the state’s 
most important institutions and the executive arm of the government. 
 
The students of the Punjab University showed a high result as to how important voting in 
Pakistani elections means to them in order to define themselves as Pakistani. Put together the 
results of those who responded with “Very Important” and “Fairly Important”, we have a 
percentage of 70.6% of PU students giving significance to their Pakistani citizenship by voting at 
Pakistani elections. As to the proudness towards the Pakistani government and the Pakistani 
army, the results differ. Regarding the Pakistani government, we have an extremely negative 
outcome with 80.7% of PU students who are not proud of the current Pakistani government. 
Surprisingly, the outcome in regard to the Pakistani army is relatively high, as 48.4% of PU 
students are “Very Proud” of the Pakistani army, 25.8% “Somewhat Proud”. We can discuss 
these results from two perspectives. In regard to the current Pakistani government, which at that 
time was headed by President Musharraf, who at the same time was the chief general of the 
Pakistani army, the army and government were thus both in the hands of the same person: 
General Pervez Musharraf. Seen from that angle, it is hard to explain how such a high percentage 
of PU students are not proud of the government, but at the same time a high percentage of the 
PU students is very proud, or somewhat proud of the Pakistani army. The only conclusion I can 
draw from this is that the significance of the army was not seen in the light of the current 
Pakistani government but rather seen generally, especially on the historical and sociological 
                                                 
314 As the survey was conducted in summer 2006, the term “current” Pakistani government, refers to the 
government of Musharraf, a presidential cum parliamentary government, legitimized through 
parliamentary voting. If we consider that as army chief Musharraf would never even have had the 
possibility to run for a presidency, his presidency is not legitimate, however through parliamentary voting 
and through the legitimization of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, you can however say that his presidency 
became legitimized. 
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significance of the army as the protector of the state Pakistan. Another reason could be that 
politicians, such as Musharraf, with their policies, are much more present in people’s minds than 
an institution as a whole. It is much easier to blame one person, Musharraf, as the representative 
of the Pakistani government, than a whole institution such as the army, that historically and 
socially has also maintained a certain respect until the day of research. 
This ambivalence is also partly portrayed in my interview results where only one of my two PU 
students commented on the Pakistani army. My male PU interview partner had a very critical 
position towards the Pakistani army, but affirmed his trust towards the army in one regard: 
 
What is the meaning of the army? If the meaning of the army is to protect the 
borders then we can trust the Pakistani army. We trust them as we trust our roots. 
They want to protect us. But not everybody has made sufficient experiences. (...) 
Everybody should maintain his own field and not interfere in different fields. 
 
At the same time, he brings out that the army should not interfere with other domains such as 
politics, which he also affirms in another statement: 
 
There is so much emphasis on the army in Pakistan, because during the first war, 
the government found it right to give so much power to the Pakistani army, 
because it suggested that the army can protect the country. Now they can do 
whatever they want and change the country as they want to. 
My second PU student showed a very similar negative attitude towards the Pakistani government 
and admitted that she is very “sceptical” towards the government, but more due to its America 
oriented politics and the secular orientation of its policies. 
Generally, we can say that the outcome of the PU students’ survey shows that they do feel a 
political responsibility in their citizenship, and therefore are even quiet critical towards the 
Pakistani government, without forgetting the significance of one institution, the army, that did 
achieve to save its popularity among people, especially under PU students.  
At the King Edwards College, only 42.1% of the students consider it important to vote in 
Pakistani elections in order to define themselves as Pakistani. The political significance they 
combine with their citizenship is therefore very low. As to the Pakistani government, the results 
are similarly low; the majority of students are either not very proud (45.2%) or not proud at all 
(35.5%) which is a very negative opinion of the current Pakistani government. Contrary to this 
negative opinion of the government, the attitude towards the Pakistani army is nevertheless 
relatively positive, following a similar trend of the results of the P.U. students. If we combine the 
results of those who are very proud and those who are somewhat proud, we will find that in total 
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90% of the students are proud of the Pakistani army. I suggest that the differing results towards 
the government and army can be read here in the same light as the results of the Punjab 
University. 
As to my interviews, only one from my two K.E. students commented on the current Pakistani 
government, which highlights her scepticism towards Musharraf’s government: 
I am very sceptical towards our government, because I think that the people of 
the army should stay in the army. For example Pervez Musharraf, he holds two 
positions. He is head of the army and has all his forces underneath and at the 
same time he is also head of the government. Army and government should rest 
separate and one should not mix these two. 
  
This is a well appointed statement towards the belief that these two branches of the state should 
not be mixed, but stay separate. Similar to the statement of the male P.U. student, this depicts the 
scepticism of the students towards Musharraf’s government. 
In general, we can thus say, that K.E. students feel less political responsibility towards their 
citizenship than P.U. students for example, but are not less critical towards the government and 
the Pakistani army. 
 
In LUMS 65.2% of the students recognize the importance of voting in Pakistani elections for 
their political responsibility as Pakistani citizens, which represents the intermediate value between 
the results of the PU students and those of the K.E. students. As to their attitudes towards the 
Pakistani government, we have quite unbalanced results among LUMS students. Whereas in the 
two other institutions, the students had a strong tendency to show little proudness towards the 
Pakistani government, the result of the LUMS students show quite scattered results, portraying 
both proudness (31.8% answered with “Somewhat Proud”) and little proudness (45.5% answered 
with “Not Very Proud”). Although this result is difficult to interpret, one of the reasons for this 
could be that LUMS has many study fields referring to politics, economy and law, which 
encourage students to be more critical or sensitive towards the government; the economical 
aspect of the government was also expressed positively in one of my interviews at LUMS. 
As to the army, we have a majority (59.1%) who is proud of the army. One of the reasons could 
be that some army families are quite well-earning so that there are many students of army families 
among the LUMS student body, which would explain the positive attitude towards the army. On 
the other hand, we can conclude the positive attitude towards the army in the same way as in the 
previous two institutions. 
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As already suggested earlier, the outcome of the LUMS students’ questionnaires might also be 
explained by one of the statements that I received from my male interview partner who described 
to me his attitude towards the government in the following way: 
 
In terms of economic reforms, future economic growth etc., in that sense I do 
find confidence in our government, but in other accounts such as the moral 
aspect of the society, I don’t think the government is morally enough to really 
care about that. It’s more a utility thing for them. (...) Right now for the good of 
the economy, I do think the government is functioning well. But if you consider 
the different departments of the government, the arm of the government – the 
executive – there’s still a long way to go. It’s very inefficient and we have a lot of 
corruption issues. 
 
This would explain why still a positive attitude towards the Pakistani government can be made 
out, but why at the same time there is also a lot to criticise. The criticism towards the military also 
openly comes to surface in the second interview with my female LUMS student, who explains 
why the military has always enjoyed so much popularity and tolerance among the people in 
Pakistan: 
 
The Pakistani military took like 70% of our GDP openly and the only reason it 
was able to do so was because of the big Indian threat. You know like ‘India is 
going to attack!’ so there’s no point in education, no point in development, no 
point in getting food for the people if we don’t exist anymore. (...) It was in the 
best interest for the military that India existed! (...) They always want this threat to 
be looming from behind! 
 
At the same time she also stresses the undemocratic principles of every military regime, which 
stop the politicisation of people:  
 
They have been suppressing politicisation of people. They have not wanted 
people to get political. Parties have been discouraged ... the first thing that the 
military does, when it comes to power is ban parties, ban politicisation. 
 
In general, I would say that LUMS students show quite a critical, reflective approach towards the 
government, which is why it is difficult to clearly point out the differences in their attitudes in 
regard to the students of other institutions, as the results of LUMS students appear in 
comparison unbalanced and/or scattered. The interviews I conducted alone led me to suggest 
this, as there are no other data to prove my assumptions. 
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3.3 Threats 
This chapter is going to portray the results of my questionnaires and my interviews concerning 
various threats and fears which may be perceived by Pakistani students. In a first step, I will 
present the results of my questionnaire by depicting the results of following variables: 
 
a. Western Hostility perceived towards the Muslim world 
b. India is Pakistan’s biggest enemy 
c. Pakistani Muslim identity needs to be defended through Jihad 
 
In a second step, I will then put these results together with the statements of my interviews 
regarding the same topic. 
3.3.1 Western hostility perceived towards the Muslim world315 
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Figure 6: I feel that the Western world is hostile towards the Muslim world 
 
At the Punjab University, 29 out of 34 students responded to this statement. The answers of the 
PU students are quiet scattered. 27.6% of PU students agree strongly with that statement, 37.9% 
just agree with it and 17.2% both times disagree or disagree strongly with this statement. On the 
                                                 
315 Participants: PU 29 out of 34, KE 19 out of 20, LUMS 21 out of 23. 
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whole we can say that if we put the results together of those who agree we have a majority of 
65.5% of PU students who agree with this statement. 
 
At the King Edwards College, 19 out of 20 students responded to this statement. A tremendous 
majority of 70% agrees strongly with this statement, and 25% just agree. Only 5% disagree 
strongly with the statement. We have a high percentage of 95% who totally agree with this 
statement. 
 
In LUMS, 21 out of 23 students have responded to this statement. Here we have again scattered 
results. 33.3% of students agree strongly and 61.9% simply agree. Only one student chose the 
option “Can’t choose” 
3.3.2 India is Pakistan’s biggest enemy316 
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Figure 7: India is Pakistan's biggest enemy 
 
32 out of 34 PU students responded to this statement. 34.4% chose “Agree strongly” and 37.5% 
simply agree and only 28.1% disagree. On the whole we can say that 71.9% of PU students agree 
with this statement. 
 
                                                 
316
 Particpants: PU 32 out of 34, KE 20 out of 20, LUMS 22 out of 23. 
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At the King Edwards College, 20 out of 20 students responded to this statement. 15% agree 
strongly, 35% simply agree, whereas 45% disagree and 5% choose the option “Can’t choose”. 
50% of the students agree with this statement, which is followed by 45% of students who 
disagree on it. There is almost a balance between these two options, with a majority agreeing with 
the statement. 
 
In LUMS, 22 out of 23 students responded to this statement. 13.6% each time opted for “Agree 
strongly” and “Agree”, whereas 40.9% disagree and 22.7% disagree strongly, and 9.1% are 
uncertain and chose the option “Can’t choose”. We have thus a majority of 63.7% of LUMS 
students who disagree with the previous statement. 
 
3.3.3 Pakistani Muslim identity needs to be defended through Jihad317 
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Figure 8: I believe that Pakistani Muslim identity needs to be defended through Jihad 
 
At the Punjab University, 30 out of 34 students responded to this question. Out of these 43.3% 
agree strongly with this statement and 20% simply agree, whereas 30% disagree and 6.7% cannot 
choose. We have hence a majority of 63.3% of PU students who agree with this statement. 
 
                                                 
317 Participants: PU 30 out of 34, KE 20 out of 20, LUMS, 22 out of 23. 
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At the King Edwards College, 20 out of 20 students responded to this statement. Among these 
15% “Agree strongly”, 20% simply “Agree”, whereas 50% disagree and 10% disagree strongly, 
and 5% can’t choose. Thus, in King Edwards we have a majority of 60% of students disagreeing 
with this statement. 
 
In LUMS, 22 out of 23 students responded to this statement. Only 9.1% agree, whereas 50% 
disagree and 40.9% disagree strongly. We have thus a majority of 90.9% of LUMS students to 
disagree strongly with this statement. 
3.3.4  Analysis and interpretation 
As to possible threats perceived by Pakistani students, I chose three statements out of my 
questionnaire which would provide me with information on their attitudes and feelings towards 
their Muslim identity in contestation with the “Western” 318 world and the big Indian “enemy”. 
As to the third statement, my intention was to measure their commitment towards their Pakistani 
Muslim identity and the degree of importance they attach towards the defence of this identity 
through Jihad319.  
 A majority of the students of the Punjab University agreed with all three statements. If we look 
at the first statement in regard to the hostility of Western countries perceived by Pakistani 
students towards Muslims, we find a majority of 65.5% of PU students agreeing on this. This 
threat is also identifiable in my interviews. My female PU interview partner had a very critical 
opinion towards Western countries and regions such as the United States and Europe: 
We are physically free, but we are not mentally free. We are mental slaves. The 
slaves of foreign countries, Europe, America ... most of it America! (...) We will 
only become mentally free if we are educated. For this we have to change our 
education system. We need our own public personalities and not those chosen by 
America to rule the country. 
 
This statement almost appears to be demonizing the big “Western” representatives, such as the 
United States and European countries. These two regions are perceived as an actor involved in 
                                                 
318 The term “Western” was not defined in the questionnaire and used in the most common sense. In 
Pakistan, the general sense of “Western” predominantly comprises the United States and Europe, putting 
emphasis especially on those countries who dominate most Western discourses represented in Pakistan 
through the media, export culture coming from these countries and sweeping the economic market and 
influencing the visual landscape of the country. Although the United States and Europe were the countries 
or regions that my respondents referred to most in my open-ended questions in the questionnaire and in 
my interviews, I am certain that the students do have a distinct understanding of the “Western world”. 
319 The term “Jihad“ per se is a very contested term and was not defined in the questionnaire. As to this, 
the term can be understood in every sense as the mere defending of the Islamic belief in a verbal sense, or 
the defending of the Islamic faith through more radical physical means. 
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the enslavement of Pakistan. This harsh statement is also followed by very negative attitudes 
towards their Indian neighbour, to which actually 71.9% of PU students ascribe a feeling of 
animosity between India and Pakistan. The same student shared many fears and resentments 
towards India with me: 
 
When we look at India from a political perspective, when we look at their politics, 
their strategies, their activities, they all do that against Pakistan. So it is natural 
than, in our hearts we also turn against them. From the beginning they were doing 
such things, that’s a reality, everybody knows that, that they were and are against 
Pakistan. They have this concept of devi mhata, the goddess mother, and they 
think that through Partition 1947 the holiness of their country was destroyed. 
Now they are trying to recover these pieces. 
 
This statement almost portrays a very self-confident and self-righteous attitude of this Pakistani 
student towards the Indian neighbour. It shows that there is strong sense of injustice perceived 
through India, which justifies the feeling of animosity towards India.  
 
My male PU interview partner shared very similar attitudes towards India, based on negative 
perceptions and experiences in Pakistan’s history: 
 
If you look at the different wars between India and Pakistan, it is clear that these 
two countries can never become friends. India will always interfere in our affairs. 
India will always highlight our negative things in their media! 
As to the third major statement concerning whether Pakistani Muslim identity needs to be 
defended through Jihad, PU students have the highest percentage of agreement with this 
statement. This can, on the one hand, be linked to their strong compassion regarding their 
religion and their strong sense of Muslim identity320. It can also be interpreted on the basis of 
their social background, as already elaborated through the economic background of the Pakistani 
students, shown via the university fees321, and through the fact that most of the students 
attending the PU have finished lower English medium schools or Urdu medium schools and thus 
share different values regarding their religion than students of higher English medium schools.322 
We have hence a majority of 63.3% of PU students who agree with this statement. In that case 
their strong Muslim identity and their fears towards the Western World and India, and especially 
                                                 
320 see chapter 3.1 “On Identity“. 
321 see chapter 1.3.3. “My repondents: The students”. 
322 see chapter 2.4.4 “Higher education in Pakistan”. 
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the feeling of injustice perceived through the “Hindu neighbour”, India, could help explain this 
result.  
The results of the King Edward’s students’ questionnaires are more diverging in the sense that 
there is not one major pattern as to agreeing to all three questions as was the case with PU 
students for example. Interestingly, it are the K.E. students and the LUMS students (95.2%) who 
agree the most (95%) on the first statement about the Western hostility perceived towards the 
Muslim world. Although the Muslim identity is the strongest among PU students323, K.E. 
students with very similar results, have – concerning this statement – the highest vote. The 
second statement on the animosity felt between India and Pakistan, shows an almost balanced 
share of those agreeing and those disagreeing, differing only through 5%, which make those 
agreeing on this statement the majority. We can therefore conclude that due to the results 
concerning their Muslim identity, the feeling of hostility towards the Muslim world is stronger 
than the hostility towards India. Hence when it comes to their Muslim identity, they feel more 
challenged and feel a greater threat than when it comes to their nationality and their enemy from 
historical times. 
My interviews have given me similar statements as to these two threats. My female K.E. interview 
partner shared her feelings towards the Western influence with me, which she esteemed as rather 
harmful for the development of Pakistan’s: 
I think for Pakistan at THIS stage Western influence is harmful. Pakistan should 
focus on Islam, but not in the sense that we should all cover up and cut off with 
everything and everybody. It’s in the other sense, in the sense that we should try 
to do everything, go in every direction, in the information technology fields or 
others. We should do everything but it should all be in a limit and that limit was 
given to us by Islam. 
 
There is a strong sense towards the Islamic orientation of Pakistan and the fear of the alienation 
of Pakistan through the Western influence. Following the same fear of alienation and less 
patriotism among Pakistanis, my male K.E. interview partner linked this Pakistani “emigration” 
not to the Western influence in general, but to the economic weakness of Pakistan: 
 
I don’t think that there is so much patriotism in Pakistan, because once you get an 
offer to go abroad then you go abroad. There is not enough food and money in 
Pakistan so that’s normal that people opt for foreign countries. 
 
                                                 
323 see chapter 3.1.2 "Analysis and interpretation" 
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In regard to India, I did however find both – acceptance and appreciation towards India, as well 
as harsh criticism - which would also explain the results of my questionnaires, which is almost a 
balanced results between those agreeing (50%) and those disagreeing (45%) with this statement. 
My male K.E interview partner told me in regard to India: 
 
India and Pakistan used to be one country, they just got separated a little later. 
According to me they have the same culture. 
 
This was followed by him concluding with the fact that India and Pakistan “should live in peace”. 
 
My female K.E. interview partner came to the same conclusion in regard to India by saying that 
India and Pakistan would have the same culture and traditions: 
 
There is not so much difference between Indian and Pakistani traditions, because 
we used to be one country once. So we automatically took these traditions with us 
when Pakistan was founded. So there is no such problem, but on a personal level 
I feel that in India Pakistanis are not perceived very well. (...) But personally, I 
myself think that Indians are simply “ok”, but I don’t perceive them very well 
either. 
 
At the same time she confessed a little bit later: 
 
Yeah, I sort of feel that India is our enemy country, because India is always 
thinking of how to harm Pakistan. 
We can see therefore that we have both here, we have the (cultural) acceptance of India, but at 
the same time the hostility towards India is still perceived.  
As to the last statement concerning whether Muslim Pakistani identity needs to be defended 
through Jihad, we have a very big number (60%) of students disagreeing on this statement. This 
is opposite to the outcome of the PU students who were with almost the same percentage 
agreeing at this stage. Compared to the results of LUMS students, with (90.9%) disagreeing, we 
have at the King Edward’s College hence a moderate outcome. 
In the LUMS student body we can at this point recognize a pattern of disagreeing highly with 
two of the three statements. The first statement on the Western hostility perceived towards the 
Muslim world has surprisingly among all three institutions the highest degree of agreement at 
LUMS, although the difference to K.E. students is only 0.2%. One reason for this could be that 
LUMS students are the most exposed to Western culture and lifestyle as elaborated in my 
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observations and in previous analysis so that they are more conscious towards the Western 
world. In regard to their identity, they do have a strong sense of identity; the conversations and 
statements collected on identity were the most present in my two LUMS interviews, indicating to 
me that these students were indeed were the most reflective towards their own identity.  
 
My male LUMS interview partner highlighted his tolerance towards the Western countries by 
sharing equally the belief that the image of the West can be very deceiving: 
 
People who follow different values are not betraying Pakistan and it’s better they 
go abroad, because they have this image of the West of being something special. I 
think they have their own choices. And I think they should go abroad and once 
they go abroad they will realise how special this is. 
 
Although quite subtle, the irony which is hidden in this statement shows a slight hostility, 
disappointment or other resentments towards Western countries. This irony could of course have 
various motives which are not identifiable through the interview.  
In regard to the two other statements, we have the majority of LUMS students disagreeing with 
both statements. 63.7% of LUMS students disagree with the statement that India is Pakistan’s 
biggest enemy. The tolerance of India has definitely also been identifiable in my interviews. 
Interestingly, both my interview partners had close friends in India, therefore their attitude 
towards India was connected with personal experiences with Indians, which were in both cases 
positive. My male interview partner told me: 
I have some very close friends in India, so I do have an idea how life is in India. I 
think India is modernizing and has modernized quite a bit. (...) I think there are 
far more poor people in India than in Pakistan, but the system in India is also 
much more promising. 
 
There is not only a personal connection to India through friends, but there is also an appreciation 
of the economic and social system in India.  
My female interview partner had a very open and liberal attitude towards India and did in fact 
rather criticize the reception of India in Pakistan by stressing the degree of manipulation and 
propaganda in Pakistan in this regard: 
Personally, I don’t know India. I have never been there, I know some people and 
I have a very good friend from India. I don’t hold any prejudices against it, I don’t 
hold any notions against it, because I know that the things we do here are very 
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much edited and they are very much suited to whoever is in power. (...) I know 
that our history is so distorted, about the way Partition happened, everything. If 
you read a Pakistan studies textbook and then go in search of the fact what 
happened and try to connect things for yourself, you would be blown away about 
how much difference exists. 
 
As to the last statement as to how many LUMS students think that Pakistani Muslim identity 
needs to be strengthened through Jihad we have a tremendous majority of 90.9% of students 
absolutely disagreeing with this statement. This negation of violence stands in line with the 
tolerance accorded to India as well and would depict LUMS students as the most tolerant and 
peaceful group in these two regards in comparison to the other student bodies. 
 
3.4. Political identities of Pakistani students in Lahore 
 
“We don’t know who we are frankly. We’ve just ghettoized differences!” 
This statement, made by one of my LUMS interview partners, depicts best in my mind the 
situation of the different identities inherent in Pakistani students, and the Pakistani society in 
general. 
Although one can probably make out common economic backgrounds of the various students in 
the different universities, and also analyze their attitudes according to the previous education they 
have had (as was analyzed by Tariq Rahman)324, it is hard to classify the attitudes of the three 
different student bodies according to the three options conservative – moderate – liberal. The 
data received and analyzed in the three different sections of this chapter show that the data of 
each university itself is so diverse that it would need a second or third assessment through 
quantitative and qualitative data in order to locate the political identities of these different student 
bodies. As my study has no general representative demand due to the small number of samples in 
each university my conclusions in this chapter are all of hypothetical nature. In terms of identity I 
have noticed that in all three universities identity was a very sensitive point, which was an 
important issue to each and every student with whom I conducted an interview. The degree of 
importance that was given to Islam was however oscillating, depicting PU and K.E. students as 
much more aware of their Muslim identity than LUMS students for example. In regard to their 
political attitudes beginning with the felt political responsibility inherent in their citizenship or 
their attitudes towards the Pakistani government and army, we have quite shaky results. The 
                                                 
324 See chapter 2.4. “Pakistani education system – spaces of interaction between different identities”. 
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political responsibility of their citizenship is certainly the highest among PU students, whereas the 
proudness towards the Pakistani government is the highest among LUMS students, and the 
proudness towards the Pakistani army among K.E. students. This shows that the political 
awareness of these three political elements on a state-level is perceived differently within the 
different student bodies and does not really allow to conclude on the political responsibility, 
awareness or sensibility of these students.  
As to the threats perceived in regard to Western hostility towards the Muslim world, LUMS 
students have, closely followed by K.E., the most receptive attitudes. As to attitudes towards 
India LUMS students have by far the most tolerant attitudes, followed by K.E. students and in 
opposition to PU students who show the least amount of tolerance towards India, as they 
perceive India most as their enemy. As to the attitude whether Pakistani Muslim Identity needs to 
be defended through Jihad, PU students show the highest degree of agreement, followed by K.E. 
students and strongly opposed by LUMS students, who show the most peaceful attitude in this 
regard. 
It is difficult to classify these three student bodies, as to which I can only highlight the diverse 
nature of the political attitudes that were found within my results. It becomes even harder due to 
this very same reason to make out what the different political identities of the different student 
bodies are, but on the other hand this highlights the difficulty of depicting a consolidated 
“Pakistani identity” which in itself is a very inherent, diverse and complex concept. 
I would thus like to conclude with the statement that the problem of no existing single 
consolidated common identity in Pakistan is due to the fact that different communities or groups 
coexist together but do not interact, but in fact only provoke social, political and religious 
tensions between them. 
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4. The political situation in Pakistan – a country in 
perpetual crisis 
Strategic and operational level 
This chapter is going to work out the political situation in Pakistan. As a time reference, I will 
summarize the political events that took place shortly before, during and shortly after my 
research. After the description of the political situation in Pakistan in this period (March 2007 – 
December 2007), I would like to outline the developments of a protest movement coming from 
Pakistani students. Next, I would like to locate the main problems of the political situation in 
Pakistan, which are most likely linked to a corrupt system. Therefore, I will present prospects for 
development through the UNODC’s work against corruption in member states. 
4.1 The political situation in Pakistan – three major events in 2007 
This chapter will discuss the political events that have happened during March 2007 and 
December 2007 – events that took place shortly before, during, or after my research and have 
helped me to develop my question of research. The discussed events will be: 1) chief justice 
Affair in March 2007, 2) The Lal Masjid Operation in August 2007 and 3) the imposition of a 
state of emergency in Pakistan in November 2007. 
I will discuss the events by presenting the issue of each of these three events and then later 
present a constellation analysis of the most important actors involved in these scenarios. The 
sources used for the depicting of these events will primarily be newspaper articles of DAWN, the 
most widespread left English newspaper in Pakistan, The Nation, a right English newspaper, 
analytical articles from BBC and Pakistan reports of the International Crisis Group. 
4.1.1 The Chief Justice Affair, March 2007 
Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudry was appointed by president Pervez Musharrf as chief justice of the 
Supreme Court in Pakistan on 7 May 2005.325 On 9 March 2007, Musharraf suddenly suspended 
the chief justice Iftikhar Chaudry and replaced him by the new judge appointed by him, justice 
Javed Iqbal. This was seen as drastic and sudden move and as a direct attack on the judiciary by 
the president. As reasons for his decision Musharraf presented allegations of corruption and 
misconduct against the chief justice. No such action of that degree, that a chief justice had been 
                                                 
325 see Staff Reporter, “Chaudry Iftikhar named new CJ“, DAWN, 08.05.2007, see online: 
http://www.dawn.com/2005/05/08/top4.htm, 09.01.2009. 
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turned “non-functional” by the president has ever happened before. DAWN reports that this was 
the first case ever: 
 
Although the country’s judicial history has been a chequered one all along, and 
judges have been removed by various methods, this is the first time that the chief 
justice of Pakistan has been made, in the words of the official handout, ‘non-
functional’ and his case has been sent to the Supreme Judicial Council for 
action.326 
Musharraf’s decision shocked the whole country and led to countrywide protests from the 
judiciary and the civil society. Lawyers protests took place in Islamabad and in Lahore, which 
ended in violent clashes between lawyers and the police. 327 Through countrywide protests of 
lawyers, media representatives, students, human right activists, as a never seen protest movement 
of that constellation before, the judiciary gained a lot of national support whilst Musharraf’s 
popularity was continuously sinking. On 20 July the Supreme Court of Pakistan thus restored the 
chief justice Iftikhar Chaudry, ignoring the president’s orders. The majority of judges in the 
Supreme Court decided “that the orders to suspend the chief justice, or to even send him on 
forced leave, and the appointment of an acting chief justice in the present situation were 
illegal”328. The DAWN article also stated that this was the first time in the country’s history, that 
the Supreme Court had thus overruled a presidential/military329 order.  
According to human rights activists such as Asma Jahangir, this was thus the beginning of the 
rupture between the military and civilians: 
`President Musharraf should have resigned much earlier, but now he owes an 
apology to the nation for all the tension and unrest in the country,’ Asma 
Jehangir, chairperson of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), said 
while talking to DAWN. ‘It is now a clear divide between the civilians and the 
military.’330 
 
The chief justice affair was only one of the different actions of Musharraf that created great 
dissent between the civil society and the army/government in general. 
                                                 
326 see Iqbal, Nasir: “CJ suspended, escorted home: • Justice Iftikhar summoned by SJC on 13th for 
reference hearing • Ex-judges call it a blow to judiciary’s independence; minister defends decision • 
Whither judicial activism?”, DAWN, 10.03.2007, see online:  
http://www.dawn.com/2007/03/10/top1.htm, 09.01.2009. 
327 see Iqbal, Nasir/Shahzad, Asif: “Nationwide protest by lawyers; 40 hurt in Lahore baton-charge”, 
DAWN, 13.03.2007, http://www.dawn.com/2007/03/13/top1.htm, 09.01.2009. 
328 Ibd. 
329 As Musharraf was holding both positions: presidency and chief of army it is appropriate to mention 
both here. 
330 Ibd. 
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4.1.2 The Lal Masjid Operation, July 2007 
Lal Masjid is the Urdu term for “Red Mosque”. This mosque is located in Islamabad and was 
known to be a madrassah for Jamia Hafsa students. The mosque was described as a mosque with 
“a reputation for radicalism, mostly attracting Islamic hard-line students from North West 
Frontier Province (NWFP) and tribal areas where support for the Taliban and al-Qaeda is 
strong”331.  
After several days of standoff between the government and the militants who had taken 
hundreds of madrassah students as hostage, the army launched a direct attack at the Lal Masjid 
and arrested the two leaders Maulana Abdul Aziz and Abdul Rashid Ghazi, who were trying to 
escape in a burqa. Throughout its history the Lal Masjid has always been tolerated or even 
promoted by the Pakistani political elite, especially under the Islamic regime of Zia-ul-Haq.332 
The attack of the government at the Lal Masjid caused the death of about 200 civilians. Although 
the public did in fact have problems tolerating the growing influence of Jamia Hafsa in 
Islamabad, which manifested itself through social harassment of the capital’s citizens and the 
kidnapping of prostitutes. Nevertheless the critique was oriented primarily against Musharraf who 
did have a bad “crisis management”: 
In the Pakistani population the radical clergy men of the red mosque were 
rejected. The publice critice hence was not against the occupation of the mosque, 
but was directed towards the bad crisis management and the late intervention of 
the goverment. It had tolerated for months, how armed students of the madrassah 
next to the red mosque have been attacking music- and video stores, threathning 
people with suicide attacts and taking policemen and prostitutes as hostages. The 
media and the political opposition thus blamed Musharraf’s “conciliation policy” 
as responsible for the emergence of this crisis.333 
 
This created even more dissent in regard to the armies policies, which over the years have been 
supporting Islamic militancy, as the support of these groups were open-sanctioned policies from 
                                                 
331 see Hasan, Syed Shoaib: “Profile: Islamabad’s Red Mosque”, BBC News, 27 July 2007, see online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6503477.stm, 09.01.2009. 
332 Ibd. 
333 Original quotation: “In der Bevölkerung stießen die radikalen Kleriker der Roten Moschee 
überwiegend auf Ablehnung. Die öffentliche Kritik richtete sich daher weniger gegen die Erstürmung der 
Moschee an sich, sondern vielmehr gegen das schlechte Krisenmanagment und das viel zu späte 
Eingreifen der Regierung. Diese hatte monatelang tatenlos zugesehen, wie bewaffnete SchülerInnen und 
Schüler der an die Roten Moschee angrenzenden Koranschule Musik- und Videoläden stürmten, 
Selbstmordattentate androhten und Prostituierte und Polizisten als Geiseln nahmen. Medien und 
Oppositionsparteien machten Musharraf daher wegen seiner “Beschwichtigungspolitik” für die 
Entstehung der Krise mitverantwortlich”; see Effner, Henning: “Pakistan vor den Wahlen: Ausrufung des 
Notstandes oder Rückkehr zur Demokratie? ”, in: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (Hrsg.): “Kurzberichte aus der 
internationalen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit Asien und Pazifik”, Islamabad, August 2007, p. 2 
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the government.334 The Lal Masjid affair thus sharpened the critique of the media and the public 
against the army and reproached them of deliberately tolerating Islamic extremism, which was no 
longer controllable neither through the state nor through the army.335  
 
4.1.3 The imposition of a state of emergency in Pakistan, November 2007 
On 3 November Musharraf – in his position as army chief - declared a state of emergency in 
Pakistan336, thus suspending the constitution and setting up a Provisional Constitutional Order 
(PCO). Musharraf held at that time both positions: presidency and chief of army. This political 
act of imposing a state of emergency – which Musharraf justified due to the rising militancy in 
the country, as was the case prior with the Lal Masjid operation and the rising suicide attacks in 
the northern areas of Pakistan – was widely seen as an act to secure his position as a president 
which was due to expire in the following weeks. The coming presidential elections at that time 
were foreseen for 6 October 2007. Through the imposition of a state of emergency Musharraf 
suspended the constitution, and thus the most basic human rights, sacked the chief justice 
Iftikhar Chaudry and all other judges who declared his act as illegal and put a ban on the free 
media. Through the martial law, the Army Act 1952, the army now gained a lot of powers as 
reported by DAWN: 
 
Under the amended act, the Army can now try civilians on charges ranging from 
treason, sedition and attack on army personnel to “assaulting the president with 
intent to compel or restrain the exercise of any lawful power” and “giving 
statements conducive to public mischief“. The unamended Army Act, too, had a 
provision to hold court-martial of civilians but only when at least one of the 
accused belonged to the armed forces.337 
 
There was a censure and ban on the media, and only state-sponsored television channels, such as 
PTV (Pakistan Television), were allowed to broadcast.  
In the course of emergency thousands of lawyers, human right activists, politicians of opposition 
parties and students took to street and protested against the imposition of emergency and the 
                                                 
334 see Hasan, Syed Shoaib: “Profile: Islamabad’s Red Mosque”, BBC News, 27. July 2007, see online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6503477.stm, 09.01.2009. 
335 Effner (2007): 2. 
336 see the text of the proclamation of emergency online: http://www.dawn.com/2007/11/04/top16.htm, 
12.01.2009. 
337 see Iqbal, Nasir: “Civilians can be court-martialled: Army Act amended”, DAWN, 11. November 2007, 
see online: http://www.dawn.com/2007/11/11/top1.htm, 10.01.2009. 
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political arbitrary of the army. Musharraf’s decision also evoked protests from international 
“partners” of Pakistan in the fight against terrorism, like the United States for example.338  
Many politicians, lawyers, students, journalists and other key figures got detained during the 
protest movements. Benazir Bhutto, political opponent of Musharraf, declared the decision of 
Musharraf illegal and commented that this was a dangerous development of the country.339  
Nawaz Sharif, second opposition leader of Musharraf’s regime, said that Musharraf would lead 
the country towards anarchy.340 
During the state of emergency Musharraf finally resigned from his position as a chief of army due 
to great national and international pressure forcing him to give up this post in order to be 
legitimized to run for presidency. On 15 December Musharraf finally ended the state of 
emergency by replacing the Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) with the 1973 Constitution 
after having made amendments to it through presidential decrees. These amendments were seen 
as providing Pervez Musharraf “a blanket cover to the president against any challenges to his re-
election, proclamation of emergency order of Nov 3, introduction of the PCO and all actions 
taken from Nov 3 to Dec 15”341. 
The general elections were planned to take place in January, but due to various events within the 
country, such as the assassination of one of the opposition leaders, Benazir Bhutto, in February 
2008, the elections were constantly postponed.  
4.2 Constellation analysis of the most important political actors and fields of 
the political crisis in Pakistan 
In order to understand these events and the political consequences they bear, it is important to 
understand the problematic issues behind these different developments. It is first of all necessary 
to look at the different actors, the different power groups, in the political landscape of Pakistan 
involved in these issues. For this, I will focus on three major actors and fields which are 
important to understand the crisis: 1) President Pervez Musharraf as a key figure in this scenario, 
                                                 
338 “Gen Musharraf second coup: Charge sheet against judiciary; Media ‘promoting negativism’; 
“Country’s ‘integrity at stake’;Legislatures intact’, DAWN Report, 04.11.2007, see online: 
http://www.dawn.com/2007/11/04/top1.htm, 10.01.2009. 
339 ur-Rahman, Shamim: “Benazir calls it martial law on dash back home”, DAWN, 04.11.2007, see online: 
http://www.dawn.com/2007/11/04/top6.htm, 12.01.2009. 
340 see: http://www.dawn.com/2007/11/03/welcome.htm,  
341 see Khan, Iftikhar A./Iqbal, Nasir: “Amended Constitution restored: Emergency lifted; Judges take 
fresh oath; PCO revoked”, DAWN, 16.12.2007, see online:  
http://www.dawn.com/2007/12/16/top1.htm, 16.01.2009. 
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2) the army and its role in these events and 3) the rising civil society and especially the students in 
this political scene. 
4.2.1 General Pervez Musharraf’s regime 
Musharraf’s policies have widely created a lot of dissent in the country, especially from the 
religio-political parties, who were especially against his policy towards the United States. 
Musharraf who has gained important value for the United States as an important ally in the fight 
against international terrorism, reaped a lot of criticism and anger among his own nationals. His 
political actions in the year 2007 hit on his popularity: the suspension of chief justice Iftikhar 
Chaudry that resulted in a big lawyer’s protest, his attempt to control the violence from 
fundamentalist groups in Pakistan’s capital through the Lal Masjid operation and the overall 
problems of tackling extremism within the country through military control have all resulted in 
the degradation of the military’s image in Pakistan and the loss of popularity for president 
Musharraf.342 
The International Republican Institute carried out a public opinion survey between 29 August 
and 13 September 2007, which shows that during the months between June and September 2007 
the popularity of Musharraf sank rapidly due to the already mentioned events. 
                                                 
342 see International Crisis Group (ICG): “Winding Back Martial Law in Pakistan”, Asia Briefing No.70, 
Islamabad/Brussels, 12.11.2007, p. 6. 
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Figure 9: Approval of President Musharraf343 
 
Furthermore, the survey shows that within these three months, where criticism grew louder in 
regard of Musharraf holding two positions and resigning his chief of army position, the 
improvement towards the resignation of Musharraf’s army post grew by 14%.  
 
Figure 10: Agreement/Disagreement on Musharraf's resignation344 
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His political actions, all three major events as analyzed below, have been perceived as acts to 
secure his position as president of Pakistan. As the Supreme Court, especially the chief justice 
Iftikhar Chaudry, was a declared criticizer of Musharraf’s political moves and as the Supreme 
Court was to decide on the legitimacy of his presidency, he declared a state of emergency, 
suspended the judges and lawyers of the Supreme Court before they could declare their decision: 
 
On 15 November, his term as president was due to end, as was parliamentary 
approval for his dual responsibilities. It was increasingly clear that the Supreme 
Court, which was to resume its hearing on the legality of his presidential election 
on 5 November, would rule against him on at least one of two grounds: that it 
was illegal for him to hold both offices and that he was bound by the bar on 
senior military officers standing for public office until they have been retired for 
two years.345 
 
His policies were thus seen as an act of “self-preservation”346 in order to gain more international 
support and raise his popularity, which both backfired and in the contrary raised more 
international and national criticism, destabilizing the country even more and degrading the 
popularity of the army within the country.  
 
4.2.2 The role and position of the army 
To understand the role and the position of the army in Pakistan it requires a detailed look on 
Pakistani politics and the historical significance of the army. Mazhar Aziz, the author of “Military 
control in Pakistan: The parallel state”, presents in this work an analytical account on the 
Pakistani military, by depicting the influence of the Pakistani army in the Pakistani policy through 
political sources, such as the political decision-making processes in regard of the army, through 
data of the National Defence College, which educates the future military rulers in Pakistan and 
through internal publications of the army portraying various perception’s of the Pakistani military 
concerning nation-building and national security in Pakistan. On the other hand, his work also 
provides a theoretical approach towards the problem of the military in Pakistan by allying it to 
two theoretical frameworks, the “path dependency” and “the historical institutionalism” of the 
army in Pakistan. His analysis is thus helpful to depict the army’s situation in Pakistan. 
                                                                                                                                                        
343 The survey polled 4.009 adults in 256 rural and 144 urban locations between 29 August and 13 
September 2007. See online: www.iri.org/mena/pakistan/2007-10-11-pakistan.asp, 16.01.2009. 
344 Ibd. 
345 see ICG (2007): 3. 
346 Ibd. 
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The army’s role in Pakistan has always been a very powerful one. Throughout Pakistan’s history 
the military has been accorded a lot of power in terms of financial aid from various national 
sources, such as its major share from the national budget347like military aid from the United States 
for example.348 Although financial aid to the military can be seen as an important pre-requisite 
condition for the Pakistani military to grow strong and powerful, it can also be argued, that 
through the historical presence of the army in Pakistan’s politics, the military’s control over 
Pakistani politics could widely expand. This is historically explicable through Pakistan’s history of 
creation where “the idea of threat perception and state survival”349 has strongly shaped Pakistan’s 
relation to its neighbours, especially India, unfolding a problem of national security. The various 
challenges resulting from this, a feeling of insecurity and the political and institutional deficiency 
in the first years of Pakistan’s existence has thus been filled by Pakistan’s military trying to cope 
with the various problems on a national and international level. The army has hence effectively 
contributed to a nation-building process in Pakistan, bunching the fears of insecurity and the fear 
of India together and providing strategies for state survival.350 
Pakistan’s rulers have thus often used the army to get control over the country. Imposing martial 
law has often been used in the country’s history, starting off with Iskander Mirza in 1958. Mazhar 
Aziz argues that every “transition from a military rule to an elected form of government in 
Pakistan is likely to produce weak civilian governments due to the presence of a strongly 
institutionalized military”351. He therefore argues, that this has shaped the future country’s 
political development as it predestined a “path dependence” and a “historical institutionalism” of 
the army. These concepts, both relating to the political power within one institution and the 
power relations within such developments which can lead to dependence of this certain 
institution through political decisions which can generate the same pattern of future policy 
choices. 352 
The army thus achieved to penetrate all important spaces in Pakistan and almost create a “parallel 
state” influencing socio-economic structures in Pakistan. Until today, the army has its separate 
education and training institutes, hospitals, housing areas, etc. The army, in many parts in 
Pakistan, thus gained a high prestige and also respect coming from many Pakistanis. This 
                                                 
347 see Aziz, Mazhar: Military control in Pakistan: The parallel state, Routledge, New York: 2008 , p. 36. 
348 Ibd., p. 7. 
349 Ibd., p. 22. 
350 Ibd., p. 25. 
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changed throughout the time and culminated in a big loss of popularity in Pakistan especially 
among Musharraf’s regime. 
Corrupt and unlawful policies, such as Musharraf’s self-preservation policies before and during 
the imposition of a state of emergency, have severely damaged the image of the army in Pakistan: 
 
The drawn-out battle to end Jihadi control of the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in the 
heart of the capital in July proved a deep embarrassment and highlighted how 
little the military government has done to control extremism. Worsening violence 
in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the Swat district of 
Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and across Balochistan has seriously 
undermined the military’s image and popularity. Inflation, inequality and an 
explosion of corruption scandals have blown apart the argument that the military 
offers a safe pair of economic hands than civilian politicians.353 
 
The opinion survey poll of the IRI shows similar results as to the popularity of the army among 
the Pakistani respondents: 
 
Figure 11: The army's role in the government354 
 
This shows that within four months those agreeing on a non-interference of the Pakistani army 
in Pakistani politics have risen by 7% showing a total result of 62% of those agreeing with such a 
statement in September 2001.  
 
                                                 
353 see ICG (2007): 6. 
354 see online: www.iri.org/mena/pakistan/2007-10-11-pakistan.asp, 16.01.2009. 
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It can therefore be concluded that the popularity of the Pakistani army has perpetually fallen, 
with a strong loss of popularity within the months of emergency from November 2007 to 
December 2007. 
4.2.3  The judiciary 
Pakistan’s inner political problems can strongly be made out through the legal situation in the 
country, not only in terms of ineffective laws, that allow the discrimination against certain groups 
of the society and the protection of politicians and army officers through several orders, decrees 
and amendments through the constitution, but also through the country’s long tradition of 
corruption in various institutions, also within the judiciary. The International Crisis Group 
summarizes the situation of the judiciary in the following words: 
 
Motivated by self-preservation and self-interest, Pakistan’s superior judiciary has 
not just failed to oppose Islamic legislation that violates fundamental rights but 
has also repeatedly failed to uphold the constitution. While superior courts have 
validated military interventions, military regimes have manipulated judicial 
appointments, promotions and removals, steadily purging higher court benches of 
independent-minded judges. This has pushed the judiciary further to the 
ideological right. Today, judicial independence is hampered not only by the state 
but also by right-wing religious groups.355 
 
Transparency International, the leading anti-corruption NGO worldwide, has evaluated 
Pakistan’s judiciary as extremely receptive towards corruption, which is due to the political 
history of the country, which has “demoralised” the country’s judges and lawyers: 
 
Since the 1950s, Pakistani history has been divided into periods of authoritarian 
military rule, alternating with brief bursts of civilian government. Almost every 
regime has altered the constitution in terms of the relationship between the 
judiciary and the executive, the provisions of emergency rule and the extension of 
presidential authority. Each also forced the judiciary to ‘re-swear’ its loyalty to the 
ruling junta, rather than the constitution. This has destroyed the institution, 
demoralised the judges and made them prone to improper influence. The civilian 
governments of Benazir Bhutto (1988–90 and 1993–96) and Nawaz Sharif (1990–
93 and 1997–99) were unable to break the links between the military, religious 
leaders and military-backed politicians since their own power also depended on 
army support.356 
 
                                                 
355 see International Crisis Group: “Reforming the Judiciary in Pakistan“, Asia Report No.160, 16.11.2008, 
p. i. 
356 see Siddiqui, Jawed A.: “A tradition of judicial subservience“, in: Transparency International (Ed.): 
“Corruption and Judicial Systems”, p. 245 see online:  
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In the course of Musharraf’s regime, Musharraf several times made judges swear an oath to a 
Provisional Constitutional Order, which hinders the judiciary to challenge the authority in form 
of the chief general and the executive, as was the case during the state of emergency in Pakistan. 
Those who refuse, have always been suspended by the government. Transparency International 
thus criticizes the control of the government on the judiciary, due to which there is a lack of 
security for judges which makes them susceptible to corruption by the government.357 Next to 
this, every military regime of Pakistan has so far tolerated corrupted judges as they would not 
challenge the military regime.358 
 
Due to these developments within the judicial system in Pakistan, the International Crisis Group 
has seriously asked for the reform of the judicial system in Pakistan.359  
4.2.4  Civil society: A student’s movement in rise 
Musharraf’s action in declaring a state of emergency has created a loud outcry in the whole 
country, mobilizing effectively the intellectual class in Pakistan: lawyers, journalists, bureaucrats 
and also the youngest layer of this class: students. United in the fight for justice, the students 
from different universities soon organized big student rallies and protests demanding the 
reinstatement of the chief justice Iftikhar Chaudry, the lifting of emergency and the re-
establishment of rule of law in Pakistan. Musharraf’s illegal act which was performed under the 
cloak of fighting the rising extremism within the country was perceived as an act of regaining his 
control and power over Pakistan that was dwindling due to his own policy. The destabilizing of 
democracy through his ambivalent policies to fight Islamistic threats in Pakistan and his direct 
attack on the Supreme Court deteriorated not only his own image and popularity within the 
Pakistani society but also that of the army. The army, which next to various military interventions 
in Pakistan still enjoyed a certain degree of popularity and prestige within the society, rapidly lost 
its popularity after Musharraf’s actions.  
Musharraf’s decision did have a direct impact on the student’s life, who not only lost their most 
basic fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression and a fair and just trial, but who also saw 
their student fellows and teachers arrested, who had a critical stance towards Musharraf’s regime. 
Throughout the student protests, which by THE NATION was defined as the “biggest protest 
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to date”360 coming from students, Musharraf was criticised as a “Pakistani dictator” who through 
the suspension of the Pakistani constitution exposed the Pakistani society to his political 
arbitrariness. 
Protests took place on the various campusses of the different universities. One of the biggest 
students protest was that organized by students of the Lahore University Management and 
Science, which took place on 5 November 2007 and was called “black day” from the LUMS 
students, resulting from the arrest of several teachers of the institute: 
 
Student leaders had earlier circulated e-mails calling for a “black day” and urging 
members of the LUMS student body to attend classes, wearing black clothing. 
The rally, first of its kind on LUMS campus, follows the arrests of Prof Dr 
Cheema, Head of the Economics Department, Prof Dr Parvez Hasan, a member 
of the LUMS Management Committee, Mr Bilal Minto (adjunct faculty in the 
Department of Law & Policy) and Mr Aasim Sajjad (Social Sciences) on Sunday 
night for participating in an anti-government meeting held at the Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) office where police conducted a massive raid 
arresting 70 civil society activists.361 
 
The students soon established a network of cooperation between the different universities. One 
of those actions was the creation of a Student Action Committee (SAC). According to THE 
NATION the SAC Lahore comprises several colleges and universities in Lahore.362 Sundas 
Hurain, pursuing her law degree at the Lahore University of Management and Science and an 
active member of the SAC describes the number of the SAC members and activists as following: 
 
Well, if you want to judge our size by our turnout at rallies, then the biggest one, 
our protest at Liberty Chowk had roughly 500+ students. If you want to judge our 
size by how many are regular at our meetings then that number ranges between 
40-70 students.363 
 
The SAC soon initiated its activism on the internet by supporting the emergency-blog 
(http://pakistanmartiallaw.blogspot.com), which publishes weekly its own pamphlet called “The 
                                                 
360 see Vora, Jayati: “Students for a free Pakistan”, THE NATION, 30.11.2007, see online:  
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20071217/vora, 24.01.2009. 
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Emergency Times364, which is mainly run by LUMS students, but where other universities also 
have their share. The demand of the SAC is based on several points which are stated in “The 
Emergency Times” of the 27 November 2007: “1. The restoration of judges as on 2nd Nov., 
2. Restoration of pre-emergency constitution, 3. Freeing the Media, 4. Release of Protest 
Prisoners”365. 
 
Additional action to facilitate the communication between the different student bodies was taken 
through the help of online social-networking sites such as Facebook and Orkut, where groups were 
formed to support the students’ movement. The students’ movement have thus not only joined 
the rest of the Pakistani civil society but portrays a big political potential that lies within this layer 
of society, that is gaining more and more political significance in the fight for a just Pakistan 
governed by the rule of law. 
4.3.  Prospects for development: corruption in Pakistan 
Development is an important underlying theme for the restoration of justice and the promotion 
of democracy in Pakistan. Corruption, as one of Pakistan’s major political problems, can be seen 
as a huge hindrance towards the political and social development of the country. It is therefore an 
important unit of analysis for understanding Pakistan’s political situation today and also an 
important aspect in order to restructure Pakistan’s future. To begin this debate, I will hence give 
a brief introduction of the problem of corruption by presenting the United Nations’ work in this 
field. Pakistan is a member of the United Nations and has ratified its most important instrument 
in countering corruption which is the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). 
Thus, I will present my analysis in two main parts. I will in my first part give a general account on 
the UNODC’s (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) role in the fight against corruption, 
by presenting the findings of an explorative interview with an UNODC expert on crime 
prevention specialized on corruption, Alexandra Souza Martins. 
 
The second part will then look at the concrete problem of corruption in Pakistan and give a short 
analysis of this problem. 
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4.3.1 The UNODC’s role in the fight against global corruption.366 
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is committed towards combating 
transnational crime such as drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings, money laundering, 
corruption, terrorism and various other crime-related sectors. For this it has developed a set of 
instruments to provide member states with technical assistance and field-based cooperation. This 
help ranges from legal advice to help in terms of implementing legally binding instruments of the 
United Nations. One of these instruments is the United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
(UNCAC) which provides strategies to counteract corruption in different sectors and agencies. 
Alexandra Souza Martins, UNODC crime prevention expert, mentions that, with regard to the 
area of anti-corruption, UNODC is mandated to support member states in implementing the 
provisions of the UNCAC. She also mentioned that UNODC is the Secretariat of the 
Conference of States Parties to the Convention and provides technical assistance upon request to 
assist member states in controlling and preventing corruption. Technical assistance activities are 
delivered based on the Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). This convention is divided in 
four main pillars: 1) Prevention of corruption, 2) criminalization and law enforcement, 3) 
international cooperation, and 4) asset recovery. The UNODC is thus working in these four basic 
sectors. 
 
According to Mrs. Souza Martins many countries request the help of the UNODC in the fight 
against corruption:  
 
Many countries have been requesting UNODC to provide technical assistance to 
help them implement the provisions of UNCAC. Countries who have ratified this 
convention are obliged to implement the provisions of the convention. Some of 
the provisions are quite complex and it happens that governments face challenges 
in translating the legal provisions into actions. Some countries that lack the 
expertise to understand how to implement the provisions of the UNCAC request 
the United Nations to help them implement these provisions. 
 
The concrete help which is provided by the UNODC depends on the specific request of the 
country and varies from country to country.  
 
After receiving a request, UNODC has to first make sure that the necessary resources are 
available for providing the requested assistance. With sufficient resources the UNODC can, for 
example, send experts into the country to conduct a “technical assistance needs assessment 
mission” where the most important gaps in the legislation of the country compared to the 
                                                 
366 The information used in this chapter is derived from an interview with UNODC expert on crime 
prevention, Alexander Souza Martins, on 8 January 2009 at the UN Headquarters in Vienna. 
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provisions of the UNCAC are being assessed, as well as an analysis of previous and present anti-
corruption policies and institutions of the specific country. After one of these missions, a 
technical assessment needs analysis can be presented, focused on either the prevention of 
corruption or the law enforcement of specific agencies and sectors in order to prevent and fight 
corruption. To guarantee the sustainable aspect of the UNODC’s technical assistance, the office 
locates through evidence-based analysis the causes of corruption and the most important factors 
for the vulnerability to corruption in a country, the strengths of the specific country and 
consequently provides the necessary missing assistance. 
 
The cooperation partners of the UNODC are different from country to country, however Mrs. 
Souza Martins stresses that the UNCAC specifically demands the creation of an anti-corruption 
body: 
 
Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal 
system, ensure the existence of a body or bodies, as appropriate, that prevent 
corruption (....)367 
 
According to Alexandra Souza Martins it also happens that the requesting country asks the 
UNODC for help in order to integrate civil society into the process of preventing and fighting 
corruption, which stands in accordance with Article 13 of the UNCAC which requires the active 
participation of the civil society in this process.368 For this, so Mrs. Souza Martins, it is important 
to find the most important and relevant actors in the combating of corruption in a country, 
which starts from the individual responsibility of every person: 
 
No one alone is able to fight corruption. Even if you have a very committed 
government, the government alone will not be able to fight corruption. There are 
various counterparts and everybody should address efforts in the same direction. 
You, as an individual have the obligation to say “NO!” to corruption and combat 
corruption in your small circle. (...) We do not only work with the civil society but 
we try to involve all the stake holders in this context.  
 
Mrs. Souza Martins stresses the importance of education in such a process.: “Education is the key 
to change values and to decrease the tolerance of corruption in a given context”. Therefore it is 
extremely important to include the youth into this debate in order to effectively change the future 
                                                 
367 see UNODC: The United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Article 6, see online:  
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political and social development of the country. Therefore, UNODC has not only developed 
teaching programmes including the youth and teachers but it has also developed several 
awareness raising campaigns to reach an even wider audience through TV commercials which are 
being shown at CNN for example and which create awareness that “every individual can 
contribute to this process of fighting corruption”. 
 
As to the measurement of corruption , Mrs. Souza Martins, responds to the difficulty of doing so. 
Leading international anti-corruption NGO’s, such as Transparancy International, work with a 
“Corruption Perception Index”369, which is conducted through interviews and surveys which take 
place in order to measure the perception of corruption in the specific country.  
 
The UNODC has itself developed a methodology to assess corruption in the justice sector 
through a questionnaire. This questionnaire was sent in the specific country to different actors of 
the judicial system, which are judges, lawyers, prosecutors, prisoners, court clerks, etc. “asking 
them about objective facts which have or have not happened in a specific country”. This 
questionnaire370 helps to asses “the integrity and the capacity of the justice sector”, so Mrs. Souza 
Martins. According to Mrs. Souza Martins it is important to make a distinction whether “you talk 
about corruption in a system or about the inefficiency of a system”. So a needs analysis of the 
UNODC is not only about measuring corruption, it’s about identifying the factors of an 
ineffective system and the location of factors which make a country vulnerable to corruption.  
 
One of the obstacles faced by many countries in curbing corruption can be for Mrs. Souza 
Martins the lack of political will in the legislative, executive and judiciary branches. It is often 
difficult to find a political will located in all these three branches at the same time, explains Mrs. 
Souza Martins.  
 
To summarize the outputs of this interview, I can therefore say that corruption is a very sensitive 
field to analyze and to work in. For the location and identification of the most important factors 
that lead to corruption it is hence important to develop a detailed field-based assessment of the 
situation in a country and locate the factors and also sectors which are most important to fight 
corruption. Apart from this, effective anti-corruption needs to integrate the most important 
                                                 
369 see the Corruption Perception Index, carried out by Transparency International online: 
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stakeholders of a country, as well as a broad and engaged civil society to create an anti-corruption 
body and especially education on this subject, which is the most important and sustainable fact 
for promoting the development of a corruption-free country.  
4.3.2  A short analysis on Pakistan’s situation of corruption 
Transparency International, as the biggest international anti-corruption NGO, has developed 
effective tools and methods in order to measure corruption in the various countries. One of these 
tools is the “Corruption Perception Index (CPI)”, which is carried out annually. The CPI 2008 
has done a ranking of all countries based on sources taken from and surveys conducted with 12 
different leading institutions, and analyzed by country experts to evaluate and measure the extent 
of corruption in the various countries.371 According to this ranking of Transparency International, 
Pakistan is hence ranked with number 139 from 183 countries in total. A “National Perception 
Corruption Index” was carried out by Transparency International Pakistan asking 4000 
respondents in urban and semi-urban areas in Pakistan 2006 through questionnaires about their 
perception of corruption in the different sectors in Pakistan. The survey identified the “Police, 
Power, Judiciary and Land” as the most corrupt departments: 
 
2006 Ranking 2002 Ranking 
1. Police 1. Police 
2. Power 2. Power 
3. Judiciary 3. Taxation 
4. Land 4. Judiciary 
5. Taxation 5. Custom 
6. Custom 6. Health 
7. Health 7. Land 
8. Education 8. Education 
9. Railway 9. Railway 
10. Bank 10. Bank 
Figure 12: Corrupt departments in Pakistan 2002/2006372 
 
The report makes out following main reasons which were indicated by the respondents of this 
survey: A moral misbehaviour in terms of a lack of accountability and discretionary power and in 
terms of inefficient socio-economic structures such as a low salary of government employees.373 
                                                 
371 For the exact methodology carried out by TI see: http://www.transparency.de/Methodologische-
Hinweise.1078.0.html, 29.01.2009. 
372 The category “Power” refers to the different “power agencies” such as WAPDA (Water and Power 
Development Authority) as well as the KESC (Karachi Electric Supply Corporation); see the National 
Perception Corruption report online:  
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases_nc/2006/2006_08_11_ti_pakistan
_national_survey, 29.01.2009. 
373 Ibd. 
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The National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS) 2002 carried out by the National Accountability 
Bureau (NAB) gives a detailed report on the situation of corruption in Pakistan.  
 
The NACS points out that causes of corruption in modern-day Pakistan lie in the “need or 
greed”374 of the people, which again have to be seen in a wider context. This means that 
corruption in Pakistan needs to be analyzed in different sectors and the conditions within these 
sectors. This analysis of the NACS thus presents following reasons for the overall prospering in 
Pakistan: 
 
Economic: Inadequate pay, pensions and public service provision, plus large 
families; 
Social/cultural: Conflict between demands of modern bureaucracy and demands 
of baradri [=caste, S.S.], family, ethnic and other ties; social pressures for 
ostentatious demonstration of wealth, dowry and to provide for one’s children ; 
Developmental: Low rates of literacy, social empowerment and opportunities for 
self-improvement; inequitable distribution of wealth and economic growth; 
Political: the feudal power structure at the rural level; low levels of political 
competition; political instability, and intermittent military rule, have weakened 
institutions; with poor example set by politicians; 
Legal and judicial: Justice is inaccessible, slow and selective, encouraging 
contempt for the law and an attitude of "everyone for themselves. 375 
 
Additionally, NACS argues that the various institutions in Pakistan are extremely weak and 
ineffective. My focal point will lie on the situation given in the judiciary as briefly discussed 
before and because it is perceived as one of the most corrupt sectors in Pakistan, which has 
following the analysis given in this chapter also the biggest relevance in the political situation in 
Pakistan in the given time framework. 
 
The judiciary in Pakistan is a very vulnerable sector as to corruption in Pakistan. The NACS 
states that:  
 
The problem of corruption is acute in the subordinate judiciary, where money 
has to be paid at virtually every step of the judicial process in order to make it 
move forward or halt the process altogether.376 
 
Causes for this are seen in the demotivation of clients by lawyers, in weak legal education of law 
students which result in “shallow knowledge of law”377 of these students and a “lack of control 
                                                 
374 see National Accountability Bureau (NAB): “National Anti-Corruption Strategy”, Islamabad: 2002, p. 
14. 
375 Ibd., p. 15.  
376 Ibd., p. 57. 
377 Ibd., p. 58. 
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and discipline of practicing lawyers”378. Next to this it is often argued that the judiciary is neither 
independent enough and that there is a decline of standards within the judiciary.379 Infrastructural 
settings such as the poor salary of judges and the perceived nepotism in the selection of judges 
can be seen as further problems for the prospering of corruption.380  
The corruption within judiciary381 becomes especially a big political issue whenever there is a new 
military intervention and martial law imposed in the country, which has the result that the 
judiciary is actually giving legitimacy to such political actions: 
 
The government exerts tight control over judicial appointments, transfers and 
dismissals, particularly at the level of the superior judiciary382. 
 
The International Crisis Group383 and Transparency International have thus demanded a reform 
of the judicial sector in Pakistan to prevent negative future political developments within the 
country. 
                                                 
378 Ibd. 
379 Ibd.  
380 Ibd. 
381 The judiciary is every time used to re-swear an oath to the amended constitution by the various military 
rulers; see: Siddiqui, Jawed A.: “A tradition of judicial subservience“, in: Transparency International (Ed.): 
“Corruption and Judicial Systems”, p. 245 see online:  
http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/download_gcr/download_gcr_2007#acknowledge, 
29.01.2009. 
382 Ibd. 
383 See the recommendations of the International Crisis Group in: ICG (2007): p. ii-iii. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
My thesis offers a hermeneutical and empirical approach towards the issue of identity formation 
in Pakistan. The hermeneutical part of this thesis focuses on the different political, historical, 
social and psychological components within this debate and provides the reader with the 
necessary ontological framework to understand the empirical part of my thesis which consists of 
my study on the political identities of Pakistani students in Lahore.  
Thus, my thesis starts with an introduction of my research methodology depicting the various 
steps that have led me towards my research. Beginning from a preview of literature, it concludes 
with my six main hypotheses which have guided me in my research plan: 
1. Pakistani identity is strongly based on Islamic values which become the outline of Pakistani lifestyle and 
policy. 
2. Pakistani identity is strongly based on Islam, which becomes the basis for Pakistani nationalism. 
3. Dominant Pakistani self-images are strongly defined by a negation of India. 
4. The postulated “Indian danger” manifests itself in a general feeling of insecurity in the Pakistani society. 
5. The phenomenon of nationalism in Pakistan and the fear of India create a feeling of insecurity, which 
leads to a higher disposition for violence. 
6. The student milieu is a fertile ground for retrieving a great political potential that lies within the 
Pakistani society. 
 
These hypotheses have equally structured the hermeneutical part of my paper, chapter two and 
the empirical part of my paper, chapter three. Chapter two generally gives a picture on Pakistan’s 
political culture by trying to recreate the genesis of Pakistan’s debate on identity. The birth of the 
Pakistani nation is shown through the various factors inherent in this debate. The historical factor 
depicts the political landscape of India in the pre-Partition phase and identifies the most 
important actors that have led towards the independence of India and the creation of Pakistan. 
Muhammed Ali Jinnah becomes here the most important person, who, as shown in the part on 
the political factor, has given a name to Muslim nationalism on the Indian subcontinent and 
promoted and reinforced the idea of Pakistan. The psychological factor is equally a very 
important part in this debate, as it looks at Partition from two different perspectives. From a 
sociological perspective by discussing the concept of violence in the context of Partition, which 
in itself has been seen as the “rape of mother India” which has resulted in intensive sexual 
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violence in the aim of destroying the honour of the “other”. On the other hand, Partition 1947 
has led to the creation of the “India-syndrome” which shapes the discourse on Pakistani identity 
by negating India as part of the Pakistani identity. Pakistan’s realpolitik, especially Pakistan’s role 
and its policies in the Kashmir conflict mirror several psychological aspects that have their origin 
in Partition 1947. 
 
Chapter two equally depicts Pakistan’s quest for its identity. On the one hand, Pakistan’s identity 
is strongly influenced by Islam and often propagated as “Islamic identity”, which is justified by 
the political implementation of Islam in Pakistan through the various constitutions and 
constitutional amendments that Pakistan has had and in which Islam was always given a different 
status. Islam has also become part of the social structure in Pakistan, as the official language of 
Pakistan – Urdu – as the identity marker of the Pakistani people has been interpreted as the 
language of Muslims and thus has been promoted in Pakistan. Religious instruction in schools 
has equally been structured according to the Islamic understanding of the Pakistani nation and its 
identity. 
 
Almost opposed to the “Islamic identity” stands the concept of “ethnic identity”: In many 
regions, the ethnic identity has been much more developed due to long historical processes than 
the Islamic identity itself. These ideological divergences between these two concepts have had its 
eruptions in various political events throughout Pakistan’s political history where different leaders 
have tried to islamsize the country in order to appease ethnic nationalism or separatism. This has, 
among others, also led to the growing power of the army in Pakistan and marked Pakistan’s 
history of military regimes. 
 
The last part of chapter two is dedicated to the education system in Pakistan – a threefold system 
of an English vernacular education, an Urdu vernacular education or a madrassah education. The 
education received in these different systems shapes the formation of the various different 
identities of Pakistani students according to the school system they have attended. 
 
At this point my own study finds its justification, which is shown in chapter three. Along three 
different units of analysis – 1) identity, 2) attitudes towards the Pakistani citizenship, government 
and the army, and 3) threats – I have presented the results of my questionnaire and my 
interviews. This data was collected in three different universities, at the Punjab University, a 
public university with relatively low student fees providing a large number of students from 
different social classes higher education, at the King Edward’s College, a public medical 
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university with medium high tuition fees with a very mixed background of students, and at the 
Lahore University of Management and Sciences, a private university with very high student fees, 
attended by students from rich families. The results have shown that indeed the student bodies 
from the different universities show different patterns of opinions and attitudes that constitute a 
mainstream thinking, but which are too diverse to classify three different consolidated political 
identities of these student bodies in Lahore. Conservative or liberal trends can be found in each 
of these three universities. 
 
The fourth chapter analyzes three major political events, the chief justice affair in March 2007, 
the Lal Masjid operation in July 2007, and the imposition of a state of emergency in November 
2007, which have taken place before, during or after the collection of my data (July – September 
2007). This political analysis, especially a constellation analysis of the most important actors in 
the political landscape, helps locate the student’s opinions and attitudes and shows their position 
in the Pakistani society, where they have constituted to a major protest movement against the 
then current military regime of Pervez Musharraf. The final part of my paper then identifies 
corruption as one of the most important problem fields within the political crisis in Pakistan and 
draws first a general picture on how corruption can be fought by introducing the work of the 
UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) and second by a closer look on the 
corruption scene in Pakistan. 
 
To conclude with the methodological structure of my thesis it is hence important to come back 
to my initial hypotheses and discuss them in the light of my results.  
 
My first two hypotheses are strongly based on the Islamic orientation of the Pakistani identity 
and its influence on Pakistani lifestyle and nationalism: 
 
1. Pakistani identity is strongly based on Islamic values which become the outline of Pakistani lifestyle and 
policy. 
2. Pakistani identity is strongly based on Islam, which becomes the basis for Pakistani nationalism. 
 
The hermeneutical and empirical parts have shown that indeed Islam does play an important role 
for the identity of this country and its citizens. Although I can definitely conclude from my study, 
that Islam is an important source for the formation of the personal identity, it is important to 
highlight that the use of Islam for constructing the personal identity and for structuring ones 
personal lifestyle is very diverse and dependent on various individual attitudes.  
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As to the second hypothesis, the hermeneutical part of my paper has shown that for discussing 
Pakistan’s identity it would be wrong to omit the ethnic identity of the Pakistani people, as ethnic 
movements and separatistic movements based on ethnic demands have a high potential for 
raising nationalistic tendencies and constituting Pakistani nationalism. 
 
My next three hypotheses are entirely focused on India’s image in Pakistan. As the literature 
often highlights the “enemy”-image of India, I have given India an important role when it comes 
to Pakistani identity, when it comes to explaining the feeling of insecurity in Pakistan and thus 
the violent disposition of the Pakistani society, as manifested in various violent events in 
Pakistan. 
 
3. Dominant Pakistani self-images are strongly defined by a negation of India. 
4. The postulated “Indian danger” manifests itself in a general feeling of insecurity in the Pakistani society. 
5. The phenomenon of nationalism in Pakistan and the fear of India create a feeling of insecurity, which lead 
to a higher disposition for violence. 
 
After conducting my survey, though, I have to falsify each of these three hypotheses. My 
results have shown that my students at least have a very tolerant image towards India, and 
that the feeling of insecurity can be made out in other factors, such as Pakistan’s domestic 
politics and the country’s perpetual fallback into military regimes. 
 
My last hypothesis focuses on the role of the students in Pakistan: 
 
6. The student milieu is a fertile ground for retrieving a great political potential that lies within the 
Pakistani society. 
 
As the youngest intellectual layer of the Pakistani society, the potential that can be found 
within this group is very big. My survey has shown that students are very “politicized”: They 
are very interested in politics and show a lot of interest towards political affairs. The recent 
political events, especially the chief justice affair and the imposition of a state of emergency in 
Pakistan, have shown that there is indeed a great political potential hidden within the students 
in Lahore. 
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Attachment 
 
Questionnaire on Pakistani Identity  
 
        Interview no.:_________ 
         
 
I. Personal Information: 
 
a) Age: _______________ 
b) Sex:  ⁯ Male  ⁯ Female 
c) Study Program:_____________ 
d) Study Year:________________ 
e) Nationality:________________ 
f) Religion:__________________ 
g) Mother tongue:____________ 
h) city of birth:_______________ 
i) Marital Status: ⁯ single ⁯ engaged ⁯ married ⁯ divorced ⁯ in a relationship 
j) Profession of Parents:  Mother:___________ 
Father:___________ 
 
II. General Information:  
 
1. We are all part of different groups. Some are more important to us than others when we 
think of ourselves. In general, which in the following list is most important to you in describing 
who you are?  
 Ve
ry
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a
t 
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a. Your nationality     
b. Your ethnic background, which is: ___________     
c. My mother tongue, which is: ___________     
d. Your religion, which is:______________     
e. Your sex, which is: ⁯ Male  ⁯ Female     
f. Your family     
g. Your marital status, which is  
⁯ single ⁯ engaged ⁯ married ⁯ divorced ⁯ in a 
relationship 
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III. Nationalism 
 
1. How close do you feel to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. How important are the following things for you to define yourself as fully Pakistani? 
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To be a Muslim      
To be patriotic      
To have a Pakistani nationality      
To speak Urdu      
To vote in Pakistani elections      
h. Your friends     
i. Your studies     
j. Your preferred political party or movement, which 
is:__________________ 
    
k. The city you live in, which is: _____________     
 V
e
ry
 c
lo
se
 
C
lo
se
 
N
o
t 
v
e
ry
 c
lo
se
 
N
o
t 
cl
o
se
 a
t 
a
ll 
a. Pakistan     
b. India     
c. The United States     
d. The Muslim World     
e. Islam     
f. Urdu     
g. Your mother tongue     
h. English     
i. Arabic     
Other things I feel close to: 
__________________________ 
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Being part of a political organization or 
movement, which is: ________________ 
     
Other criteria: 
________________________ 
     
 
 
3. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
 
 A
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a. It is my duty to honour Pakistan’s history.     
b. I am proud of the Pakistani nationality.     
c. When I see the Pakistani flag, I feel overwhelmed by pride for my 
country. 
    
d. I love Pakistan.     
e. I have a strong emotional commitment towards Pakistan.     
f. Pakistan’s victories in sports are important to me.     
g. I wish that Pakistan becomes more powerful on the international level.     
h. I think that there should be more patriotism in Pakistan.     
i. India should learn from us.     
j. Western countries should learn from us.     
k. Pakistan should only help other countries if it is of national advantage for 
Pakistan. 
    
 
4. In every country there are things which one is proud or ashamed of. If this is the case can u please 
state what these elements are? 
a) I am proud of: 
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
___ 
b) I am ashamed of: 
____________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________ 
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IV. History: 
 
1. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
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a. Partition 1947 was an important step towards promoting Muslim Identity 
on the Indian Subcontinent. 
     
b. The communal riots in British India and today India show that Hindus and 
Muslims cannot live together in one country. 
     
c. I feel the creation of Pakistan was a legitimate step to secure Muslims 
safety on the Indian subcontinent. 
     
d. I feel that Bangladesh was in the wrong to get separated from Pakistan.      
e. I feel that the Islamization policy of Pakistani governments were a good 
thing for Pakistan. 
     
f. I feel that Pakistan has suffered from a lot of injustice during partition.      
 
2. When you think of the history of Pakistan since Partition 1947, which is according to you the event 
that has mostly marked Pakistani society? 
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Every country is scarred by societal conflicts. Which conflicts according to you mark most your 
country? 
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
4. Which are according to you the most important historical events in the history of Pakistan? 
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Is there according to you any historical Pakistani figure that you would want to still be alive 
today? If yes, please state who and why this person is important to you. 
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 ______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
V. Kashmir: 
 
1. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
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a. Pakistan has full right to claim all of Kashmir.      
b. India is doing injustice to the Muslims living in Kashmir.      
c. The Muslims in Kashmir need a strong military support from Pakistan.      
d. Pakistan should continue the fight over Kashmir with India.      
e. I think that the UN should play a greater role in the Kashmir conflict.      
f. I believe that the Kashmir conflict violates Pakistan’s izzat.      
g. The only way to establish the izzat of Pakistan is to recover Kashmir from 
India. 
     
h. Pakistan has to do Jihad in order to free Kashmir from the Indian 
invaders. 
     
 
2. Do you think the Kashmir - conflict justifies the animosity between India and Pakistan? Please 
explain your answer. 
⁯ yes, because 
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
⁯ no, because 
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. How would you react, if Kashmir was lost by Pakistan and went to India? 
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
Pakistani Self –Images 
1. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
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a. I would rather be a citizen of Pakistan than of any other country in the 
world. 
     
b. The world would be a better place if people from other countries were 
more like Pakistanis. 
     
c. Generally speaking, Pakistan is a better country, than most of the other 
countries. 
     
d. People should support their country even if their country is in the wrong.      
e. If Pakistan does well in international sports, it makes me proud to be a 
Pakistani. 
     
f. Urdu and Hindi is one language with two faces.      
g. I am proud of Political Parties and movements who want to islamisize the 
country. 
     
h. Pakistan needs a stronger army so as to defend itself.      
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2. How proud are you of Pakistan in each of the following? 
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a. The current Pakistani government      
b. The political system in Pakistan      
c. Pakistan’s political influence in the world      
d. The Pakistani army      
e. Pakistan’s foreign policy towards India      
f. Pakistan’s foreign policy towards the United States      
g. Pakistan’s history      
h. Pakistan’s achievement in literature      
i. Pakistan’s achievement in art      
j. Pakistan’s achievement in music      
k. Pakistan’s achievement in sports      
l. Other:      
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Muslim Identity: 
 
1. In case you are Muslim, which of these elements are very important, fairly important, important, 
not important at all to define yourself as a Muslim? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
 
 
 A
g
re
e
 
st
ro
n
g
ly
 
A
g
re
e
 
D
is
a
g
re
e
 
D
is
a
g
re
e
 
st
ro
n
g
ly
 
C
a
n
’t
 c
h
o
o
se
 
a. Thinking of the controversy on the Mohammed cartoons I feel that 
Muslim Identity is at stake. 
     
 
b. Thinking of the Pope’s statement on Islam I feel that Muslim Identity is 
constantly at stake. 
     
c. I feel that the Western world is hostile towards the Muslim world.      
d. I feel that Muslims all over the world suffer a lot of injustice.      
e. When I think of the injustice suffered by Muslims around the world, I get 
angry.  
     
f. I believe that Pakistani Muslim Identity needs to be defended through 
Jihad. 
     
g. I believe that Muslim Identity needs to be strengthened.      
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a. To pray 5 times a day     
b. To fast in Ramadan.     
c. To dress in an Islamic 
way. 
    
d. To obey your parents     
e. To defend your 
country 
    
f. To respect Pakistani 
traditions 
    
Other:      
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Perception of the other 
 
Pakistan and India 
 
1. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
 
 A
g
re
e
 
st
ro
n
g
ly
 
A
g
re
e
 
D
is
a
g
re
e
 
D
is
a
g
re
e
 
st
ro
n
g
ly
 
C
a
n
’t
 c
h
o
o
se
 
Islam is an important factor so as to differentiate Pakistan from India.      
Hinduism is a national threat to Islam.      
I believe that Hindus and Muslims cannot live together peacefully in one 
country. 
     
Pakistan has more in common with other Muslim countries than with India.      
When I think of India, I think of all the injustice that India has passed on 
Pakistan. 
     
India is Pakistan’s biggest enemy. 
 
     
I believe that there can never be peace between India and Pakistan.      
History has proven that India has no intention to be friendly with Pakistan.      
A dialogue between India and Pakistan is not possible, as they are too 
different. 
     
I feel that India has more political power on the international level than 
Pakistan does. 
     
India always blames Pakistan for every bomb blast in their country.      
 
 
3. How would you feel if India gets a permanent seat in the UN-security council? 
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Imagine there was a current war between India and Pakistan. Would you consider joining the army 
to defend your country? 
 
⁯ yes  ⁯ no    
5. In case of a war between India and Pakistan, would you approve the help of Islamist organizations 
to fight India? 
 
⁯ yes  ⁯ no    
 
6. How would you feel if in a war between India and Pakistan, India was supported by the United 
States? 
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
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7. How do you feel when India falsely accuses Pakistan for any violent attack (like a bomb blast) in 
India? 
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
7. If you were the president of Pakistan and had the power over the Pakistani army, how would you 
react in case of a war between India and Pakistan? 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Pakistan and the United States 
 
1. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
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I believe that the United States of America and Pakistan should have more 
political ties. 
     
I believe that the USA is an important ally of Pakistan in the fight against 
terrorism. 
     
I believe that the USA is an important political partner for Pakistan against 
India. 
     
I think that the United States should cooperate less with India and more 
with Pakistan. 
     
America’s foreign policy helps to fight international terrorism.      
I believe that Bush is a good American president.      
 
 
Aggression Potential 
 
 
1. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
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“We should fight Indian soldiers who torture our Muslim brothers and sisters 
in Kashmir!” 
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“The only way we can get respect from India is, when we show them who is 
stronger!” 
     
“Pakistan aur India ke darmian kabhi nahin dosti ho sakti hai isle andaar se 
ek dusre se nafrat karte hai!“  
     
I approve a defensive Pakistani foreign policy towards India.      
I would approve a military strike against India in case the violence in 
Kashmir reaches an unexpected intensity of violence. 
     
 
 
2. Can you sympathize with Moslems living in India? 
 
⁯ yes  ⁯ no    
 
 
3. What do you feel, when you hear about Hindu-Muslim escalations in India? 
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. How would you react, if your university would allow Hindu students to study at your University? 
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. How would you react if you had a Hindu as a neighbour? 
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Culture: 
 
1. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
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Increased imports of Indian Films and Music is damaging our national and 
local culture. 
     
Increased imports of Western Films and Music is damaging our national and 
local culture. 
     
I feel it’s a shame that Pakistani actors and actresses play in Indian dramas 
and movies. 
     
I feel that India is more modern than is Pakistan.      
I think Pakistan should promote more the film- and music sector.      
I prefer that famous Pakistani artists stay in Pakistan and don’t go to India 
to make more money. 
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2. Would you like to visit India one day? 
 
⁯ yes  ⁯ no    
 
 
 
Society: 
 
1. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
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I feel that my country has very strict social and religious norms so as to how 
behave with other people. 
     
I have difficulties following traditional roles as how to behave.      
Children should always honour their parents, even if they are in the wrong.      
I approve of the strong separation of sexes in Pakistan.      
Girls need to cover properly so as to be protected from assaults from the 
male sex. 
     
I approve of arranged marriages.      
I approve of love marriages.      
Girls have equal chances like boys in Pakistani society.      
The reputation of Girls is particularly interesting as it clings/rests upon the 
izzat of a family. 
     
 
 
2. Would you like to move to another country one day? If yes, in which one and why? If not, why not? 
⁯ yes in ____________,  because 
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
⁯ no, because 
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Abstract 
This paper presents a study on the political identities of Pakistani students in Lahore. Through a 
self-conducted study in a field research in Lahore from July to September 2007 the attitudes and 
opinions of three different student bodies in Lahore in regard of Pakistani politics and Pakistani 
identity were gathered and analysed in the light of the identity formation discourse in Pakistan. 
Thus, this paper starts with a hermeneutical approach analysing Pakistan’s political culture 
through a close look on the genesis of Pakistan’s creation and the following national identity 
discourse. This genesis is being looked at through different parameters such as political, historical 
and psychological components within this debate, which influences the education of young 
people in Pakistan. The education in Pakistan which is characterized by a threefold system: an 
English vernacular system, an Urdu vernacular system and a madrassah system, is the outcome 
and core of a big identity issue in Pakistan, which significantly shapes a student’s view on the 
world. 
This is where the empirical part of the paper connects. The study which was carried out through 
a questionnaire and with additional semi-structured interviews with students analyzes their 
responses and portrays the results of the survey along three different units of analysis: 1) identity 
2) attitudes towards the Pakistani government, citizenship and army, and 3) perceived threats. 
The study shows that the students from different social backgrounds do show a core mainstream 
thinking towards specific issues, whereas one consolidated identity even within one student body 
cannot be made out, as all nuances from conservative to very liberal can be found in each 
institution. 
The political potential of students is not only remarkable through the presented study but shows 
itself within their political activism, which gathered high relevance during the events of the chief 
justice affair in march 2007 and the imposition of a state of emergency by president Pervez 
Musharraf in November 2007. The political potential located within this group finds its place 
within Pakistani civil society in the demand for a just Pakistan. A constellation analysis of the 
Pakistani political landscape, its major actors and its biggest problem fields, such as corruption, 
embed the student’s initiative in the current debate on Pakistan’s political development. 
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Im Zentrum dieser Arbeit liegt die Präsentation einer Studie über politischen Identitäten von 
pakistanischen StudentInnen in Lahore. Die von Juli bis September 2007 selbst durchgeführte 
Studie im Rahmen einer Feldforschung vor Ort zeigt die unterschiedlichen Einstellungen und 
Meinungen von StudentInnen in Bezug auf pakistanische Politik und ihre eigene Identität auf 
und analysiert sie im Rahmen von Identitätsdiskursen in Pakistan. 
Der hermeneutische Teil der Arbeit identifiziert die pakistanische politische Kultur als zentrales 
Analyseelement und betrachtet sie anhand verschiedener politischer, historischer und 
psychologischer Parameter in der Auseinandersetzung der Debatte um eine pakistanische 
Identität, welche ausschlaggebend für die Erziehung junger Menschen in Pakistan ist. Das 
dreigliedrige Bildungssystem in Pakistan – ein Englisch geprägtes Bildungssystem, ein Urdu 
geprägtes Bildungssystem und ein Madrassah Bildungssystem - ist nicht nur Ursache sondern 
auch Problem einer Identitätsdebatte in Pakistan, welche die Ansichten und Weltanschauungen 
jener StudentInnen signifikant formt. 
An dieser Stelle setzt die Arbeit mit einem empirischen Teil fort: Die Analyse und Auswertung 
eines Fragebogens und zusätzliche semi-strukturierte Interviews mit StudentInnen von drei 
verschiedenen Universitäten, die alle unterschiedliche Schichten von StudentInnen unterrichten. 
Die Auswertung fokussiert vor allem auf drei spezifische Analyseeinheiten: 1) Identität, 
2) Einstellungen gegenüber pakistanischer Regierung, Staatsbürgerschaft und Armee sowie 
3) wahrgenommenen Bedrohungen. Die Ergebnisse der Studie zeichnen ein Bild von drei 
verschiedenen Studentenkörpern, die zwar ein jeweils unterschiedliches Mainstream-Denken in 
Bezug auf bestimmte Fragen aufzeigen, jedoch aufgrund unterschiedlicher sozialer Hintergründe 
und verschiedener Nuancen politischer Einstellungen von konservativ bis liberal keine 
konsolidierte politische Identität repräsentieren. 
Das politische Potenzial, das in dieser Gruppe steckt, findet sich nicht nur im empirischen Teil 
wieder, sondern ist erkennbar in dem politischem Aktivismus der StudentInnen, was vor allem in 
den letzten Jahren auf Grund der Absetzung des Richters des Obersten Gerichtshof im März 
2007 sowie durch die Verhängung des Ausnahmezustandes in Pakistan durch Präsident Pervez 
Musharraf im November 2007 an hoher Relevanz gewonnen hat. Jenes politische Potenzial 
innerhalb der StudentInnen ist somit Teil der pakistanischen Zivilgesellschaft im Kampf für ein 
gerechtes Pakistan. Eine Konstellationsanalyse der politischen Landschaft Pakistans, ihrer 
wichtigsten Akteuren, sowie der größten politischen Problemfelder Pakistans wie etwa 
Korruption, bettet den politischen Aktivismus jener StudentInnen in die aktuelle Debatte um 
Pakistans politische Entwicklung ein. 
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